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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation the author reflects on the absence and presence of God within Christianity. This is 
accomplished through engaging and seeking to understand key conversations following the Copernican 
Revolution and the-death-of God . The goal is to understand and model how it is that Christianity 
defines itself as a faith tied to knowing God and yet is appraised by many as a religion characterized 
by God's conspicuous silence, absence and death. These are 'God after God' conversations understood 
to include contributions from philosophers, Essentialists, and Christians following the-death-of 
God. With these 'God after God' conversations are tied to the institutional expression of Christianity 
and  the diversification of and within religion during the modern era. It is with this in mind that the 
conjunction and disjunction between Christianity as religion, spirituality, and mysticism can perhaps 














 From ana- as in after- or return-, meaning the return of the question of God and the return to the 
conversation about God specifically after the-death-of God.
 Amnetheism/Amnetheist/Amnetheistic
 From the Greek word amnesia (Αμνησία), the forgetting of or loss of memories. This is used in 
the context of the anatheistic conversations as those leaning toward the forgetting of God as in the 
losing of or being done with the God who is silent, absent and perhaps dead in the sense of never 
having lived to begin with.
	 Anamnētheism/Anamnētheist/Anamnētheistic
 From the Greek word anamnēsis (Ανάμνηση), the remembering of or recollection of what a 
memory that is forgotten. This is used in this context as the opposite of amnesia, in the sense of 
remembering the God who has been forgotten, the wanting to hear the voice of God again after it 
has been realized that God has ceased speaking, the company of God after it has been realized that 
God has left, seeking to join in the activity of God after realizing that we no longer see what God 
is doing.
 Askesis
 From the Greek word askesis (άσκησις), here understood as the practices, disciplines, and habits of 
the mystics addressing the heart and mind of the mystic through embodied relational practices.
 Catholicism
 The early Christian church or 'ekklesia' (ἐκκλησία) is separated by worldview, geography and 
time from the post-Christendom expression thereof as Catholicism. In this dissertation we speak 
of Catholicism in the singular and as loose concept we can bundle Orthodoxy into. This is to 
gain a handle on the Orthodoxy as a constellation of paradigms, or worldview, and differentiate 
it for the purpose of reflection from Protestantism. It should not be taken to mean that Orthodoxy 
is in any way singular, centralized, or monolithic. Instead, it is a recognition that Catholicism is 
drawn together through a shared constellation of paradigms as foundationally Orthodox and yet 
practically distinct from Protestantism.
 Constructivism
 Here the work of Steven T. Katz and collaborators addressing concerns with early essentialism in 
light of continued research into mysticism related, perhaps primarily, to mystical texts.
 The-death-of God
 The argument that God is not only silent and absent but also dead in the sense of never having existed 
to begin with. The phrase is attributed to Nietzsche but it reflects the transition in world(view) 
from that of Christendom as a sacral age publicly defined as religious to modern society publicly 
defined as secular.
 Essentialism
 Here as ‘Essentialism’ is the later work of Robert K.C. Forman and collaborators and the ‘early 
essentialism’ (perennialism) reflecting early thinkers about the essential nature of the plurality of 
and within spirituality, religion and mysticism.
 “Expérience”
 The adoption of the French word “expérience” that blends together the English ‘experiment’ 
and ‘experience’. The idea being that expérience may produce data in relation to persons as 
simultaneously experimenter and experiment within the active participant.
 Fideism
 The faithful belief in God usually apart from experience and as subject to the formal and orthodox 
expression of Christianity.
 Orthodoxy
 Here Christian Orthodoxy is understood to precede Monasticism, Christendom and then comes to 
be expressed as Catholicism and Protestantism. To be “orthodox” is to agree on the fundamentals 
related to the Christian faith and is used here in a more expansive sense than, say, meaning the 
Oriental Orthodox Church or the Eastern Orthodox Church.
 Protestantism
 The early Christian church or 'ekklesia' (ἐκκλησία) is separated by worldview, geography and time 
from the post-Christendom expression thereof as Protestantism. In this dissertation we speak of 
Protestantism in the singular as broad generalization. This enables us to incorporate the varieties 
denominations, movements, and independent churches without getting lost in the details. However, 
Protestantism is by no means singular or centralized and is instead drawn together through a shared 
constellation of paradigms. Here we recognize that the collection of paradigms, or worldview, 
drawing Protestantism together is foundationally Orthodox and yet Protestantism is practically 
distinct from Catholicism.
 Realism and non-realism
 Here particularly focused on the ontology of God, meaning whether God is understood to be an 
idea or idea that one relates to or an apprehensible reality such as Śūnyatā (Emptiness) underlying 
the Cosmos or Šeḵînâ (self-revealing Person). We thus seek to distinguish between the-idea-of God 
as  internalized within individuals and institutionalized within the Church and the-reality-of God as 
Person engaged by people.
 “Quies”
 An inner place or state of quietness, stillness and solitude practiced by mystics-to-be and mystics. 
Here it is understood as internal state-place cultivated through practices (askesis).
	 Saḷāyatana
 In Theravāda Buddhism Salayatana speaks of the six sense organs as sight, sound, touch, taste, 
smell and the mind. This is understand here as the internal reflection of our external senses (sight, 
sound, touch, taste, smell) which includes the imagination and conceptual capabilities of the 
thinker (sight, sound, touch, taste, smell, imagination). Here the internal senses mirror the external 
and play a role not only in the imaginative life of the individual but also in their capacity to intuit, 
apprehend and relate to the non-local and transcendent.
	 Śūnyatā
 The Sanskrit Śūnyatā (Language: Sanskrit, meaning the Emptiness) along with annata (Language: 
Pali, also meaning Emptiness) and suññata (Language: Pali, also meaning Emptiness and the 
Pali word for the Sanskrit Śūnyatā) are used as interrelated concepts. They are borrowed from 
Buddhism and here abstracted for the purpose of the conversation. Here Śūnyatā refers to the 
Emptiness of Nature as the totality of the Cosmos or Space-Time continuum; annata is used to 
refer to the Emptiness of our world(view) s and religions and their conditional existence as human 
and evolving creations; and suññata to the Emptiness of our social and public self of the individual.
 World(view)
 Usually ‘world view’ or ‘worldview’ but here ‘world(view)’ as unifying era and worldview. This 
also draws a constant visual distinction between the world and our view of the world.
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Introduction
In this dissertation we explore presently occurring conversations that follow the-death-of God. These 
are conversations followed by an exploration of the question of God returning not on the basis of the 
conclusions of the-death-of God within modernity nor on the terms of the defence of the classical 
religious positions of Christian pre-dating the modern. The returning question instead proceeds with 
the understanding that following the Copernican Revolution that politics, philosophy and theology 
have become decidedly “modern” without being good conversation partners with each other. The 
returning question of God follows modernity and therewith the politics, philosophy and religion of 
modernity. Within modernity the validity of the Christian faith and the practice of Christianity were 
re-conceived after Christendom with the modern secular and religious world(view) s reflecting the-
death-of God that had already taken place. The returning question of God returns on its own terms 
with the recognition that modern society, including the discrete activities of the secular and religious, 
is characterised by God’s absence. Here we explore the-death-of God conversations taking place 
within modern philosophy, the quest for what mysticism ‘is’ and modern Christianity. This brings 
us to an exploration, or thought experiment, as considering the question of God anew and afresh as 
moving on from the-death-of God.
This dissertation proceeds with the recognition of stepping into a conversation that has been going 
on for a long time and recognizing that we all will leave our lives before it is ever completed. This is 
not so much the conversation as covered in this dissertation but as a broader historical conversation 
that has already taken place over preceding centuries. What follows as a series of chapters exploring 
the problem of God’s absence and presence steps between the world(view) s of modernity and post-
modernity with the researcher having a foot in each world(view). This is, then, a conversation that 
takes place between two co-existing world(view) s. The goal of the research is perhaps less to arrive 
at a conclusion than at an inconclusion. We arrive at our inconclusion through a series of chapters 
where we mostly grapple with the problem of God as having already taken place within Modernity 
as proceeding from the-death-of God. Yet we aim to understand the returning question of God after 
Modernity as also after the Christianity of Modernity. For the returning question of God is one that 
arrives afresh “after” Modernity as both after the-death-of God and after the Christianity of Modernity.
M.Th. Timothy Victor Student #: 3182-738-1 7
List 1 Overview of the dissertation:
1.1 In Chapter 1: Introduction, we introduce the research and provide a brief outline of 
the chapters to follow.
1.2 In Chapter 2: Research methodology, we consider modelling and reflection as 
methodologies drawn together to explore God’s absence in modern philosophy, 
mysticism and Christianity.
1.3 In Chapters 4-6 we explore the ‘God after God’ conversations that take place within 
the modern Era as preceding anatheism as itself a ‘God after God’ conversations that 
follows the modern Era. In Chapter 3: modern philosophy, we explore world(view) s 
and their conditionalism to arrive at the Western agreement with the Eastern on 
Emptiness and objective non-realism of God. In Chapter 4: modern mysticism, we 
explore the quest for what mysticism ‘is’ as beginning with an early essentialism, 
which is countered by Constructivism, and then deepened by the contributions of 
recent Essentialism.  And in Chapter 5: modern Christianity, we explore modern 
Christianity as a conditional world(view) now hosted by the world(view) of Modernity. 
And therein Christianity largely agrees in practice with modern philosophy and with 
Essentialism. These chapters provide an overview of the conversations appraising 
Christianity as a faith wherein God is silent, absent and dead in the sense of never having 
existed to begin with. To this we add a modelling of consecutive western world(view) s 
leading to the world(view) of Christendom. It is from this world(view) that both the 
modern world(view) and the Christian world(view) emerge. Christianity continues 
after Christendom as now Catholicism and Protestantism. We make use of the broadest 
understanding possible of Catholicism as the institutional church preceding the modern 
era and descended there-from; and for Protestantism as all modern churches stemming 
from the Reformation and descending from the foundation there-from.
1.4 In Chapter	6:	Anamnethēism, we engage in a ‘thought experiment’ building on the 
understanding of world(view) s and their conditionalism toward a post-Essentialism 
that incorporates the Emptiness of society, religion, self and the Cosmos and Self-
revelation of God. Here there is an anatheistic exploration nuancing Christianity as 
spirituality, religion and mysticism in light of the conjunctions and disjunctions. The 
focus is on the conjunction and disjunction as a deconstruction that serves as retrieval 
enabling a repetition of engagement with the relational presence of God and Emptiness.
1.5 In Chapter 7: Inconclusion, we draw the dissertation to a close as seeking to further 
conversation. There is perhaps an opportunity to redefine Christianity anew after the 
Christianity of Modernity for those seeking to be in relation with God without having 
to choose between atheism or the traditional or modern expressions of Christianity.
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Research methodology and considerations
At the heart of this dissertation lies an elusive problem perhaps enhanced rather than resolved here. 
In its simplest form this dissertation is a conversation about God with others conversing about God. 
The curious absence and presence of God is explored through the ‘God after God’ conversations and 
contextualised against a broader institutionalised Christian faith that is ostensibly all about knowing 
God yet wherein God is found to be curiously and conspicuously absent. It is therefore rightly 
situated within the field of Christian Spirituality. Yet it is a learned reflection that is part theology, part 
philosophy, and part mysticism.
This dissertation is, no doubt, a flawed product. It is perhaps more conversation and reflection than 
argument for or against established positions and views. It is also, most assuredly, informed by the 
author’s personal biases. But perhaps the return to models and world(view) s will provide a suitable 
hermeneutic enabling fruitful conversation of the ‘God after God’ conversations.
2.1 METHODOLOGY
This research is informed by a number of research methodologies such as participant-observation 
and grounded research methodology but it is mostly an informed conversation and reflection of an 
individual in the process of understanding anatheism. Here a complex set of diverse conversations and 
reflections related to God’s absence and presence are drawn together explored and their relationships 
less mapped and modelled for others than as seeking an understanding for myself. This dissertation 
has been to gain further clarity and simplicity on a complex problem.
2.1.1 USE OF SOURCES
The use of sources has varied in this research with some going back years and others only recently 
published or discovered. Somewhere along the way some thoughts and concepts have become my 
own or better reflected my own. I have done my best to cite sources where needed or italicise perhaps 
unfamiliar concepts. There is a fluidity to language and perhaps even a poetic and artistic weaving 
of philosophical concepts in the discussions of many of the authors engaged with here. Perhaps this 
dissertation reflects that in places but as a learner their conceptual fluency certainly invites and merits 
continued reading and engagement. As reflection I often work with rather than explaining their thinking. 
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Sources have also been diverse including sources not usually respected (such as YouTube and 
Wikipedia) and those well respected (such as published and peer reviewed articles to greater works). 
YouTube references are provided in a footnote as a URL as are web pages. As such, this conversation 
stands between two kinds of conversations. One is strict and academic and requires more precision and 
the other colloquial and imprecise. Sources have included published, to-be-published and unpublished 
works, works published in print and digitally, and no small number of conversations over years along 
with my own work reflections.
In working between print publications and PDFs reflecting print publications, references to 
authors are provided as “author date: page”. As e-books report the position one is in the text 
differently there is yet no easy means of establishing a rock solid convention. In some cases a 
quote or reference from e-book is cited as “author date: %”, in others as “author date: loc.nnnn”, 
or “author date: loc.nnnn/nnnn”. This is because Amazon Kindle reports the position in the e-book 
variously depending on the publication.
2.1.2 PARTICIPANT-OBSERVATION
The author has long wrestled with and participated in Christianity. This reflection in this dissertation 
is as participant-observer in various ways over nearly thirty years.
List 2.1.2 My Church participation
2.1.2.1. Early exposure to church. My first exposure to Christianity was through the Methodist 
Church and Dutch Reformed Church through a family that visited church occasionally. 
This was followed by missionaries from the Assemblies of God through my much 
older brothers and later a friend who got “born again” and baptised. It was at that 
friend’s baptism that I first experienced a ‘glimpse’ of God’s attention, like becoming 
aware of someone watching you that you catch in the corner of your eye but who is lost 
to you when you look for them in a crowd.
2.1.2.2. Mystical experience. In 1988, at the age of twelve, the author had their first ‘originating 
theistic experience’ or ‘mystical experience’. This was followed by a number of similar 
yet unique experiences/phenomena perhaps better describe as ‘waking dreams’ and 
‘sleeping visions’. In 1991, the author experienced a visionary-mystical encounter 
with Jesus as risen Lord, quickly followed by phenomena such as one reads about the 
New Testament and now commonly referred to as prophecy, healing and deliverance. 
And it is here that I first experienced tension between experiencing God as active and 
present and having to have faith in God apart from such. Here the religious around 
me argued for “faith” as distinct from experience and coupled with the notion that 
such experiences could not be trusted and should not be sought. This tension has 
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been a feature of my church experience ever since. Yet such experience has enabled 
a nuancing of God’s presence, voice and activity in quality, duration, intensity and on 
who initiated and who responded. It has also resulted in no small amount of tension 
between the aims and goals of the institutional churches in offering regular and set 
services and activities and the apprehended and often disruptive activities of God as 
present in Person to speak and act.
2.1.2.3. Time in the ministry. In 1993 God encouraged me to study theology and over the years 
of 1994-1996 I completed my undergraduate studies in theology. From 1996 onwards 
I worked as youth pastor (arguably the world’s worst); lectured theology at a local 
church Bible school; was the speaker at Alpha Courses; helped run a national worship 
festival the Newsong Festival; and was heavily involved in a church specifically aimed 
at reaching post-modern young adults who usually left church as school leavers only 
to return after their mid-life crisis. During the years of 2001-2006 I was supported by 
a collection of individuals and two churches to work as a freelance urban missionary 
mostly with New Agers and church leavers. Here I defined my urban missionary led 
around a missional-mystic framework referred to in the Vineyard vernacular as “doing 
the stuff that Jesus did” as in words of knowledge, physical and emotional healing, 
driving out demons, and bringing people into reconciliation with God. This led to a 
curious and growing conflict between me pushing more for the relational presence of 
God in such missional activities and arguing for such in the church and its services 
while churches pushed back. The Vineyard Movement proved a curious middle ground 
that included such but I never quite understood why this was not working for me.
   Having run a number of Alpha Courses I was convinced that it worked well for 
those who came from a Christian background but not for those more pluralistically 
oriented. My missional-mystic framework included a number of activities, talks, 
seminars and series I produced and offered such as: The problem of God, The seven key 
relationships and The trinity sessions, hosted regular weekly open-ended small groups, 
and a monthly stall at the Holistic Lifestyle Fair offering ‘open channeling’ for free to 
spiritual seekers and explorers. I understood that Christians had a need to evangelize 
but communicated poorly with others. And that (1) people had a need for a relational 
engagement with God but that (2) Christians put forward blockers related to beliefs and 
behaviour without enabling an opportunity to meet with God. The missional-mystical 
framework held as its highest priority the presence and activity of God and placed such 
as first and primary. Many who had deconverted from Christianity because they were 
raised to believe in a God they did not experience or whose life experienced shattered 
their belief in God returned on the basis of experience God immediately present to 
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them. My missional-mystical strategy included such converts and reconverts landing 
in established and healthy churches. I naively believed that addressing their lack of 
experience was sufficient. However, a deeper problem emerged with many returning 
to me six months to a year later to argue that doing church was not about relating to 
God. Though I had found an approach and strategy that worked, the deeper problem 
appeared to be related to church. But I did not quite understand my and their frustrations 
with church. I knew that I needed to find a new way of doing church, but struggled to 
conceive of what that ‘new way’ could be and even if I could make that my work.
  Struggling to conceive of what to do as a viable, practical and meaningful alternative 
to church I decided that deconstructing and gaining distance and perspective over time 
was needed. I needed to deconstruct the paradigm of the church that makes the church 
and not the relational presence of God central. I had the privilege in 2006 of taking a 
six month sabbatical and settled on resigning from ministry and left the church, seeing 
it as an institutional approach to gathering people to meet about but not with God 
and not knowing what to do as an alternative. Since then I have been post-Church, 
which included a ten-year period of having almost nothing to do with the church 
while changing fields and careers several times. Soon after I helped start an ‘emerging 
church’ and left over similar frustrations related to the relational presence of God. 
There are many ‘new approaches’ to church that are relational and though perhaps 
contextually relevant they continue meeting about God in new ways. I then contributed 
toward the Divine Feminine Version of the New Testament1 which resulted in no small 
amount of tension and controversy with many people that I knew. There again I noted 
a tension between (1) people looking to find God as having left Christianity and as not 
ever wanting to become a Christian and (2) Christians fighting against them using a 
narrow language and view of God that completely inhibited their process.
2.1.2.4. Mystical re-calling. In 2016 I had another intensive visionary-mystical experience of 
God, encouraging me to formally study further and to return to work as a freelance urban 
missionary. Since then I have been running Urban Mystic, a venture toward reaching post-
modern spiritual seekers and church refugees. We have run The seven key relationships 
and The trinity sessions and experimented with intentional monthly meeting with people 
and encouraging people to live deeply into their relationships in pursuit of friendship, 
companionship and intimacy with God. It is from this perspective that I now seek to 
engage deeply and responsibly with the returning question of God as a consideration of 
what Christian ‘is’ after Modernity and after the Christianity of Modernity.
1	 	https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/27579745-the-divine-feminine-version-of-the-new-testament
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2.1.3 PHENOMENOLOGY
This dissertation touches on originating theistic experience as a present-continuous experience as 
relational engagement with God. It recognizes that there is (1) a real and literal understanding of God 
of God as a transcendent Person and (2) a non-real understanding where the relationship is real for 
the individual with enough faith but God is not real. Here God is understood as a real Person whether 
available to experience or held to by faith alone to the former. Yet God is not understood as such by 
the latter and, perhaps, the notion of faith prohibits both from seeking precisely such experiences to 
explore. In each case the relationship is real, but the object of the former is understood as a literal 
Person only available by faith and not experience and the latter as a non-literal idea who can never be 
experienced as a Person.
Yet, despite this distinction, the belief in the former or the latter does not determine whether God is 
a Person or an idea or neither. In fact, the idea of God may even well match the Person of God. This 
is the deep epistemological problem raised in modern philosophy that is not solved in Christendom’s 
reliance on metaphysics or Christianity’s relying on rationalism. In each case, the problem of God 
is reinforced by the silence and absence of God in the modern world(view) and Christianity being 
attached to the formal church and faith distinguished by modern Christianity from experience. The 
questions one would ask from an empirical concern related to the phenomenon of “knowing” God 
are of vital importance. Exploring such epistemological concerns is, however, not the focus of this 
research. Instead we seek to understand how the absence of God in Christianity is understood in 
modern philosophy, mysticism and Christianity.
We here delve into the spaces of and between ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’. We assume 
each as specific ideas, activities and fields of research that overlap and mutually inform us about 
something deeper they touch on. Here ‘spirituality’ is understood as a characteristic of the individual 
related to their values and behaviour and somewhat individual, personal and private; “religion” as 
socially constructed institutions and their intellectual and historical accruals within a world(view) 
that become the established norms and assumptions about God and life over consecutive and evolving 
world(view) s; and “mysticism” as concerning our relational connection and means of cultivating 
connection with ourselves, others, and the transcendent as impersonal and personal.
Mysticism involves our apprehension of the transcendent as impersonal as the deep ontological 
Emptiness (Śūnyatā) to the Cosmos, world(view) s and people; and the transcendent as personal as 
self-revealing and manifesting in the Cosmos relationally to people (Šeḵînâ). Śūnyatā is perhaps our 
deeper apprehension of the space-time continuum, all human society and structures as conditional 
and empty including our religions, and even our very selves as understood in and through religion and 
society; Šeḵînâ is our apprehension of the personal transcendent as self-revealing Person breaking 
in from beyond Śūnyatā. The former term is borrowed from Buddhism and the latter from Judaism.
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2.1.4 MODELLING
Models are used in research, academics and business and though theoretical prove themselves 
incredibly useful practically. Models have been used to understand changing paradigms within what 
is now the field of science, as done by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970); to 
understand trajectories and positions in complex debates with differing avenues of research, such 
as those related to the doctrine of revelation as explored by Dulles in Models of Revelation (1992), 
to understand and map various religious world(view) s, as done somewhat selectively by Wink in 
Engaging the Powers (1992) in support of a Christian world(view) and more complexly by Krüger 
in Signposts to Spirituality (2018) as engaging deeply with the pluralism of and within religion; and 
even to understand the inner drives and motivations of individuals such as the alternative believer 
in relation to their world and the faiths, such as Steyn’s ideal type of New Ager in Worldviews 
in transition (1995); and there is literally tons  of examples in the business world with regards to 
business operating models and strategies as approaches to organizing and conducting business 
ventures producing, transporting and selling products and services. This dissertation offers models 
of world(view) s and prototypes a mysticism ‘after’ modernity as incorporating Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ.
The basic functions of modelling, as developed in this dissertation in relation to an historical western 
faith, are for the creative exploration of the ‘God after God’ conversations toward the recollection of 
relational engagement with God. The idea is to develop a model or prototype enabling a quick and fair 
organization of concepts related to ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’. Such a model enables us 
to draw together phenomena such as Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ without having subscribe to an earlier and 
historical religion that understood the world vastly differently to the way we do today. 
We moved from a ‘pre-modern era’ to a ‘modern era’ and are moving toward a ‘post-modern era’, 
what Caputo (2001:38) calls the “sacral”, “secular: and “post-secular”. At the core of this transition, 
according to Perel2, is a transition from the pre-modern to the contemporary is a change in our model 
of relationships and therewith our models of spirituality. The term ‘modern’ is no longer a term 
of admiration or a synonym for ‘contemporary’ but rather laden with derogatory implications in 
much the same manner that ‘pre-modern’. Modernity is now regarded as a worldview, according 
to Steyn (1995:7), “which has developed from people’s infatuation with science, characterised by 
rationalism, individualism, materialism and secularism.” Modernity has failed to satisfy the deepest 
needs of humanity. Some circles believe that humanity must “transcend modernity and enter into 
a post-modern world in which the destructive features of the modern world will be left behind” 
(Stein 1995: 7). Postmodernism emphasizes communalism, global awareness, religious tolerance, 
feminism and anti-materialism with “… many of the tenets of constructive post-modern though and 
those of the New Age movement” shared and the “new age movement … viewed as a post-modern 
phenomenon in itself” (Stein 1995: 8). Yet the simplicity of the change is from (1) our pre-modern 
2	 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5iu9_8Vsmtk
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or sacral world(view) taking care of all our beliefs and offering eternal securities in exchange for 
faith and obedience and (2) our post-modern and post-secular world(view) being one wherein the 
individual is solely responsible for all their beliefs and the outcomes of their living and loving without 
the social provision of certainty and security.
Our world(view) provides us its model questions and answers in relation to everything, including 
‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’. Being sensitive to how world(view) s work helps when 
experiencing something that is not well explained or escapes what is familiar – such as mystical 
experience of Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ. Making use of models is important.
List 2.1.4 Functions of a model:
2.1.4.1 Gain clarity. Models enable us to understand the complex relationships within 
cultures, philosophies, traditions, religions. They are at once simple and yet clearly 
communicate. Models help us gain perspective on broad and complex issues and 
phenomena and help us understand them for what they are. They help us develop a 
working picture of problems, process and phenomena that can be hard to define or can 
be understood from multiple perspectives. It is also helpful to develop a model when a 
problem cannot be reduced to a single explanation, when motivations cannot be clearly 
identified or when ideas are developing in steps over time without being static. The 
relationship between ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’ is easier to understand 
when modelled than when we are wrestling with epistemological concerns alone. Here 
we generate profiles of what a world(view) is, of Christianity as a world(view), and of 
a mysticism after modernity and Christianity incorporating Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ.
2.1.4.2 Ask questions. As people we ask questions from our own perspectives as including 
our own area of expertise. Yet there are questions that can emerge when modelling 
that would not necessarily occur to us. This is because our world(view) provides a 
point of departure, focus and prepared questions and answers. By developing a model 
of world(view) s and mysticism we are able to ask contextualize questions and the 
answers given to them. This helps us recognize that earlier world(view) s do not ask 
or answer our questions and so we must fairly question and listen. It also enables us 
to understand that politics, philosophy, science and religion all develop over time and 
that the relationship between each is itself in constant process.
2.1.4.3 Develop a contextual hermeneutic. Modelling enables a contextual hermeneutic where 
we fairly address earlier world(view) s even though our knowledge thereof is imperfect 
and the details escape us. This enables us to allow the texts of earlier world(view) s to 
be read as situated in that world(view) rather than ours. It also helps us understand that 
some questions posed by one world(view) may never be answered by another and yet 
while others are answered in different ways in various world(view) s. This encourages 
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us to allow for nuanced answers and non-answers when exploring ‘spirituality’, 
‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’. We therefore consider what a world(view) ‘is’ here; model 
the modern world(view) in Chapter 3: modern Philosophy ahead of discussing the-
death-of God and conditionalism; note the three quests for what mysticism ‘is’ in the 
modern era in Chapter 4: modern mysticism and model Essentialism; model the 
Christian world(view) and discuss modern Christian rationalism as the metaphysics 
of Christendom in translation in Chapter 5: modern Christianity; which enables 
an exploration of the returning question of God alongside these ‘God after God’ 
conversations albeit in a new and post-secular or post-modern way than secular or 
modern in Chapter 6: anamnētheism.3 To cover God-absence over such a long period 
of time requires modelling as the scope of potential conversation is immense.
2.1.4.4 Explore conjunctions and disjunctions. Modelling enables primary issues to 
be recognized in their appropriate hermeneutic context, such as the discussions of 
Christian rationalism in relation to Christian doctrines of the church and revelation or 
the discussion of the-death-of God and conditionalism in relation to modern philosophy. 
Yet, somehow, these may be drawn together in exploring an anamnētheistic model 
incorporating Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ. It is here that we can recognise various conjunctions 
and disjunctions such as: Christianity as a world(view) to the modern world(view) 
with both continuing and overlapping and continuing the earlier world(view) of 
Christendom; or of the conjunction and disjunction of the relational presence of God in 
the thinking of the believer and mystic whether in modern Christianity or Christendom; 
and of the conjunction between the Emptiness (Śūnyatā) in the thinking of the modern 
philosopher as supported by Christian rationalism and Buddhist philosophers and the 
disjunction between each and the Christian mystic and mystic-want-to-be around the 
relational presence of God (Šeḵînâ). 
2.2 CONSIDERATIONS
2.2.1 APPROACH
The research is approached as a conversation and reflection rather than as an argument or explanation. 
It is as a learner seeking to understand rather than as one who holds a position seeking to argue it 
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a preliminary attempt at modelling conversations that have been in play for a long time. And as it 
covers a narrow set of ‘God after God’ conversations that take place in relation to a long period of 
time where people have lived in and understood their world in entirely different ways we begin with 
an exploration of world(view) s. Here modelling is vital in gaining perspective on complexities such 
as the significant shifts in society related to modernization and postmodernisation. These are not 
easily tied to singular events but instead to processes with a pre-history and post-history. 
This work is perhaps also a bit confessional in the similar sense to which Krüger’s, Forman’s, 
Caputo’s, Cupitt’s and Kearney’s are. By this I mean that my thinking and researcher is personal 
and yet my own beliefs and experiences are not made into the subject of the research. The work of 
Krüger in Signposts to Silence (2018) and Komjathy in Introducing Contemplative Studies (2018) 
“represents a paradigm shift, a new model for research and education” (Komjathy 2018:13) that’s 
critical, subjective, contextual, relativistic and confessional.4 Here there is a confessionalism steeped 
in academics that shifts the conversation from being ‘about’ religion to ‘concerning people and their 
relationships’. There is an insight into spirituality as contemplation and mysticism as related to both 
the individual and the transcendent after secularism and the Christian religion. Authors such as 
Komjathy, Krüger, Forman, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Derrida, Caputo, Cupitt, Kearney, 
etc. are both confessional and insightful contributors. This researcher attempts to follow similarly and 
is deeply  aware of having stepped into larger conversations that are well established, such as between 
Constructivists and Essentialists. These contributors all write as standing within a broad paradigm 
change taking place within our society. They write in recent history around recent developments in 
our thinking about ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’, and ‘mysticism’. But what is a world(view) and what do 
world(view) s do?
2.2.2 WORLD(VIEW) S
Modelling world(view) s helps us understand the ‘God after God’ conversations related to God’s 
absence and relational presence. In one sense there is no difference between the world we live in 
and the world as we understand it. Yet, in another sense, we do not see the world that is but instead 
understand the world to be as we see it. It is in this sense that I use the word ‘world(view)’ as 
incorporating ‘the world’ and ‘our shared view of the world’.
In the most basic sense, there is no distinction between the environment as the world we live in, the 
environment as the world we see, our understanding and explanation of the environment as pertaining 
to the world, and the perspective, world and experiences of those we live with in community. We can 
simply assume that we see the world that is as it is and as we and others around us know it to be. 
Humans are social beings, and we share a common society upon a single world, yet different societies 
4  Krüger’s and Komjathy’s works arrived late in this research and, though included, bring so many trajectories together that have not 
been explored here.
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see the world in very different ways. But, as the reader well knows, the notion of ‘experience’ and 
‘worldview’ are much more complicated than that in that we are schooled into our language, behaviour, 
means of making a living, and our faiths. And so, through a process we acquire a worldview and come 
to inhabit and perceive the world through our worldview. We may then speak of a small geographic 
portion of the world and the people who live there for a time as sharing both the world and their view 
of the world. We may then speak of a world(view) in the singular as that of a particular individual and 
community, however large or small, and of world(view) s in the plural with respect to large groups 
and sub-groups who historical periods and geographic terrain may overlap.
Kuhn, in The structure of scientific revolutions (1970), explores how it is that two people standing 
right next to each other to look at a scene should receive approximately the same stimuli. But people 
don’t see stimuli and instead the world they know and what they know about the world is highly 
abstract (Kuhn 1970:192). The same stimuli can produce different sensations and the same sensations 
may arise from different stimuli. The route from stimuli to sensation is conditioned and layered by 
education (Kuhn 1970:193), participation and attention. The result is that two different people standing 
right next to each other, could ‘experience’ the world in an entirely different way and have entirely 
different views on the world. And it is this that leads Barbour to write Issues in science and religion 
(1966), Frankenberry to write Religion and radical empiricism (1987), and Caputo to dig through 
the problems with empiricism to get at what it is that people of faith are speaking of when speaking 
about God such as in Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project 
(1987), The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida (1997), The Insistence of God: A Theology of 
Perhaps (2013), and Hermeneutics: Facts and Interpretation in the Age of Information (2018).5 Over 
this period, the exploration of ‘experience’ has been recognised as a modern construction, that is 
of a particular worldview ill-suited to exploring theistic experience. And it is this recognition of 
world(view) s that we rely on when exploring the ‘God after God’ conversations. What is built into the 
neural process that transforms stimuli into sensations has numerous characteristics (Kuhn 1970:196) 
and therewith there is a pedagogy to neural processes, meaning that people are educated into and by 
their world(view).
List 2.2.2.1 Pedagogic neural processes
2.2.2.1.1 World(view) s are transmitted through education (Kuhn 1970:196).
2.2.2.1.2. World(view) s develop by trial and error and those that endure prove more effective 
than its historical competitors in a group’s current environment (Kuhn 1970:196).
2.2.2.1.3. World(view) s are subject to change both through further education and through the 
discovery of new paradigms with the environment (Kuhn 1970:196), such as stimuli 
unsuitably resolved in the paradigm.
As world(view) s are shared, we may think of them as collective paradigms containing paradigms.
5	 This	is	not	intended	as	a	detailed	list	of	citations	and	merely	illustrative.
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List 2.2.2.2 World(view) s as paradigms
2.2.2.2.1. ‘Paradigm’ may stand for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, 
contributions, etc. shared by members of a given community (Kuhn 1970:175) as well 
as what that community excludes. We use the concept in this sense as world(view) as 
recognised academic fields whether in the natural sciences or humanities as well as 
of boundaried social groups and sub-groups. We also make use of ‘paradigm’ in this 
sense when speaking of the Christian-Aristotelian world(view) and Modernity as a 
world(view).
2.2.2.2.2. ‘Paradigm’ may denote one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-
solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis 
for the solution of the remaining puzzles (Kuhn 1970:175). We will later do exactly 
this, when reflecting on Christianity as a faith that is a paradigm or world(view) and 
with the church and doing church as paradigm central to Christianity as a religion and 
being a Christian.
When speaking about the postmodern philosophers, Essentialists, Constructivists, Christians as 
Catholic and Protestant, we are working with people who share a theory or set of theories with each 
other and yet live in and interpret the world in different ways to their neighbours. We understand this 
and it perhaps does not need to be argued here, but the implications need to be held in mind when 
reading this dissertation. A ‘paradigm’ in this sense governs not the subject matter in question but 
rather a group of practitioners, and therefore it cannot be assumed that the world(view) of the reader 
is shared with the author or even that the same issues and concerns matter to each.
In light of the above, we need to consider that our secular world(view) is in constant dialogue with 
our premodern religious world(view) s and that such dialogue is no longer predominantly a Christian 
concern. It is now pluralistic. Here our faiths are in constant dialogue among themselves, with each 
other, and with modernity. And as each world(view) converges, a new world(view) is emerging that is 
post with regards to modernity, nationalism, secularism and religion. And yet, within this world(view) 
that is “post” with respect to religion, that the question of God returns within the context of the ‘God 
after God’ conversations.
Here there is a fundamental difference between the natural sciences and the humanities in that where 
the former rely on instrumentations that put forth certain values that the latter relies on persons who 
constantly provide indeterminate values. Kuhn (1970:198) uses the example of an ammeter, which a 
professional makes use of when measuring current. The layman may readily see the value, but must 
be schooled into making use of the instrument and interpreting the value. The very concepts and 
application that have become unconscious to the professional must be taught, acquired and practiced 
by the laymen in order to make proper use of the instrument. In particular, there are two different 
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process related to the measuring and interpretation of the value. Here the perception of both may be 
the same when looking at the number on the ammeter, but their respective interpretation depends on 
their prior experience, training and application.
This is particularly relevant in this dissertation as, for example, how one makes use of and interprets 
religious activities such as the Eucharist for Catholics and the Message for Protestants. In both cases 
the particular visible, invisible and theodramatic stimuli are evident. Here the real presence of God 
is of immense and central importance to the Catholic in the Eucharist, less so to the Protestant and 
absurd to the atheist. Similarly, the real presence of God in the Message is primary for the Protestant, 
secondary for the Catholic and, again, absurd to the atheist. The ‘real presence of God’ is not evident 
and of prime importance to the Protestant because they have not been schooled into such, and perhaps 
have been somewhat schooled into the absurdity of such. But it is blatantly absurd to the atheist who 
has been schooled precisely into such and often because of attempts at schooling them into such. 
Similarly for the Message, with the Catholic schooled somewhat against such and a little into the 
absurdity of such, while the atheist has clearly been schooled into the totally absurdity of such also 
and often in part by being schooled into such. In each case, their respective world(view) s as Catholic, 
Protestant and atheist interpret the sense stimuli.6
The study of ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’, and ‘mysticism’ also differs from the natural sciences in 
being concerned with the realm of personal selfhood. The distinctive nature of ‘ultimate commitment’ 
and ‘religious commitment’ and its perception differs from speculative works of natural philosophy 
and theology (Barbour 1966:207). Here we are looking into the Transcendent as impersonal in the 
Buddhocentric and Christian faiths while also trying to explore the transcendent personal in the 
Christocentric faiths. And though there is overlap between the two in the commonality of persons 
being involved in both, and though they both make use of introspective practices and highlight 
introvertive experiences coupled with character transformation toward the likeness of the Buddha 
and Christ, each lives in different world(view) s.
As such, Barbour (1966:214) notes that religious communities share a language for describing their 
common experience. Such language may convey little to those who have not participated in the life of 
the community even as it may clearly orientate one who has. Such language may also as easily school 
a learner into the faith as school someone out of it as it may sound completely absurd to someone 
listening in as outsider.
The ‘God after God’ conversations are a tremendously brave adventure in admitting the human and 
transcendent contributions to the people of the earth as a whole though perhaps more at not allowing 
the latter to continue as though the former. This is, practically speaking, also tremendously risky in 
that there is also the admission of transcendent persons, realities and their respective representatives. 
6	 This	is	not	to	say	that	the	‘real	presence	of	God’	is	not	in	the	Eucharist	or	Message	or	even	to	say	that	it	is,	but	instead	to	
highlight	the	different	world(view) s	in	appreciating	the	presence	or	absence	of	such.
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Yet we do not necessarily know how to distinguish fact from fiction or data from speculation when 
speaking of the transcendent.
Kuhn (1970: 205) views practitioners of science, herewith natural and social sciences, as ‘puzzle-
solvers who must develop the ability to set up and solve problems (rather than relying on model 
questions supplied to the learners with approved answers curated within their world(view)’. Yet Kuhn 
goes on to note that such puzzle presentation and solving may be highly valued in the fields of the 
natural sciences but is appreciated perhaps less and variously in other fields (Kuhn 1970:209). And 
this is certainly the case not only between science and religion but also between philosophy and 
theology. The result is that where such puzzle presenting and solving proves particularly difficult in the 
academic community in relation to ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’. This research proceeds 
as though identifying and provisionally sorting a puzzle related to God’s absence and presence.
2.2.3 SCIENCE AND HERMENEUTICS
The modern problem of relying on scientific investigation and data and strongly differentiating 
such data stemming from the relational context can perhaps be visually represented. This visual 
representation serves as a point of departure for discussing scientific data and its limits and therewith 
establish the need for hermeneutic contextuality.
By way of example, the chemistry of depression, love, happiness and anxiety can be expressed as a 
balance between dopamine, serotonin, and oxytocin. These can be measured and visually expressed. 
In the diagrams below7 the relationship between neurochemicals are correlated with emotions.
Dopamine Serotonin
Depression Love Happiness Anxiety
Oxytocin Dopamine Serotonin Oxytocin Dopamine Serotonin Oxytocin Dopamine Serotonin Oxytocin
Diagram 2.2.3 The neurochemistry of emotion
The diagram above at once tell us about the relationship between these neurochemicals and correlate 
them to our emotions. So, we know from the diagram that these chemicals are involved, that they are 
produced within the brain, that they can be measured, and that the chemical balance between them 
can be correlated with emotional states. There is no doubt that the diagram above is a scientifically 
accurate expression of the data. Nevertheless, such recognition tells us nothing about any of these 
chemicals, their production, measurement, or correlation. The diagram shows what we know about 
7	 This	is	taken	from	an	animated	artwork	and	cut	into	the	frames	here.	The	original	source	is	online:	https://www.reddit.
com/r/gifs/comments/arqx9o/love_is_better_than_any_other_drug_its_free_so/
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their relationship to each other, their correlation to emotions, while telling us nothing about how we 
know this or about their relational context.
That we can measure, understand and express the neurochemistry of emotion is both a monumental 
and recent achievement. And such an achievement is tremendously relevant to everyone whether a 
medical professional such as a general practitioner or a specialist such as a neurosurgeon. Yet it is 
a recent achievement, with such data not available to people as recent as two hundred years ago. 
The International Society for Neurochemistry (ISN) was only established in 19658. And though the 
historical pedigree is as old as religion and philosophy, with various stories about human personality 
and emotion, this is a 20th century expression of science rooted in the paradigm of objectivity. And 
as a recent expression of science within Modernity, science has come to be seen as the only valid 
explanation of anything and everything. The corollary is that what science can’t explain is not ‘real’ 
and other stories rooted in metaphysics and religion are therefore not true. And here it is that the social 
sciences struggle to establish themselves as ‘scientific’, not because they are not science but because 
they are not the peculiarity that is laboratory science. Yet this struggle is entirely related to a specific 
kind of ‘laboratory science’ wherein specific kinds of tests, procedures, approaches, etc. are taken as 
valid and authoritative. By implication, what cannot be explored in and through test tubes is not, and 
if it can then it can’t really be religion.
Of course, we are not here speaking about the academic fields themselves as formally constituted 
in relation to each other. Instead we are speaking about ‘science’ and ‘truth’ out in the wilds of daily 
life. An exploration of “spirituality”, “religion” and “science” plays between these two worlds, one 
strict and academic and the other not. We must then converse with both parties.
However, as accurate and neat as those diagrams are, and however much we can explore in 
tremendous detail these specific neurochemicals and their correlation to emotion, they tell us nothing 
about anything else. Here there is an ascertained correlation between the neurochemicals and 
emotions, but correlation does not imply causation and to assume this a logical fallacy. And there with 
such correlation tells us nothing about why such chemicals are produced or what is causing them. Are 
these neurochemicals produced in response to genuine relational connection between persons? Or is 
it the presence of these chemicals that determines the emotional state of the person? Is the chemical 
state the result of relational connections present, or perhaps as related to memories being recalled, or 
perhaps in response to fictions as in works of art like books, plays, series or movies? And one step 
further, are these neurochemicals and emotional states in relation to persons, such as ‘you’ or ‘I’, 
or the transcendent as impersonal or personal? And is the neurochemical-emotional correlation to 
the transcendent, whether impersonal or personal, produced in response to a relational connection 
present, being recalled or imagined? This visual report of neurochemicals and their correlation to 
emotions tells us a tremendous amount, and is a monumental modern achievement, while telling 
us nothing about their causation. It becomes then not that we cannot explore the ‘more’ or ‘beyond’ 
8 https://www.neurochemistry.org/isn-about/
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what science can say but rather that we cannot speak scientifically about that which we cannot speak 
scientifically about.
And one sees a parallel here between what we know and can verify and what we do not yet know 
and cannot yet verify. Cupitt (2008: loc.648/2437) notes that there is a classical distinction between 
empirical fact or sensory stimuli which has become the province of science and eternal and revealed 
truth that have been the long-standing concern of philosophy and theology.
Yet it matters tremendously that we are loved, by whom we are loved, and who we love in turn. 
And though we can easily love a “non-real” God, the ‘God after God’ conversations are for some 
about loving the fiction or idea of God, for others letting go of God-concepts, and for yet others a 
coming to know and love God as a Person through entering relationally as giving and receiving love. 
This is not to say that philosophy and theology are not scientific or that science is not theological or 
philosophical. They are. Instead it’s the recognition of perspective and focus. We can look closely and 
with a tremendous amount of detail at something or take a step back to see less detail but more of what 
is going on. And here we have the difference between a specific kind of laboratory science and that of 
hermeneutic contextuality when asking questions and seeking particular answers.
It is also to recognise that however advanced our technology is that it is still developing. For 
though we can measure the chemicals in the brain and observe and model the brain in real time, we 
cannot tell from the data alone whether the emotions are evoked imaginatively, induced chemically, 
produced concerningly due to some biological problem, or relationally responsive. And the degree 
to which we need to normalize or disturb the neurochemistry or whether people need to attend to 
their relationships takes us to a wider perspective than the narrow science that is laboratory science. 
We can, for example, create tools to measure brain activity but are a long way of understanding the 
biological and relational foundations. And we can, by way of another example, encourage behavioural 
and social activities as tools which in turn affect the neurochemicals produced.
Our scientific observations of neurochemicals and their correlation involves scientific and non-
scientific observations as enabled by a field of research. As Cupitt (2008: 597/2437) states:
“The question is particularly awkward, because we humans never actually see space or 
time or the most general principles of natural philosophy directly. All we actually have 
to go on is the mass of data that is coming in all the time through our sense organs. Spits 
and spots of sensation: how does it all get built into the coherent and objective world we 
actually have around us?”
Science is clear that when we speak about anxiety or love that we can drill down to an examinable 
organ or process or phenomenon. And that though we can explore a specific something, such as brain 
chemicals, in tremendous detail that the relational context is not as easy. For when speaking about 
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‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’ we are dealing with a uncontrolled situations and though we 
can speak scientifically as in a very narrow kind of science about love or anxiety it does not mean that 
we are not speaking accurately or meaningfully about the relationships or hermeneutic context when 
doing so. In our colloquial or day-to-day language, we speak clearly and often about these emotions 
and God. The specificity of a strict scientific language and its checks and balances has a time and 
place but is not the sole purveyor of truth. Instead, to label something ‘unscientific’ or as ‘having no 
scientific foundation or basis’ is to exclude a valid conversation on faith assumptions.
So, when speaking about love or anxiety we don’t actually ‘see’ the chemicals and to ‘see’ them 
is contingent on a host of processes collated into a narrow and specific field. Laboratory science is, 
simply put, not social science or contextual hermeneutics but can be edited in support of ‘I believe 
this’ or ‘I believe that’. As noted by Cupitt  (2008: 648/2437):
“... there was a sharp distinction between the sensuous world below and the eternal, purely 
intelligible world above, it was usually thought that whereas science is concerned with 
the lower world of the senses and empirical fact, philosophy is concerned with the higher 
world of a priori, eternal truth.”
The work of neurochemistry as illustrated in the diagrams above relies on the arrival at an ‘if’ in 
relation to the neurochemicals and an ‘if’ in relation to the emotions for the correspondence between 
them to make sense. Here the question is not about ‘beliefs’ but about the relationship between 
a specific kind of laboratory science and very general emotions. And here there is a relationship 
between the rigorousness of scientific data and its establishment coupled with emotions so incredibly 
diverse in experience and expression. Both are, however, settled as ‘if’s’. And if either end up being 
questioned, and become an ‘if not’, then either or both as tied to their correspondence become absurd 
and meaningless. And furthermore, we cannot investigate the emotions of love and anxiety or their 
relational connections as existing or imagined, and no less real in either case, in the same manner 
that we investigate their neurochemical foundations in people. And though we can establish that the 
neurochemical response is dependent on perception rather than relationships existing or imagined, 
there is an absurdity to arguing from the scientific observations that therefore relationships and 
associated persons therefore are proven not to exist.
This reference to neurochemistry, emotions, individuals, and existing and imagined relational 
connections as real, albeit in different ways, plays out similarly in the quest for what mysticism ‘is’. 
Here we are working with ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’ and do so in keeping with the 
advances and contributions of the modern era which includes science, philosophy and theology.
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2.2.4 HERMENEUTIC CONTEXTUALITY
A new era in philosophy develops from the foundation of the Copernican Revolution. Here the-death-
of God plays out in the thinking Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger who offer monumental works 
of philosophy. Their thinking is further developed by the likes of Cupitt, Caputo and Kearney. Their 
works collectively contribute toward an understanding of the hermeneutic contextuality of people 
in different world(view) s whether consecutive, discrete and isolated, or parallel and pluralistic. Our 
hermeneutics, as science and art of interpretation, enables us to look back to world(view) s that have 
come before as deconstructive for the purpose of looking forward toward our own world(view) as we 
reconstruct it updated with all the contributions of the modern era.
The tension between science and religion, following their divorce over the Copernican Revolution, 
has resulted in each dogmatically unable to hear the other. The goal of postmodern hermeneutics is 
perhaps not reconciliatory in the sense of trying to bring science and religion together, but instead a 
child of the divorce seeking to make its own way forward in the world after the divorce. It is here, as 
noted by Grondin (1995:ix), that hermeneutics seeks ‘not to relativise or trivialize truth but instead to 
uncover the truth of what is said’. When exploring the quest for what mysticism ‘is’ whether through 
the work of modern philosophers, Essentialists or Constructivists, or Christians we are catching 
up to their work within the recent years of the modern era. And when considering hermeneutics, 
we are considering the spirituality of those postmodern as in their first-person present-continuous 
engagement with the transcendent as an event that takes place as pursuing the transcendent and as 
pursuing an understanding of the transcendent. This is a ‘retrieval, repetition and event’ as explicated 
by Caputo which instead of foreclosing with metaphysics and dogmatics encourages a first-person 
present-continuous experience of the event of engaging the transcendent.
Hermeneutics is, according to Caputo, an attempt to ‘stick to the original difficulty of life rather than 
betraying its complexities with metaphysics’ (Caputo 1987:1). It is restoring the original difficulty 
of Being (Caputo 1987:2) in the sense of “first-person present-continuous” (cf. Waaijman, public 
presentation, SPIRASA 2018, Johannesburg). It is an attitude that characterizes a postmodern society 
that is suspicious of those who desire to escape the uncertainty of the present with the certainties of 
metaphysics and to take away the stress and risk and unknown in the seeking of and after the truth 
(Caputo 1987:3). Yet this is not a seeking of ‘a priori’, meaning guaranteed or metaphysical truth, 
but instead the truth of Being. Caputo’s “radical hermeneutics” is an “openness to mystery” (Caputo 
1987:213) as be-ing, being, Be-ing and Be-com-ing/Be(com)ing (Cupitt). Here, clearly, both Cupitt 
and Caputo follow from Heidegger’s thinking in Being and time (1927).
This is then, perhaps, a hermeneutic contextuality enabling us to ask our questions without expecting 
previous world(view) s to provide already-concluded answers suitable to us. Our hermeneutic is not 
a return to ‘a priori’ or metaphysical truth. Instead it is a turning to our text in context or better 
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appreciating the context and text as con-text or ‘context’. Here both text and context are a form 
of text as context. We lift our eyes from a certain kind of laboratory science not as a leap of faith 
but a stepping into our own context as in our own world and view of the world as world(view). 
Our choice is not between utter certainty and utter uncertainty as play between absolutes but from 
certainty as connected to texts and institutions relying on them in their world(view) to the acceptance 
of provisionally and uncertainty of our lives as our relational context which shares much in common 
with the people who wrote their texts from within their context. Hermeneutics is the discipline of trying 
to understand what is said by its motivation and means of expression and not only by its words and 
its opposite is perhaps an obstreperous misinterpretation by means of valuing our world(view) alone. 
Contextuality and truth do not entail relativism of truth, but rather the uncovering of truth by shaking 
off the relativistic difference between our world(view) as modern people and the world(view) of the 
text we are reading. Hermeneutics is thus an exploration of what has been said as synoptic expression 
of what is being said. It takes their world and view of the world seriously too. Hermeneutics is then 
an active deconstruction of both our and their world(view) in order to here enable an understanding 
of the ‘God after God’ conversations as related to God’s absence and presence.
Hermeneutics then enables us to engage historical texts from within our world(view) as respecting 
their world(view) now as text. Our hermeneutics must be con-text-ual and as contextual then permitting 
texts to speak what they speak from within their world(view) rather than as though expecting them to 
speak the sense of ours from within ours. We can only agree on the absurdity of such an expectation. 
The most important reason to do so is that it admits them to the conversation as though offering us 
data to work with, however ir-/relevant and ir-/reverrant we may consider it to be. Failing to do so we 
can easily associate the absurdity of our expectation with the texts themselves as being absurd. If we 
fail to adopt and adapt our hermeneutic tools, we readily make our wrestling with the text primary 
and therewith the absurdity with which we engage into the absurdity of the text. And then we cannot 
move from text to text or from our context alone between their and our own contexts.
Hermeneutics is not a leap from our modern science back to a dogmatic premodern faith of 
Christianity as shaped in line with the thinking of Aristotle and Plato. Instead it is a corrective to our 
world(view) as a context that has been long shaped by the divorce between science and religion in 
the Copernican Revolution. Hermeneutics frees us to the degree to which we are no longer forced to 
choose sides between the inaccurate science of premodern religion and the reasonable accuracy of 
modern science. Their failure to communicates affects us and has certainly shaped the world(view) into 
which we have been born. Yet we do not have to remain locked within their divorce. We can instead 
negotiate a new and better world(view) respecting both our premodern and modern world(view) s.
For as we speak about our relationships with persons and the transcendent, we are at once speaking 
about things such as neurochemicals and their correlation to emotions such as love. But our focus is 
not on those neurochemicals or their correlation, but instead on the ‘real’ relationship between persons 
M.Th. Timothy Victor Student #: 3182-738-126
and the transcendent. This is the language game as further developed from Nietzsche, Wittgenstein 
and Heidegger. Caputo (1997: xxi) reflects that:
“Deconstruction regularly, rhythmically repeats the religiousness, sans the concrete, 
historical religions; it repeats nondogmatically the religious structure of experience, the 
category of the religious. It repeats the passion for the messianic promise and messianic 
expectation, sans the concrete messianissm of the positive religions that wage endless 
war and spill the blood of the other, and that, anointing themselves God’s chosen people, 
are consummately dangerous to everyone else who is not so chosen; it ceaselessly repeats 
the viens, the apocalyptic call for the impossible, but without calling for the apocalypse 
that would consume as the cut  that opens the same to the other sans sectarian closure; it 
repeats Abraham’s trek up to Moriah and makes a gift without return to Isaac, sans the 
economy of blood sacrifice, repeating the madness of giving without return; it repeats the 
movement of faith, of expecting what we cannot know but only believe … of the blindness 
of faith … in the impossible, but without the dogmas of positive religious faiths.”
In hermeneutics we recognise the need to work in translation at many levels, including what ‘is’ and 
what ‘is not’ relevant. So, for example, we recognise that it is not just what is said but also where and 
how what is said that matters. When dealing with texts, and contexts, we recognise that some things 
standing as phenomenally profound in one world(view) can fail the process of being carried across 
translation. When dealing with historical texts, we are challenged in interpretation and translation. 
Cupitt (1984: loc.214/5689) encourages us to get “inside the language and culture that shapes our view 
of the world” and therewith also to distinguish the physical and translated text from the ‘inner text’. 
The goal in, for example psychoanalysis and counselling, is to understand someone else’s experience 
on its own terms rather than one’s own as helper. The process is also complicated by the psychoanalyst 
or counsellor having to, through reflective listening and challenging, help those counselled understand 
and voice their own experience. The work of hermeneutics is to enable precisely such expression and 
translation. Hermeneutics is thus tremendously important when working with texts from the context 
or world(view) of Christendom and texts from the context or world(view) of the modern ear. Here it 
is not just the text that matters but also the context in which Christendom played out and the context 
in which the modern era plays out as following the Copernican Revolution wherein both religion and 
science fail to hear one another because they speak at each other liked those divorced from the divide 
between their respective world(view) s.
In many ways our religions are products of consecutive world(view) s now out of sync with the 
modern world(view) as they endure as institutions after the end of their respective world(view) s. 
We may therefore recognise our common orientation toward an ‘ultimate horizon’ beyond our 
M.Th. Timothy Victor Student #: 3182-738-1 27
world(view) s as a common concern in ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’ while respecting that 
our historical forebears have long shared diverging conversations encapsulated in their religions 
offering us diverging mystical experiences and possibilities. And though our religions perhaps share 
a “tendency to foreclose questions” (Krüger 2018: loc.989/13538) the returning question of God in 
relation to the ‘God after God’ conversations can only be authentically expressed and pursued by 
holding ourselves open to the possibility of God. Yet it is not only our religions that would seek to 
‘foreclose’, but the modern and secular era of thinking itself forecloses the possibility of God.
The most significant hermeneutics is then the hermeneutics of Be-ing and be(com)ing as shared by 
Cupitt and Caputo following Heidegger. Deconstruction arises, according to Caputo (1997: xxi) from 
“a certain experience of the promise sans the dogmatics of any particular faith”. This is not as the 
‘given’ in Husserlian terms, or in dogmatic modern Christian sense, but as expectation of something 
‘unpresentable, running up against the unforeseeable, a certain absolute experience’. Deconstruction 
and hermeneutics are then a precursor to the returning question of God after the death-of-God that is 
itself a continuation of deconstruction as religion (first-person present-continuous) ‘sans’ or without 
religion (dogmatic theology and belief foreclosing the question to provide certainty). It is an openness, 
an invitation and exploration open to the transcendent as impersonal and personal, perhaps as Śūnyatā 
rediscovered anew “after” Buddhism and as Šeḵînâ rediscovered “after” Christianity not at odds with 
each other though perhaps not yet reconciled either.
This deconstruction is an ongoing of the Reformation that has peaked within the modern era 
as Catholicism and Protestantism only to collapse as religious world(view) s hosted within the 
secular world(view) and tensioned in relation to each other. And though this results for Caputo as 
a hermeneutics of the kingdom of God, meaning an interpretive style in keeping with the prophetic 
spirit of Jesus (Caputo 2007:26) this is not yet a kingdom theology as the mysticism of God as the 
transcendent breaking into our world(view) and meeting with us immediately and in Person (Šeḵînâ). 
For mysticism in the Christian sense is tied to the expectation that the kingdom arrives in the Person 
of Jesus and therefore that Jesus arrives in Person to speak and act. As noted by Caputo (2007:32):
“The church tends by the inner momentum of its institutional structure to assert its own 
authority, to authorize itself … The church authorizes or founds itself by invoking the 
authority of the Founder who did not intend to found anything but to announce the good 
news that the kingdom of God was at hand and the end time was in sight.”
The hermeneutics and deconstruction of Cupitt and Caputo finds like expression in the anatheism of 
Kearney, an invitation that doesn’t foreclose the event of God’s uncertain Being with the certainty of 
metaphysics. The hermeneutic contextuality of the emerging world(view) is the one where the question 
of God is allowed and even enabled to return anew and afresh on its own terms. And here the returning 
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question of God can rely on the ‘if’s’ of ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’, and ‘mysticism’. These remain an ‘if not’. 
Here we make an attempt at moving from ‘if not’ to an ‘if’ by modelling a resolution between Emptiness 
(Śūnyatā) and Presence (Šeḵînâ) in the hermeneutic contextuality of consecutive world(view) s.
2.3 PROBLEM SELECTION
My primary concern relates to people wanting to be religious without religion, to searching for the 
‘more’ to living and loving in relation to the transcendent as Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ. Yet in order to get 
there we must join the conversation taking place since the modern era started. Here there are several 
‘God after God’ conversations that follow the transition from a Christian world(view) to a modern 
and secular world(view). Yet it is also a conversation that must take place with people living as 
mystic want-to-be’s in our present day. So, the conversation includes both the absence of God and the 
presence of God within Christianity as a world(view).
There is an irreducible  complexity to each discussion that cannot be fully explored within the 
constraints of this dissertation. The goal is to discover what needs to be explored further. This 
dissertation than stands as a work-in-progress that cannot be completed within its constraints. 
This is, however, not a failure as the goal is to understand what must still be explored. It is, here, a 
recognition of the complexity without betraying it with the certainty of metaphysics (Caputo 1987:1) 
and embracing the-death-of God whose relevance is still being worked out. Biernot and Lombaard 
(2018:10) note that:
“…the relevance of the death-of-God theology, not as the last gasp of liberal Protestant 
theology, but as something still worthy of attention, especially with the framework of 
Cupitt’s argumentation drawing on the best traditions of criticism of religion of the past 
two centuries. The idea of objective theism may not be as firmly re-established after its 
quavering in the wake of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment criticism, as some 
may still be swayed to believe today. However, we should not wave away that segment 
of spiritually oriented people for whom God is conceivable only as an ‘impossible love’ 
similar to their deceased parents or a meaning-giving ‘leading idea’ in their lives. If 
mainstream Protestantism is withering away, is conservative evangelical Christianity the 
one we wish to see succeeding it, with its promotion of the image of God as a highly 
anthropomorphised and sentimentalised figure healing our uncertainties in this life and 
offering an eternal abode in the future one?”
Krüger (2018: loc.669/13538) notes the possibility of developing “a synoptic perspective within one 
existing tradition, assimilating the other traditions into that one as it is” and notes Nicholas of Cusa 
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(Cusanas) (1401-1464) as having done so. But we wish to avoid this. This is perhaps what  Masao 
Abe has done in conversation with various people, such as in Cobb and Ive’s The emptying God: A 
Buddhist-Jewish-Christian conversation (1991) or Keenan’s The meaning of Christ: A Mahāyāna 
Theology which offers a Mahāyāna Buddhist reinterpretation of Christ (1993). Abe collapses the 
meaning of Christ through kenosis, the self-emptying of God in Christ, into the Śūnyatā of Buddhism 
while Keenan offers a Mahāyāna reinterpretation or articulation of the meaning of Christ though 
perhaps without maintaining the integrity of Šeḵînâ.
I do not wish to make the Christianity of Christendom or the Christianity of Catholicism or 
Protestantism central. Instead I wish to move forward as a post-Christian ‘after’ Christianity. To do 
this is to touch on what Krüger (2018: loc.743/13538) calls the “avoided (and evasive) transcendent” 
within Christianity itself. The work here is synoptic in discerning the relational presence of God 
across consecutive Christian world(view) s and requires getting less inside of the text of historical 
Christianity than the Being of God today. The returning question of God is then set within the ‘God 
after God’ conversations as related to God’s absence and presence within ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and 
‘mysticism’. Krüger (2018: loc.743/13538) notes that:
“Simplistic repetition today of any of the forms taken by any of the old traditions in 
a bygone epoch would amount to ahistorical or anachronistic fundamentalism or 
romanticism. The alternative would be to engage in a process of responsible, reflective 
mediation and articulation of the many pasts that we are heirs of today, in the context of 
a larger intercultural multilogue.”
This is then not a choice for what Biernot and Lombaard (2018:10) call “conservative evangelical 
Christianity” but for what can come after it or Kearney (2010: loc.3/248) “dogmatic theism”. The 
problem is akin to a series of problems interrelated and intertwined with one another. Our goal is to 
gain clarity on what must be explored and to articulate clearly and simply the contributions of modern 
philosophy, mysticism and Christianity toward the returning question of God after the-death-of God.
2.3.1 INTERRELATED PROBLEMS
The 'God after God' conversations take place in relation to the changeover from a sacred to a secular 
world(view). It incorporates the continued work of philosophers, the quest for what mysticism ‘is’ and 
Christianity as set within a secular, modern and scientific world(view). Yet as taking place after the 
transition from the sacral world(view) of Christendom they are the 'God after God' conversations as 
taking place “after” the world(view) is no longer defined by or in relation to God. It is a complex and 
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intertwined problem where different world(view) s compete with and both support and contradict one 
another. We live in a world(view) that is at once secular yet brings together religious world(view) s 
more numerous in expression and number than previously available to any people group. This at once 
makes no sense while making complete sense and we are challenged to understand this.
The interrelated problems include, and are by no means limited to: (1) the changeover of the secular 
world(view) and the divorce between science and religion; (2) the-death-of God and the recognition 
of the conditionalism of our world(view) s; (3) the quest for what mysticism ‘is’ as offered by early 
essentialists following the change of world(view) and the-death-of God in a world(view) that brings 
together the whole world’s people and their religious heritage; (4) the translation of Christianity from 
the world(view) of Christendom into the world(view) of the secular age and therewith Christianity 
as now Catholicism and Protestantism following the Reformation that took place alongside the 
Copernican Revolution; (5) the absence and presence of God; and (6) the returning question of God 
after the secular age as afresh and new without having to choose either the religions preceding the 
secular age or their expressions within.
2.3.2 ‘IF’ AND ‘THEN’
Our entire world(view) rests on an ‘if’ and ‘then’. In a specific kind of laboratory science, we build 
on various contributions to arrive at that ‘if’. And having arrived at an ‘if’ we can proceed to the 
‘then’. It makes sense then that the problem with ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’ depends 
on our arriving at ‘if’s’ in order to proceed to ‘then’s’. But what are the ‘if’s relevant to the 'God 
after God' conversations?
We shall then aim to arrive at an ‘if’ for ‘religion’ by way of modern philosophy in relation to the-
death-of God and conditionalism, recognising a convergence between Eastern and Western philosophy 
on no-thing-ness by way of Śūnyatā and the legacy of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein; for 
‘spirituality’ in relation to modern Essentialism; and for ‘religion’ as modern Christianity in relation 
to the institutional church and the practical outworking of the doctrine of revelation. And this small 
collection of ‘if’s’ will enable a hermeneutic exploration of Christian mysticism toward a Christianity 
‘after’ Christianity.
2.3.3 THE ABSENCE OF GOD AND GOD-ABSENCE
The 'God after God' conversations take place in relation to the absence of God and the felt God-
absence within those to whom the question of God returns. Here there is the recognition that the 
secular age challenges the earlier sacred world(view) s. And though we explore it mostly in relation 
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to God-absence as a common denominator among all religious world(view) s in the secular age. We 
are challenged to differentiate between the absence of God and God-absence.
The problem is also complicated by the relative lack of God-experience, however ‘God’ is conceived. 
We recognise that many Hindu faithful attend their traditional or modern services within a modern 
secular world(view) without themselves experiencing Self-realization (Ātman jñāna) and that few 
are considered to historically have done so; that the Buddhist attends their services without attaining 
Enlightenment (bodhi); and that the Christian attends their services without experiencing relational 
the immediate relational presence of God (Šeḵînâ). Yet in their previous sacral world(view) s people 
believed in Self-realization, Enlightenment and God without themselves experiencing such either. 
The changeover of world(view) from sacred to secular presents unique challenges with regards to 
our understanding of pluralism and mysticism if mysticism is understood to relate to the transcendent 
rather than the spirituality or religion as expressed within a sacral or secular world(view). Each 
religious world(view) experiences their own equivalent of the Copernican Revolution in transitioning 
from their sacral age to the secular age and perhaps their own equivalents of the Reformation in 
redefining themselves for the secular age. We, however, focus here on the Christian world(view) and 
the reality and meaning of the absence of God and God-absence within Christianity as world(view) 
and practiced and institutional religion.
This also, to some extent, encourages us to keep the 'God after God' conversations as pluralistic 
as it is focused on Christianity and the absence of God and God-absence within Christianity as 
‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’.
2.3.4 EMPTINESS AND ABSENCE AS DIVIDE OR MULTIPLY BY ZERO
The philosophical usage of the absence of God and the-death-of God within Western philosophy 
somewhat approximates the usage of Enlightenment (bodhi) in Buddhist philosophy as the deeper 
ontological truth of Emptiness or No-thing-ness (Śūnyatā) in relation to the cosmos, society and 
religion (anatta9) and the self (suññata10). Yet there is a parallel  between the Emptiness of Buddhism 
and the absence of God and the-death-of God in secular world(view). And in the same way that 
Emptiness is used in relation to Hinduism in Buddhism to argue for the acceptance of Emptiness over 
the belief in God without corresponding experience of God, so too does it apply to Christian theism 
in the world(view) s of Christendom and the secular age.
This absence is often employed as a divide or multiply by zero in the sense that whatever you 
believe about the reality of God can be discounted on the basis of God’s absence. And so too can the 
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to the belief in God also means adding the absence of God to the belief in God. Here one effectively 
changes nothing about the reality of God. We are challenged to go beyond this divide/multiply or 
add/subtract zero as Emptiness and the absence of God. Here we must also consider the reality of the 
relational presence of God, of Šeḵînâ, of God drawing near in Person to speak and act.
2.4 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY AS REFLECTION
The dissertation is primarily a conversation and reflection, a wrestling with what Christianity ‘is’ in 
relation to God’s absence and presence as ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’. As such it stands here 
in isolation with the intentionality of orienting the author toward further studies related to Christianity 
in the post-secular age as Christianity after Christianity. Such studies may, in the future, include 
contemporary Christian mysticism, originating theistic experience, and the theological and practical 
nurturing and cultivation of Christocentric mystics and Christocentric mystical communities of faith.
The key to reconciling their contributions lies in defining mysticism and developing a model of 
experience enabling the explorer, seeker, representative, Source(s)  and academic of religion and 
spirituality to participate in the conversation. We must account for not only the variety of but also the 
variety within each religion. And we must incorporate the 'God after God' conversations and allow 
the question of God to return after the ways it has been formulated and anew or afresh in comparison 
to the options that we have been working with.
2.5 ACCESS TO RELEVANT RESEARCH CONTEXT
The research context is academic and ecumenical, taking place in relation to a lived and practiced 
faith of Christianity as a faith in crisis in the secular age largely arising from the absence of God and 
God-absence. Published and respected texts are engaged in order to understand what the problem 
between Christianity as faith and Christianity as ‘expérience’ is defined respectively in relation to the 
institutional church and the practice of the relational presence of God. And these both feed into, and 
receives feedback from, a dynamic and relational working environment that is both post-modern and 
post-religious where the question of God returns God after the-death-of God and after the Christianity 
of the modern and secular age.
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2.6 TERMS AND TERMINOLOGY
The struggle to express the meaning of “God” in language is well noted by Frankenberry (1987:24-
25) who says that:
“From Plato to the present, human reason has struggled to give conceptual expression to 
what is meant by “God”. Competing rational systems of thought have been constructed, 
skilful theistic arguments have been advanced, and bold speculative syntheses have 
been proposed.
In recent years, as the problem of God as shifted from the onotological to the linguistic 
level, questions have been raised as to the meaningfulness of all conceptions of God and 
the cognitivity of any assertive claims concerning God’s existence, nature, attributes, and 
relations to the world.”
There are a number of concepts that recur throughout the dissertation, and though explained at some 
point, perhaps the explanation occurs later than the introduction of the concept or word. Therefore it 
is best to refer to the glossary provided earlier to familiarise the reader ahead with these concepts as 
contextualised within this dissertation.
2.7 AUDIENCE
This researcher is situated within an era of decolonization wherein Christianity varies considerably 
within a context and across contexts. Thus there is a tremendous difference between highly traditional 
and modern churches, between Orthodox and independent, denominations and movements, Catholic 
and Protestant, as well as between Catholic and Catholic, Protestant and Protestant, etc. Yet the 'God 
after God' conversations are relevant to people throughout the western world. When we speak about 
Christianity we speak about it is a whole and generally with the awareness a broad understanding is 
not achieved at the exclusion of the complexity and diversity. The 'God after God' conversations this 
researcher engages in includes people in the far north such as United Kingdom and European Union, 
the far west within North America and Canada, and the far south within Australia from the perspective 
of a South African. The goal is to enable the furthering of the 'God after God' conversation not for 
Christianity but with those postmodernists engaging the world's religions, including Christianity, not 
to return to them but to answer the questions as people who are post-Christian and post-religious. This 
is not, then, a dissertation grappling with Christianity as it finds its way in the modern world but for 
those grappling with finding their way out of Christianity and religion in a post-modernising world.
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2.8 CONCLUSION
I began by acknowledging that at the heart of this dissertation lies an elusive problem perhaps 
enhanced rather than resolved here. In its simplest form this dissertation is a conversation about God 
with others conversing about God as 'God after God' conversations. This is not a work that can claim 
to speak for or on behalf of Christianity while focusing on and being concerned with Christianity.
Here the exploration is of worldviews and Christianity leading into the present, but its not a work 
for Christians in the present. Instead, it is work done in order to gain an understanding of Christianity 
as it has preceded into the present world wherein the returning question of God is also the question 
that returns after the Christianity of the modern and secular age.
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– 3 –
Modern philosophy
The secular age of religious pluralism we live in differs remarkably from the earlier world(view) of 
Christendom. Modern philosophy grapples with the significance of the Copernican Revolution and the-
death-of God and metaphysics. In this chapter we explore the notion of a world(view), their change, 
and the diversification of religion in relation to the secular world(view). We also consider that multiple 
religious world(view) s coexist today by finding space and expression within the broader secular age as 
a place-holder and banner world(view). modern philosophy wrestles with the transition of world(view) s 
and is a significant “God after God” conversation related to the absence of God and God-absence.
3.1 THE MODERN ERA
We recognise that there is a correspondence between the world we live in, those we live within in 
relation to the world, and the way we see, interpret and understand the world. As such, we share 
paradigms with our society and community. And as the world changes, so too does our view of the 
world. Our world(view) changes because the world changes and as our world changes so too does our 
view of thereof. We then speak of a world(view) bringing both the world and our viewpoint together. 
As one’s world(view) is shared, communal, participatory, and constellational ‘paradigm’.
List 3.1.1 World(view) s as constellational paradigms
3.1.1.1 ‘Paradigm’ may stand for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, 
contributions, etc. shared by members of a given community (Kuhn 1970:175) as well 
as what that community excludes. We use the concept in this sense as world(view) 
as recognised academic fields whether in the natural sciences or humanities as well 
as of boundaried social groups and sub-groups. We also make use of ‘paradigm’ in 
this sense when speaking of the pre-Modern western world(view) as the Christian-
Aristotelian world(view), Modernity as its consecutive successor, and of the modern 
Christian world(view) as developed post-Christendom in relation to and within the 
world(view) of Modernity.
3.1.1.2 ‘Paradigm’ may denote one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-
solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a 
basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles (Kuhn 1970:175). We note this earlier 
and will later reflect on  Christianity as a faith paradigm or world(view) wherein the 
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church is paradigmatically and constellational central to Christians and Christianity. 
Christianity itself continuous as various constellational paradigms or world(view) s 
within the banner world(view) of the secular age.
As constellations of paradigms, world(view) s are highly functional and boundary the world that 
people inhabit and interpret their world for them.
List 3.1.2 The basic functions of a world(view).
3.1.2.1 World(view) s provide explanations. We do not figure out everything for ourselves 
without the input of people who have come before. Every world(view) provides 
explanations of the world, society and ourselves. These explanations are the stories that 
structure and enable our relationship with our environment and other people. As such, 
our world(view) is not just of the world we live in but also the filter through which we 
appreciate and boundary our world. Different world(view) s tell different stories about 
the world and people live in relation to their world as guided by those stories.
3.1.2.2 General assumptions and core paradigms. Our world(view) is the basis for evaluating, 
judging and validating our experience while itself creating the boundaries of what 
the world is and teaching us how to live in relation to it. Events and circumstances 
are approached from the point of view or reference of our world(view). As such, our 
world(view) consists of general assumptions and core paradigms we are socialised into 
and contribute toward maintaining.
3.1.2.3 Psycho-social reinforcement. As we share a world(view) in common with others, 
we all contribute toward reinforcing the set of general and shared assumptions, core 
paradigms, and assumed explanations. This enables social cohesiveness within our 
world(view) wherein the patterning of our family, occupation, and faith takes place. 
Our world(view) is then co-created and translates the world abstracted from stimuli 
and our social world. There is a powerful psychological and social, or psycho-social, 
dovetailing between our world(view) as interpreter and interface strengthening the 
individual in relation to the world(view) and the world(view) in relation to its people.
3.1.2.4 Integrate new information. Our values, philosophies, experiences and understanding 
of the world is inherited and then need not be personally confirmed or defined anew, 
with anything new first processed against ready-made templates as model questions 
and established answers. As such, our world(view) consists of general assumptions 
with most new experiences, insights and theories integrated positively within the 
collective world(view). World(view) s then, and in general, develop incrementally 
through innovation. And what lies too far outside our world(view) may be explained 
away or rejected and in so doing our world(view) remains stable.
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We first begin with a model of a world(view) and then explore what sets the Christian-Aristotelian 
world(view) so far apart from the modern world(view) to show that the Christian world(view) has 
more in common with the modern world(view) than the Christendom it succeeds.
3.1.1 MODEL OF A WORLD(VIEW)
A world(view) is then a meta-concept/perspective/lens comprised of the world we live in, our 
understanding and explanations thereof, and the society we live within. We are born into a world(view) 
and contribute toward it. Our world(view) is a conditional psycho-social co-construction between 
the individual, their environment and their broader community. A world(view) is then both the 
environment we live in as the world and the lens through which we interpret that environment. It is 
our view of the world, the world we live in, and those we live in relation to.
A world(view) is thus a meta-translator between people and their world as well as people sharing 
their world(view) before them and after them. It is anchored historically in the past, geographically in 
the present, and evolutionally or eschatologically in the future. A world(view) looks to the horizons 
of time and geography as well as the depths and height of their accomplishments and contributions 
while being shared across generations in the past and future. A world(view) thus defines the world 
even as it is reciprocally defined by it.
And as a conditional, temporal, and social construction we can model a world(view) as follows in 
Diagram 3.1.1.1 Anatomy of a world(view) below.11
List 3.1.1.1 Anatomy of a world(view) above:
3.1.1.1.1 Beginning. Every era and world(view) has a “beginning” associated with the history 
of particular people with an era easier to date than their world(view). The “beginning” 
of an era may be dated to events and individuals, though debated as dynamic process 
of originating.
3.1.1.1.2 End. Every era and world(view) also has an “end” associated with the history of a 
particular people with said “end” easier to date as era than world(view). Even as the 
“beginning” is a dynamic process so too is the “end” a dynamic process often dated to 
events and individuals.
3.1.1.1.3 World(view). Every world(view) is a meta-, unifying- and orienting-perspective 
and story that can be identified with a particular people within specific geographies 
and dates. Here we find the core operating paradigm or assumptions shared across a 
world(view). With regard to God, in a secular world(view) the paradigmatic script is 
“that God is not” and within a religious world(view) “that God is”.
11	 JS	Krüger	offers	this	model	in	Signposts	to	spirituality,	allowing	us	to	here	explore	some	of	the	implications	in	relation	to	the	
recognised	convergence	of	world(view) s	and	emergence	of	a	postmodern	world(view).
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Diagram 3.1.1.1 Anatomy of a world(view)
When considering the life-cycle of a worldview we may model as per Diagram 3.1.1.2 Life cycle of a 
world(view) above, resulting in a paradigm shift with regard to religious belief in God. Expanding on 
the diagram above we retain “beginning”, “end” and “world(view)” but recognise that both era and 
world(view) develop from “beginning” to “end” whilst maintaining their “story” or “world(view)”.
List 3.1.1.2 Life cycle of a world(view)
3.1.1.2.4 Expansion. Every era, and related world(view), develops over time and expands in 
scope toward a peak of civilization and story from their “beginning”. We may think of 
this as expansion in the form of developing, exploring and growing.
3.1.1.2.5 Recession. Every era, and related world(view), recedes over time and declines in scope 
from the peak of their civilization toward their “end”. We may think of the recession 
in the form of a contraction, stabilization and regression.
3.1.1.2.6 Retrospective. Every world(view), related to an or consecutive eras, tells a story that 
is cohesive and based on their heights. While expanding, every world(view) tells a 
story in light of its projected heights rather than in keeping with its state of being or 
level of self-evaluated progress.
3.1.1.2.7 Origin. Every world(view) tells a story going beyond the beginning of the era it speaks 
for, though the origin is only accessible through storytelling.
3.1.1.2.8 Decline. Every world(view) , related to consecutive eras, tells a story that is equally 
cohesive during its recession. While declining, every world(view) t lls a story in 
light of its projected heights rather than in keeping with its progress. Where religious 
world(view) s tell creation stories, such as Christianity telling the story of God creating 
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everything from nothing, we find our secular modern world(view) telling a similar 
story of the Big Bang. Both are available in texts and held to, albeit divisively, by 
representatives and adherents of their respective world(view) s.
3.1.1.2.9 Destiny. Every world(view) tells a story going beyond the end of the era it speaks 
for, though the destiny is only accessible through storytelling. Where religious 
world(view) s tell eschatological stories related to how God is going to close history 
our secular modern world(view) tells a similar story of the Big Crunch. Both stories 
are available in texts and held to, albeit divisively, by representatives and adherents of 
their respective world(view) s.
3.1.1.2.10 Secular world(view). Every secular world(view), often as successor to sacral 
world(view), transitions to the default faith position of secularism that ‘God is not’. The 
secular age challenges every sacral world(view) most especially with regards to their 
politics, science and religion. Here whether exploring the world(view) s of Christians, 
Buddhists or Hindus (by way of example rather than as exhaustive) each transitions 
from a sacral world(view) where their respective faiths played a central role in society 
to a secular world(view) where they continue as anachronistic and peripheral. 
3.1.1.2.11 Religious world(view). Every sacral world(view), as now rooted in their modern 
secular world(view), seeks to retain their earlier faith position that their ‘God-concept 
is’, though what God ‘is’ as ‘concept’ differs significantly between and among 
Christians, Buddhists and Hindus. Here there is a preservation of sacral world(view) 
as continuing into the culture, faith and values related of the secular age. Here the 
faith diversifies within the family and within society. We may, for example, find (1) 
religious fundamentalists rejecting the secular world(view) as easily as find (1) a 
sacral conservatism adhering to sacral values and faiths interpreted anew in a secular 
world(view) as readily as (1) liberal expressions redefining the faith entirely through 
the lens of the secular age.
In light of the above, we need to consider that our secular world(view) is in constant dialogue with 
our sacral world(view) s and that such dialogue is no longer predominantly a theistic Christian or 
secular atheistic or humanist concern. And on the foundation of the converging world(view) s within 
the secular age a new world(view) is emerging that is ‘post-’ not only with regards to the secular 
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and modern but also the nationalisms and religions that succeed the secular age. And yet, within this 
world(view) that is “post-” with respect to religion, that the question of God returns afresh and anew.
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Diagram 3.1.1.2 Life cycle of a world(view)
3.1.2 CONSECUTIVE WESTERN WORLD(VIEW) S
World(view) s develop as successors to one another and over a relatively long history. Our present 
secular world(view) developed over a long period of time in relation to historical peoples and eras 
within a narrow northern geographic area variously considered western, European and Christian and 
as expressed in and through modern colonial and cultural expansionism. And though it is perhaps 
more conceptually than geographically boundaried today, the historical lineage of Christian people 
and their faith can be traced through the early modern era to the medieval period to the early Roman 
Empire. And though it is a complex history, we may summarise it as per Diagram 3.1.2 Consecutive 
world(view) s below:
List 3.1.2.1 Consecutive world(view) s
3.1.2.2.1 Graeco-Roman world(view). The Graeco-Roman people, era and world(view) pre-
date the modern world(view) and yet their world(view) is the foundation of our modern 
world(view).
3.1.2.2.2 Medieval world(view). The Medieval people, era and world(view) succeed the 
Western Graeco-Roman world and internalise the Graeco-Roman world(view). The 
later Medieval era sees the rise of Christendom as a direct expression of the earlier 
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world(view), yet the Medieval world(view) remains unique. The Medieval world(view) 
owes itself to the Graeco-Roman era, people and world(view).
3.1.2.2.3 Modern world(view). The modern people(s), era and world(view) s arise from both 
Graeco-Roman and Medieval world(view) s, yet the modern world(view) is unique. 
This era differs from its predecessors in that they were successive and competitive, 
often eliminating each other. Here the modern world(view) owes itself to the Graeco-
Roman and Medieval eras, peoples and world(view) s. It differs in that it is an equalizer 
among the diverse world(view) s of the modern world enabling the convergence of all 
peoples and bringing the somewhat equal challenge of secularism to all religions.
3.1.2.2.4 Post-modern world(view). The Postmodern people(s), era and world(view) s 
arise from the modern world(view) s, yet is not only unique in its own right. Yet it 
equally owes its existence to the Graeco-Roman, Medieval and modern peoples, eras 
and world(view) s. It differs from the earlier world(view) s in being conditionally 
constructed from all the modern and modernizing world(view) s. Yet it is, potentially, 
equally post- with regard to all their religions and the anatheistic conversation is likely 
equally post- with regard to all their secularisms and religions.
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Diagram 3.1.2 Consecutive world(views)
Of course, as summarised above this is highly simplified. We may see these as successive geographic 
and historical peoples and their respective world(views) enabling a recent global people. As such 
this world(view) incorporates the contributions of various preceding civilizations as world(view) s as 
though it is the same world(view) advancing. And though each preceding world(view) was perhaps 
more bound to peoples and places, the new post-sacral world(view) is globally connected with and 
enabled by the recently modernised generations of all the world’s peoples. As such, the post-sacral 
world(view) is as equally a post-Western world(view) as it is a post-African or post-Asian world(view) 
and yet it is conditionally co-constructed from among the various modernised and modernizing 
peoples in, for example but not limited to, Europe, Africa and Asia.
Looking back, we can easily acknowledge that the post-sacral western people arise in relation 
to the secular European people, the secular in relation to the sacral people in the same geographic 
region, and the sacral in that region in relation to the Roman people spanning what is now Europe, 
the Middle East and North Africa. And though we may debate the dates and events in relation to 
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each, and even the notion of the West or Europe (as we can for Africa or Asia) such debate is not 
immediately necessary for the development of a model of successive world(view) s and the 'God after 
God' conversations explored in relation to the post-sacral age as Christianity after modernity.
We may also note that Christianity should perhaps no longer be considered a western phenomenon 
and faith as the broader Christian lineage extended across North Africa and the Middle East and 
beyond. Yet as Christianity has classically been centred in Rome in Christian thinking following 
Rome’s adoption of Christianity (380) we can bundle it together with an exploration of consecutive 
western world(view) s within the same geographic region. Even ahead of the fall of the Western Empire 
of Rome (around 500) we find Rome and Constantinople serving as the strong poles of the Christian 
faith that is by then a divided Roman Empire with centres in each. This division was perhaps, in part, 
cemented for the Christian faith following the Islamic conquests of Alexandria (641), Antioch (613) 
and Jerusalem (637), leaving Constantinople as its equivalent in the East to Rome in the West till the 
Great Schism (1054) and reinforced by the thankless sacking of the Constantinople by its Western 
brethren (1204). It is then fair to discuss the lineage of Christianity as tied to the consecutive western 
world(view) s, bearing in mind that it is not solely a western phenomenon.
This is in large part due to our focus on 'God after God' conversations that include Catholicism and 
Protestantism as descendants of an earlier Western Christendom itself rooted as first as the church in 
the Roman Empire and then as monasticism in the Western Empire preceding Western Catholicism as 
perhaps even synonymous with Christendom. We do, however, need to be mindful of the complicated 
connection of the developing Christendom with regard to its patristic foundations and the 'ekklesia' as 
the people of God rather than Christianity as the institution of the church as sponsored by the Empire 
as the official religion of the empire or Christendom as a society within the former and broader Roman 
Empire and the later historical developments earlier in Europe, the Middle East and Africa and more 
recently as following colonization and post-colonization. This enables us to triangulate the trajectory 
of the faith as synoptically  expressed within the 'ekklesia' as the people of God within a broader 
society preceding the West as patristic foundations, within the developing West, and succeeding the 
West in the post-modern world(view) s as related to the church, Christendom and Catholicism and 
Protestantism as its descendants.
And though Diagram 3.1.2 Consecutive world(view) s above is perhaps too simplistic, we should 
note that there is a complex and dynamic relationship between the Christian faith, the Roman Empire, 
Christendom and its descendants as Catholicism and Protestantism leading into the early and later 
modern era.
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3.1.3 WHY WORLD(VIEW) S CHANGE
Within the modern era of the history of the west we experienced religion, science and politics 
branching off into discrete endeavours from a unified Medieval Era as Christendom. Recognised 
as such, there is a political reformation within politics, a scientific reformation within science, and 
a religious reformation within religion which all have to do with their respective governance. It is 
important to note that the present Christian world(view) developed in relation to the faith first being 
adopted as the official religion of the Roman Empire, furthered through remaining independent of 
that same Empire, later coming to be so closely associated with the Christendom that is the new 
Holy Roman Empire and Holy Roman Church in the later Medieval Era, which brings us to the 
modern world(view) wherein the reformations within science, politics and religion provide us with 
Christianity as the church that is now a highly complicated bundle and collection of Catholicism-s 
and Protestantism-s. Again, though the dates and details are important, they are not immediately 
relevant to the development of our model of the Christian worldview. 
There is thus an interplay between consecutive world(view) s that build on each other. A world(view) 
has a lifespan as modelled below in Diagram 3.1.3.1 Paradigmatic contributions within a world(view) 
below. World(view) s change once incremental challenges add up to produce a revolution wherein the 
world(view) is reconstituted anew.
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Diagram 3.1.3.1 Paradigmatic contributions within world(view) s
List 3.1.3.1 Paradigmatic contributions within world(view) s
3.1.3.1.1 The straw that breaks the camel’s back (the human side). Advances and contributions 
as innovations and paradigms are constantly emerging and integrating. Not every 
advance, contribution or idea will lead to the reconstitution of world(view). However, 
there are those that serve not only as contributive but redefining. The reconstitution of a 
world(view) depends on the consensus of many, as evidenced by the Heliocentrism of 
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Aristarchus of Samos (310-230 BCE) being rejected and that of Nicholas Copernicus 
(1473-1543 CE) accepted with the Copernican Revolution. (One could, and perhaps 
should, argue that Christ’s revolution over temple-based and nation-based religion was 
overturned with the establishment and development of the church.) Where New Physics 
opens us to a new scientific paradigm following soon from the Newtonian so too does 
Pietism and the subsequent Awakenings open Christianity to a new religious paradigm 
following the Reformation as unfinished.
3.1.3.1.2 The activity of a transcendent Person (the divine side). A world(view) can also be 
defined by the intervention and activity of a divine beings. And whether one and the 
same or simply different transcendent persons making the same claim as competitors 
is not a question we seek to answer here. Instead we recognise that such a transcendent 
Person is reported as self-identify as the “I AM” to Moses (c. 13th century BCE); that 
the historical man Jesus returns as the risen Lord (c. 6/4 BCE to 33/36 CE) appearing 
(c. 33-36 CE) to Saul of Tarsus (c.5-64/67 CE) and to no small number of others in 
the millennia since; that such a transcendent Person is reported to send representatives 
such as with the angel Gabriel appearing to Muhammad (570-632 CE) in a cave (c. 
610 CE). And though not world(view) reconstituting as a fact12 alone, this is the like 
experience of many even today and not well considered by philosophers. We can 
add to this the various experiences of primal and shamanistic as well as new age 
spiritualities and spiritualism involving transcendent persons as ancestors, angels, and 
gods/goddesses.13 
Though world(view) s have mostly ended with the death of civilizations they have also developed 
within as consecutive world(view) s wherein the same world(view) has been reconstituted through 
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We model this in Diagram 3.1.3.2 The paradigmatic redefinition of world(view) s below.
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3.1.3.2.1 Paradigm A. An outdated paradigm no longer contributing to the present world(view). 
Yet it is perhaps one that has perhaps never played a role in the past of this world(view) 
even though, objectively speaking, such a paradigm exists elsewhere.
3.1.3.2.2 Paradigm B. A paradigm that played a role in the past of this world(view) but no 
longer plays a s g ificant role in the current and established world(view). An example 
is perhap  that of our sacral world(view) s that are outdated but once defined the 
world(view).
3.1.3.2.3 Paradigm C. A paradigm that plays a present role in this world(view) and has found a 
place within the banner world(view). Examples of this include our sacral world(view) s 
continuing in the present secular world(view).
3.1.3.2.4 Paradigm D. A paradigm that is significant but not incorporated into the world(view) 
as a banner world(view) or the continuing sacral world(view) it hosts.
Most events and contributions are integrated by a world(view) into itself, however a world(view) 
is constituted anew through world-altering contributions. Whenever the world is reshaped so too is 
a civilisation’s view of the world. There is thus an outgoing world(view) that gets de-constructed 
from within and then re-constituted around a new paradigmatic centre that emerges from within the 
outgoing world(view) as a new world(view).
Modernization enables the convergence of all people’s which changes both world and world(view). 
Through modernization previously isolated people are now enabled to live together in relation to 
their world and each other in a new, modern, way. Modernization is, however, not a simple process 
of expanding a world(view) but rather a reconstitution of a world(view) around a new paradigmatic 
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centre. It needs to be said that though Christianity has been paradigmatically central within the same 
geographic region that there is a complex internal relationship between Christianity and Christendom 
wherein they should not be considered synonymous. We can, however, appreciate that they may be 
considered synonymous.
The 'God after God' conversations are a tremendously brave adventure in admitting the human 
and transcendent contributions to the people of the earth as a whole. This is, practically speaking, 
also tremendously risky in that there is also the admission of transcendent persons, realities and their 
respective representatives.
3.1.4 THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION
Within the Western world(view) the Copernican Revolution is a decisive transition between the 
Christian-Aristotelian world(view) of Christendom as supported by metaphysics in the sacral age and 
by rationalism in the secular age. The Christian Reformation takes place in the same era resulting in 
the institutional church as now Catholicism and Protestantism. And therewith we find each respective 
expression of the institutional church wrestling with each other and Modernity.
We may view the complex and interrelated history of the Western Roman Empire as comprising a 
period wherein: (1) Christianity was adopted as the official religion; (2) the Western Roman Empire 
fell to the Visigoths; (3) Christendom emerged to take over governance of the form Western Roman 
Empire and re-established the monarchy and papacy; (4) these all contributed toward the sacral 
world(view) of Western secular society.
The most significant transition lies, however, with the remarkable difference in cosmology. In the 
Christian-Aristotelian world(view) the entire Cosmos revolved around the Earth at its centre. Here the 
sum total of the universe consisted of 6 planets, 42 fixed constellations set against a crystalline sphere, 
and the abode of God lying just beyond. Everything within the Cosmos was neatly and hierarchically 
ordered. Here transcendence was spatially conceived and God viewed as reigning over the cosmos 
as a geographically-transcendent outsider. In this world(view) one could literally ascend through the 
heavens to place a flag on the terrain of Heaven lying beyond the Cosmos on the other side of the 
crystalline sphere. And God reigned hierarchically over the geographic and political terrain of the 
Earth through the representation of the Emperor and the Pope who live in Rome.
It is in the context of the Christian-Aristotelian world(view) that the Copernican Revolution takes 
place and religion, philosophy, science and politics are unbundled from each other. It is also here 
that  the most significant tension emerges between science and religion resulting in a divorce that 
continues till the present. Where the older world(view) united politics, religion, philosophy, science, 
economics, etc. all under one singular metaphysical umbrella as the given world(view) the secular 
world(view) distinguishes each from the other. This world(view) also transitions between very 
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different conceptions of how the world is governed. It transitions from a hierarchical conception with 
God reigning over the Heavens and on the Earth through the representation of the Emperor and Pope 
in Rome to humans governing their respective nation-states and ordering their respective institutions. 
Where we previously had a united metaphysical philosophy drawing every governing institution 
together, we now have rationalism providing internal coherence to discrete or separated institutions.
Alongside the Copernican Revolution the Reformations of the institutional Church establish 
Christianity after Christendom as Catholicism and Protestantism in all their diversity. Here the Catholic 
Church views itself as governed by the Pope on the basis of Tradition or Apostolic Succession while 
the Protestant Church views itself as governed by the Scriptures on the basis that they are the eternal 
and living Word of God seen as taking precedence over Tradition.
The Copernican Revolution marks a transition in secular and religious thinking. Here the older 
metaphysics of the Christian-Aristotelian world(view) is replaced with the Rationalism of Modernity. 
And within this period, we see the emergence of (1) early essentialism, (2) Constructivism, (3) 
Essentialism, (4) modern Christian theology, and (5) modern Christian spirituality. And each struggles 
to understand the religions of the world in light of the transition from the Christian-Aristotelian 
world(view) to the rationalism of Modernity.
Though we recognise the diversification in relation to the consecutive Western world(view) s it is 
perhaps better to work with an understanding that enables us to speak about the world(view) s across 
the Earth. Caputo puts forward the sacral, secular and post-secular, which we have already made 
liberal use of.
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Diagram 3.1.4 Three consecutive world(view) s
List 3.1.4 Three consecutive world(view) s.
3.1.4.1. The sacral age. Where society is governed by the religious (Caputo 2001: 38) and 
“religious” is not a dirty word. Here the individual lives in relation to a given idea of 
God and seeks the God they know about (Caputo 2001:39-42).
3.1.4.2. The secular age. Here logic or reason prevails and we no longer begin with a “given” 
with regard to God or society (Caputo 2001: 42). Here the world is divided between the 
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“religious” and “secular” (Caputo 2001:43). It is here that the notion of what exists has 
to do with whether it exists objectively or is predicated - between whether it is there 
or whether we agree upon it and shape our lives in relation to our agreements (Caputo 
2001:44). It is here that science becomes about the material world as objectively 
independent of the viewer that becomes the subject of science and religion relegated to 
the subjective and internal world of persons (Caputo 2001:44-45). Here God “ceases 
to exist” as an objective reality and comes to exist only within the hearts and minds of 
the believer as subjectively produced. Caputo (2001:55-56) notes that:
   “By the end of the nineteenth century God was indeed all but dead to the 
intellectuals. Religious faith had become scientifically dubious (Darwin), 
psychoanalytically twisted (Freud), and cosmically and politically reactionary 
(Marx), while Kierkegaard was saying Christian faith represented a leap into 
the absurd. The view from the pews was largely unshaken by all this. Modernity 
had no spiritual vision to offer in the place of the one it had torn down, which 
is perhaps why religion still prospered among the poor and uneducated rank 
and file in the churches. But religion was dead or dying fast among its learned 
despisers as science progressed and the general level of learning rose.”.
   Christianity seems to build its contemplative spirituality off this very foundation. 
We shall consider this later.
3.1.4.3. Post-secular. In the new and emerging world(view) we find “faith flourishing without 
metaphysical backup” and the question of God returning to people (Caputo 2001:56-
57). Here we see the “metaphysical recuperation of the pre-metaphysical situation of 
faith” (Caputo 2001:58). Here people are not returning to the established religions but 
looking to live their lives as guided by their questioning and yearning for the deeper 
and more to life and of love. Here the-death-of God is also the-death-of absolute truth 
and metaphysics (Caputo 2001:59). An emerging people now seeks a new way of being 
after the sacral and secular ages (Caputo 2001:69). It is a world(view) where people 
are as suspicious of pre-modern sacral metaphysics as it is of modern and secular 
certainties (Caputo 2001:66).
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3.1.5 DIVERSIFICATION
An inevitable result of moving away from metaphysics as given in revelation or available and purely 
attained by reason toward rationalism as determining the meaning and validating what is true from 
below. Inevitably this results in the diversification of religious world(view) s that takes place within 
the family and society as the core paradigms change. Here we transition from politics and religion as 
given and universal in the sacral age to membership in formally constituted institutions and not-for-
profit businesses in the secular age.
3.1.5.1 RELIGIOUS DIVERSIFICATION FAMILIES
Within the same family or household one generation can easily be the modernizing generation 
wrestling with their traditional faith in a modern world(view) while their children, the next generation, 
may include a number of different individuals commuting daily between that modernizing sacral 
world(view) within the family to the public world(view) of the secular age. One household can 
include a generation born in the sacral age, now aged and passing, who parent a new generation born 
in a secular age, and even a third generation born in the post-sacral age.
Several generations of people may hold to and commute between different world(view) s daily. Here 
with traditional, modern and modernizing world(view) s coexisting however precariously and supportive 
in relation to each other. The following model can as easily represent a Christian family, whether Catholic 
or Protestant, as it can a family rooted in African Traditional Religion, Islam, Hinduism or Buddhism. We 
model this diversification within the family in Diagram 3.3.6 Religious diversification within families 
below. As below, we model the diversification from modernizing to modern where Generation 1 are 
parents who live with a sacral world(view) who parent Generation 2 as raised within the home within 
that sacral world(view) while commuting, often daily, to the public secular world(view) where they are 
educated and work.
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Let’s explore the diagram above. We find two world(view) s co-existing – the sacral world(view) in 
the home and the secular world(view) at large. The individual raised and commuting between the 
two is challenged to work out what they believe in a secular world(view) characterised by choice and 
opportunity. In turn that individual may choose to become a believer as in choosing the ‘belief for’ 
their god-concept as provided within the family and religious world(view) s. Yet they could as easily 
choose to be ‘undecided and agnostic’ or choose to be an atheist as a choice to ‘believe against’ the 
religious world(view) s they inherit.
Yet this if further complicated. As sub-cultures of believers can consist of ‘sacral fundamentalists’, 
‘sacral traditionalists’ and ‘sacral modernists’. Each is a distinct collection of paradigms prioritizing 
the sacral and secular in different ways. Similarly, the atheist can be a ‘secular fundamentalist’ perhaps 
embracing a strong anti-theism or a ‘secular modernist’ to whom religion is an anomaly they can 
appreciate without having to work against.
What is important here is understanding that such differences in world(view) an co-exist in close 
proximity to each other and yet people can not only see the world in different ways but go about living 
in the world in completely different ways.
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3.1.5.2 RELIGIOUS DIVERSIFICATION IN SOCIETY
Within society the transition from traditional world(view) to modern world(view) though successive 
is paradigmatically significant. Where the traditional world(view) integrates all aspects of life 
and politics, science and religion are rolled into one, the modern world(view) distinguishes them 
and considers their relative lack of scientific knowledge to mean that they are equally uneducated 
politically and religiously because they are somehow wrong at the scientific foundation of their faith. 
During this process the practice of faith transitions from the public centre of life to the specialised 
sideline while the common, or public, life becomes secular and anything related to faith and religion 
shifts from the public governance of society toward the private life and practices of the individual.
The transition from sacral to secular age and world(view) is a complete revolution rather than innovative, 
development14. The result is a secularization15 that is as much a desacralisation of the common life and 
the establishment of discrete specializations of social institutions. Here both monarchy and church, as 
expressions of Empire, are segregated from public, and now secular as opposed to religious, life. There 
is thus a distinction between the interest of the public as all people and that of the monarchy or church 
in a sacred and secular. The result is that each is constituted anew.
Though modernization results in a marked distinction between the modern and traditional 
world(view) s as eras, there is not only a separation of religion from the public life of all but also the 
diversification of religious world(view) s within a modernizing and modern society takes place in and 
in relation to modernity as world(view). The adaptation of religions to the modern era and world(view) 
takes place as both innovation and revolution. Religions are highly innovative and adaptive and find 
many ways to continue within a modern world.
This diversification, and the continuing relevance of religion, is argued for by the religious and 
seeded into a secular society through continued provision of goods and services as representing God. 
This continuing of relevance goes alongside the now irrelevance of religion as somewhat enabling 
each other. There is a handover between the goods, services and products of the faiths and the sciences.
Religious diversification takes place generally as modelled in Diagram 3.1.5.2 Religious 






M.Th. Timothy Victor Student #: 3182-738-152
God “is” God “is not”














Collapses “origin” and “beginning”




















































































































3.1.5.2.1 A traditional expression of their sacral/premodern religion. These sacral 
world(view) s can be various primal religions such as those of Africa, for example the 
Zulu worship of Unkulunkulu, and those of the Native American Peoples, such as the 
Hopi worship of Tara, the sun spirit as creator, or the Lakota worshipping Inyan as 
the named equivalent of the Hopi. It can also be one the world’s great religions such 
as the Indian worship of the supreme spirit Brahma or the equivalent ‘voidness’ or 
‘emptiness’ of Therevāda Buddhist as suññatā and Mahāyāna Buddhist as Śūnyatā, 
and the creator gods of the monotheisms of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which all 
lay claim to their respective ‘God’ as God – whether ‘God’ as the Yahweh  of the Old 
Testament and Judaism, ‘God’ as the Trinity (Father, Son and Spirit) of later Christian 
theology, and Allah as ‘God’ of Islam16. In their own way each of these, and the 
various other sacral religions, sha e  common equaliser in the crucible of modernity. 
Within every secularizing world(view) we find sacral religious communities refusing 
to secularise and who see modernity as an enemy of faith, beliefs, practices, values, 
culture, heritage, etc. Here the personal religions, as in the religion of persons engaging 
transcendent Persons, are particularly vulnerable while impersonal traditions, such as 
the Buddhocentric stream of faiths, find an ancient-modern parallel in the rejection 
of gods and faith. And though many personal faiths find their way forward to coexist 
and thrive within a broader secular age, there is a fundamentalist stream characterised 
16	 Though	our	focus	here	is	on	Christianity	it	is	not	unaware	of	the	deconstructionist	approach	where	Derrida,	for	example,	is	
'religious	sans	religion'	or	'religious	without	religion'.	
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perhaps by a militant rejection of secularism, such as the fundamentalist expression of 
Islam or Christianity, but mostly by a return to, say teaching the scriptures literally with 
creationism serving as example from Christianity. In this sense, we can readily healthy 
expression of traditional/premodern/sacral religion as values influencing behaviour 
and relationships which do not make headlines as well as unhealthy and dangerous 
expressions which do. In general, militant fundamentalism is truly an edge case while 
conceptual and attitudinal fundamentalism proves more enduring and pervasive.
3.1.5.2.2 A modernised expression of their sacral/premodern religion. Modernizing 
world(view) s do not only retain a sacral religion that refuses to update itself in relation 
to the secular age or in edge cases militantly oppose secularism, but also finds a new 
expression of their sacral world(view) as a modern or modernised religion. Here 
the sacral world(view) is updated within and in relation to the secular world(view), 
shifting from sacral pre-modern expression to modern. Here Christianity reconstituted 
in a complex manner first as a unified post-Nicaean religion within the Roman Empire 
toward Christendom and the church and then again, more recently, as a diversely 
fragmented faith in its post-Christendom expression as Catholicism and Protestantism. 
Here Catholicism and Protestantism are both orthodoxies developed in and in relation 
to modernity as era and world(view), in turn making way for newer and more innovative 
modern expressions of the church.
3.1.5.2.3 The emergence of a religious expression as uniquely modern and secular. 
Modernity also finds its own religious expression wherein atheism and secularism 
become religious and a form of spirituality, meaning not that they register as official 
religions but that they stands not only as religious position or but as proponents of their 
world(view) that tells stories related to sacral world(view). Here the fideistic belief 
‘that God is’ has transitioned to the fideistic belief that ‘God is not’ as the consensus of 
the people. And even though this is the case, we adopt traditional practices and beliefs 
only to neuter them of their foundations in order to commercialise and commodify 
them. Here, by way of example, yoga and mindfulness have become a new expression 
in the secular age as somewhat distinct from their vital place within the sacral age 
of Hinduism and Buddhism. And though they may be culturally flavoured there is 
perhaps little is retained beyond linguistic depth. Instead, each becomes a modern 
and secular phenomenon that is part of the self-maintenance and self-management of 
people with zero concern for (1) the Self-realization that the self is in fact ‘the Self’ as 
in Brahma; (2) Enlightenment, that the self is in fact neither the self that is the self nor 
the self that is the Self, but is rather Śūnyatā,17 meaning that within there is no self at 
all; or (3) the Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) of Christ as Lord and saviour.
17	 The	usage	of	Śūnyatā	(shoon-ya-ta)	in	this	dissertation	is	not	without	regard	for	the	differences	between	the	Sanskrit	
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3.1.5.2.4 The development of new religious movements. The emergence of new religious 
movements in the secular age have been as either imported from one world(view) 
into another world(view), or have originated in their modernised context as new 
expressions of earlier religions, with faiths like the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, 
Seventh Day Adventists, etc.18 all wrestling within the same modern and modernizing 
era and world(view) as Calvinists and Lutherans alongside Anglicans and Catholics 
for what Christianity ‘is’. Here perhaps the impact of modernization and modernity 
on Africa, by way of example, unsettles traditional African Religion. And where 
traditional African religions struggle with modernization and modernity, people 
may readily convert to Christianity as Christian has long been presenting anew as a 
modern religion. Similarly, where Christianity has been pitted against science there is 
much encouragement for Buddhism finding science a valuable evangelistic partner to 
Christians struggling between their sacral and modern expressions. Here traditional 
premodern and sacral religion may be considered as flailing within the secular age 
while being challenged by the arrival and developments of other faiths already well 
adapted to the challenges of modernity.
3.1.5.2.5 Anatheism as the return, reconsideration or reopening of the question of God. The 
conversation explored here is not a conversation in relation to sacral, modern or new 
religious movements but rather a post-religious ana-theism as in a new or return to the 
question in the context of Christianity. It is a conversation intentionally focused on 
those done with religion and who seek not to return to the religions already established 
or even to establish a new religion.19 As such, it is a new expression of the problem of 
God20 not as tied to our Christianity but instead to our humanity.
3.1.5.3 PROGRESSIONS
We have, in a short space of time, transitioned from one earth at the centre of the universe with one 
sun, 6 planets and forty-two constellations made up of stars set against a crystalline sphere in the 
1500s till the 2000s where the next generation of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS-V) is a project 
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including the “Milky Way Mapper, the Black Hole Mapper and the Local Volume Mapper”21. and 
includes five large scale telescopes, two spectrographs with over five hundred robots tracking a small 
selection of the two-hundred-and-fifty-million visible stars, with that small selection a staggering six 
million stars. Yet the formal program makes place for individual contributions through making its 
database publicly available22. The scientific revolution begun with the Copernican Revolution has not 
simply continued but has also evolved exponentially in capacity.
The scientific revolution is not limited to astronomy and the hard sciences alone going back to the 
Copernican Revolution but ongoing. There are further developments in the physical, biological and 
social sciences of these with perhaps evolutionary theory remaining as a strong point of contention 
between religious fundamentalists and scientific fundamentalists. The implications of Gotama 
and Christ stand alongside those of Copernicus and Darwin and resound in the 'God after God' 
conversations. There is a progression in our knowledge not only in the hard sciences but also in the 
humanities, including our study of ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’. 
The practical complexity increases in all our scientific endeavours, including our investigations into 
religion and spirituality. Here the scientific method is applied equally to philosophical, theological 
and historical research and activities from within with Christian conservatives making some form 
of stand toward and against Christian fundamentalism and liberalism. Speaking relativistically, each 
may be contributing synoptically towards Christianity as it is today. However, the paradigmatic centre 
of each is what Krüger invites us to explore what we mean by God as in our “god-concepts” (1989:49) 
And with Derrida, what is it to be a Christian, or Jew, as the church as the people of God apart from 
a geopolitical Judaism and Christianity as repeating the “covenant in a religion without religion” 
(1997: xx-xxi). It is important to accept that the fundamentalism we find amidst modern Christianity 
is a response to the modern era and modernity world(view) and not necessarily representative of 
the preceding Christian faith. It is also codependent in relation to conservatism and liberalism who 
each support themselves in relation to the other. Furthermore, the shift to orthodoxy is a significant 
paradigm shift foundational enabling first Christendom and then the formal Church paradigm as 
central to Christianity.
It is to our models of consecutive world(view) s as a society wherein Christianity is itself a 
world(view) stemming from the consecutive world(view) s of Christians, that we couple the key 
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What is important in the diagram above is the recognition that a singular faith, such as Christianity, 
can be expressed in and through various consecutive world(view) s. The progressions are, however, 
not entirely synchronised between world(view) s. The western world(view) modernised from within 
and following the Copernican Revolution. Other world(view) s come to experience the same transition 
from sacral to secular along with their own diversifications in economics, politics, science, philosophy 
and religion within society and the family.
3.2 THE-DEATH-OF GOD
Though Nietzsche announces Modernity’s requiem æternam deo or “prayer for God as one recently 
deceased” this is based on developments in the modern world and the modern world(view). As 
summarised by Nietzsche (2010: loc.1443-1445/6623):
“God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort 
ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the 
world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? 
What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred 
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games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we 
ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?”
This announcement is based on the divorce between science and religion during and around the 
Copernican Revolution. The world that was once completely religious as Christendom is by Nietzsche’s 
time secular. God has long been silent and absent and now declared dead. This death took place 
possibly earlier with Christianity as having imbibed Aristotle’s science and Plato’s philosophy and 
the emerging science of the secular age as relieving itself from metaphysics along with the Monarchy 
and Pope of the sacral age. This conversation and theology develop further toward Christian churches 
serving as tombs and monuments to a God who is not only dead, but perhaps never existed to begin 
with. But there is an ongoing or returning question of God that dogs the death-of-God theology.
The-death-of God takes place in the Copernican Revolution and takes time for the implications to 
work its way through politics, philosophy and religion.
3.2.1 MODERN PHILOSOPHERS
Here we have a lineage of thinkers including Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger who are 
followed by Cupitt, Caputo and Kearney. And each, following the-death-of God, embrace a contextual 
hermeneutic encouraging people to think past and through the world(view) they have inherited to 
engage deeply with life and living.
Cupitt moves to a non-realist view of God (Cupitt 2011: loc.890/2281) as a point of departure 
for thinking about mysticism ‘after’ Modernity. The-death-of God is an idea, according to Cupitt, 
popular since the French Revolution and the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer, where Western 
philosophy permanently breaks away from God. By then humanity is “not the inhabitant of a fixed 
divine framework for his life, but rather as the maker of his own knowledge, his own history and 
his own social order” (Cupitt 2011: loc.492-525/2281). Here people finally break politically with 
the world(view) of Christendom as culminating in the French Revolution and with the religion of 
Christianity and its God with the-death-of God. Yet, according to Cupitt, the “full impact of the Death 
of God would be felt by the late twentieth century” (Cupitt 2011: loc.492-525/2281).
But this is also the death-of-all Grand Narratives, as in anything capitalised. Cupitt (2011: loc.492-
525/2281) reflects that:
"Sometimes I confess that I still love the dead God, just as I still love my dead parents. Most 
recently, I have begun trying to break away from the remnants of the idea of God as an 
infinite substance. Instead I see God as ‘God everliving and everdying’, a burning process, 
the outpouring and the utter transience of everything, into which we plunge and now which 
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we pass joyfully away. As a new religious symbol I like, not only the Sun and the Fountain, 
but also the dancers of Henri Matisse. See also Everything is a Period Piece."
Here Caputo notes that, for him “The play is all.” (Caputo 1987: 293). The death-of-God theology 
“remains relevant today” (Lombaard and Biernot 2018:10). For here thinkers such as Cupitt, Caputo 
and Kearney encourage us “but way of awakening to the play of the flux and hence of staying in the 
play oneself... after ‘owning up’ to the elusiveness which envelops us all ... to let all things–gods, 
earth, and mortals–be” (Caputo 1987: 293).
This is not as a return to Christendom and its metaphysics. Nor is it a preservation and argument 
for Christianity as Catholicism and Protestantism within the secular age. The death-of-God theology 
is furthered as the returning question of God perhaps best expressed in the thinking of Cupitt, Caputo 
and Kearney. It is with them in mind that we explore the question of what Christianity ‘is’ after the 
sacral age in the secular age. And even as Postmodern philosophers touch on the theology of the 
kingdom of God and the mystery thereof, they do not necessarily touch on the mysticism of the 
kingdom. Instead our exploration of the returning question of God follows on from the death-of-God 
not as returning us to the sacral religions and fundamentalisms and conservatisms but as a renewed 
and new questioning.
Cupitt invites us to consider what mysticism ‘is’ after the secular age, to a recovery of mysticism 
before and within the secular age, and Kearney helps us recognise the question as returning after the 
secular age. And here the question returns not as returning us to Christendom ‘before’ the secular age 
or as supporting Christianity as Catholicism and Protestantism ‘within’ the secular age but afresh 
and anew after the secular age. Here: Cupitt focuses on the lack of metaphysics and recapturing 
a religion without religion; Caputo directs us toward a retrieval and repetition of being religious 
without religion; And Kearney lends voice to what being religious without religious is as the present-
continuous event of inviting, waiting upon and welcoming the Stranger who draws near in Person.
The problem with world(view) s and our commuting between world(view) s is that two people 
standing on the same point on the earth at the same time can see entirely different worlds. The 
returning question of God for the secularist and modern Christian is completely different even as it is 
for the post-secularist seeking to be religious ‘sans’ or without religion. But where (1) the secularist 
may seek a world where God has been completely forgotten and (2) the modern Christian to return 
the world to its governance, the (2) post-secularist seeks a world ‘after’ both the sacral and secular 
ages. This question is particularly challenging to those committed to secularism and Christianity as 
Catholicism and Protestantism. But their challenges are not the primary concerns of the post-secular. 
Instead, their concern lies with the absence of God in the secular age and within Christianity therein. 
And as the post-secular emerge from the secular world(view), we gain an understanding of God’s 
absence in relation to that secular world(view) and the pluralism of modern religions therein.
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In the-death-of God theology God is viewed as silent, absent and dead in the sense of never having 
existed to begin with. Yet here we can (1) return to living without God or (2) remain open to the 
mystery or (3) repeat the invitation, wait upon and respond to the Stranger becoming present in 
Person. This is, perhaps as noted by Westphal in reference to Kearney, ‘anatheism as a work of 
philosophy and not theology’ (Westphal in Kearney 2016: loc.231/287).
3.2.2 NON-REALISM
The line of reasoning takes us to a non-realist view of God, meaning that the relationship with God is 
psychologically real but the ontological fabric of God is imaginative. God exists within the heart and 
mind of the believer but not as a Person ‘out there’. Or perhaps it is that God can exist as such, but 
also exists as a transcendent Person?
According to Cupitt (1984: loc. 3756/5689), modernity is “unhistorical and unsustained by the 
presence of tradition, it is both impoverished and sinful”. It is unhistorical as well represented in the shift 
from art as the “public symbolic communication celebrating public myths” from religion to the state and 
its institutions (Cupitt 1984: loc.3739/5689). And here religion has come to be understood as an “ever-
changing human product” (Cupitt 1984: loc.3788/5689) with them all equally true. Yet we no longer 
live in a secular world where the world is viewed as solid but viewed as fluid. It has become increasingly 
clear that ‘the discoveries of the modern scientific world are in fact inventions’ and therewith Cupitt 
(1984: loc.3788-3804/5689) notes that:
“long-established belief that there is an objective world-order that embodies just one 
intellectual structure, or (in the Kantian version) that the world can only be known as 
objective in so far as it is made to conform to the requirements of just one intellectual 
structure, at last broke down. It became increasingly clear that all theories are not discoveries 
but inventions, human imaginative constructions that are imposed upon experience and can 
be described as ‘true’ only in the sense that, and for so long as it is found that, they work 
usefully. To put it brutally, there is no ready-ordered objective reality any more: there is only 
the flux of becoming, and continuing ever-changing human attempts to imagine and impose 
order. We have to make sense, we have to turn chaos into cosmos.”
In fact, we do not only “copy or trace the structure of a pre-existing independent reality out there” but 
instead build our world and view of the world as world(view) therewith (Cupitt 1984: loc.4328/5689). 
Hence all our language is symbolic (Cupitt 1984: loc.4344/5689) and practical (Cupitt 1984: loc.4360). 
With Wittgenstein we see a shift Plato’s Being and how to get there from the imperfect emanations 
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thereof to Descartes knowledge, and how to acquire it, to meaning, and how to attain it (Cupitt 1984: 
loc.4443/5689) that represents the shift from the modern to the postmodern world(view).
According to Cupitt (1984: loc.4066/5689), Nietzsche’s the-death-of God is “more than simply 
dogmatic atheism” and means “nihilism” in the sense that everything is made and un-made and re-
made by people and for people. It is, democratic. And so, “in the end nothing exists except the range of 
possible forms of consciousness before us, and the need to choose what to make of our lives” (Cupitt 
1984: loc.4098/5689). We must “renounce the illusions of metaphysics and accept the primacy of the 
practical and of our common life” as derived not only from the “Judeo-Christian tradition” but all the 
world’s traditions (Cupitt 1984: loc.4500/5689).
Modern spirituality as secular and contemplative is tremendously similar to Wittgenstein as 
described by Cupitt (1984: loc.4241/5689) that it is in the sense of:
“a highly inner-directed person who needed before all else to satisfy his own conscience. 
To such a person believing in God and doing God’s will means the same thing as being 
inwardly free from falsity, having a right sense of oneself and one’s own life, and living 
a life that is both free and dedicated. Intellectual truthfulness must from and rest upon 
something more fundamental, moral truthfulness”
It is Wittgenstein along with Kant that fixes the limits of knowledge in order to make room for faith. 
Here what’s known is known and what is unknown is known by means of faith. And the trade-off is 
with making religious beliefs non-factual (Cupitt 1984: loc.4257/5689). Here “faith in God can shape 
your life, without its being necessary to suppose that God exists objectively ‘out there’”. Here we 
have the layman’s concept of religious belief (Cupitt 1984: loc.4293/5689). And as such, the belief 
moves toward “non-realism” (Cupitt 1984: loc.4533/5689) and God interpreted as a “guiding ideal, 
not given in experience but instead functioning as the ultimate focus and goal of our intellectual and 
moral life” (Cupitt 1984: loc.4549/5689). Here God comes to mean the human idea of God and as 
projected from the self, God is the Self (Cupitt 1984: loc.4549). The God-image then lies within the 
human psyche. It “does not matter if the ordinary person does not make a clear distinction between 
mystical and ontological realities… provided that he can use it to convey the true inward meaning of 
God” (Cupitt 1984: loc.4549/5689).
There is thus a shift in the “perception of religious meanings” along with a shift from religious 
“truth” to religious “meaning” (Cupitt 1984: loc.4564/5689). In the 20th century religion has “become 
entirely human” (Cupitt 1984: loc.4595/5689).
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Cuppitt (1984: loc.4738/5689) notes that we do not have to choose a “nostalgic realist theology” 
and that:
“This ‘Copernican revolution’ as Kant called it, spelled the end of the old realist 
metaphysical notion of God. The objective God of realise was inseprarably bound up 
with the idea of an objective and eternal cosmic order. When that order came to be seen 
as a human product, when for example it was realized that scientific theories are not 
discoveries but inventions, then the God of realism came to be seen as a mythic projection 
of the human mind. Feuerbach, Marx and others could regard the believer’s objective 
God only as his own magnified mirror-image. To them it seemed that religious belief was 
necessarily precritical in outlook, for it insisted on crediting God with cosmos-ordering 
and legislative powers that Kant had proved to be in fact our own.”
And now, according to Cupitt (1984: loc.4783/5689), the notion of “my God” is “an expression of my 
spiritual commitment to my life-aim” and therefore Cupitt (1984: 4873/5689) can argue that:
“Critical thinking begins with the theory of knowledge and is typically anthropocentric 
in outlook. It accepts without complaint the fact that human knowledge is after all just 
human knowledge, man-made, provisional, fallible. What else could it be? And the correct 
attitude to theory is neither sceptical nor dogmatic, but pragmatic. We must have theories, 
but each and ever theory is no more than a tool with a limited range of usefulness. Critical 
thinking seeks emancipation from the tyranny of theories that have become dogmas. Its 
spirit is light, supple, clearheaded and mobile, like Wisdom in ancient Judaism, and the 
Tao in China.”
Since the mid-nineteenth century Christian doctrine is also viewed as “a human expression, with a 
human history which can be traced in great detail as critical historical research displays the cultural 
settings, the human need and the power-interests that produced and established it” (Cupitt 1984: 
loc.4934/5689).
Cupitt agrees with Caputo and Kearney in that he does not “think that practice of religion has 
to depend upon the acceptance of a body of dogmatic beliefs” (Cupitt 1984: loc.4949/5689). The 
result is that “the distinction between the Christian and the non-Christian is no longer a disagreement 
about beliefs but has become simply a difference in spirituality” (Cupitt 1984: loc.5089/5689). The 
distinction is one of the aesthetic expressions of spirituality and where it is anchored. As such, following 
the Copernican Revolution the beliefs of modern society and religion come slowly tumbling down. 
There is thus no longer anything objective impressed upon us but instead everything is produced in 
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relation to and for people. The result is that “ethics comes first and religion is our way of representing 
to ourselves, and renewing our commitment to, the complex moral and spiritual values through which 
we shape our world, constitute ourselves, gain our identity and give worth to our lives” (Cupitt 1984: 
loc.5186/5689). The meaning of God is then religious and not metaphysical, an ideal embodying our 
values and ethics and not an objective person (Cupitt 1984: loc.5199/5689). Where the “earlier forms 
(of religion) tended to be more collectivist; its newer forms are more concerned with self-realization” 
(Cupitt 1984: loc.5261). As further expressed by Cupitt (1984: loc.5261-5276/5689:
“As it has progressed so the old dogmatic consolations, with their outworn associated 
structures of oppressive social and psychological power, are inevitably passing away. But 
the historic task of religion, of embodying our values, witnessing to them, conserving 
them, setting them forth in symbols and securing their realization in human life, remains 
unchanged. It will be performed all the better when the painted veil of illusion, that has 
hitherto hidden its workings, has finally dropped.”
3.3 CONCLUSION
The modern philosophers bring us to an awareness of our world(view) s and the limitation of the 
thinker therein. And they make us aware of the hermeneutic challenges associated with interpreting 
thinkers in different world(view) s even if those world(view) s precede theirs. Here, by way of 
example, there is a monumental shift from the-idea-of God in the pre-modern sacral world(view) 
of Christendom to the-idea-of God in the secular age and our modern era. What is not clear is the 
degree to which the-idea-of God of the sacral world(view) s must also be considered as non-real; or 
even that the modern secular distinction between the God-concept as real and non-real needs to be 
maintained. Nevertheless, the modern world(view) holds to an objective non-realism with regard 
to the existence of God. What it means to believe in God is to hold to the objective realism of God 
apart from experiencing God as an objective reality. Instead, God is experienced as psychologically 
real. Those who have 'faith' do not rely on engaging God as objectively real. Instead, Tradition and 
Scripture and the institutional church are taken as the concrete or objective foundations of faith.
This brief overview of modern philosophy brings us to the quest for what mysticism ‘is’ and 
thereafter what Christian ‘is’ in the secular age. Here we will see Essentialism support the objective 
non-realism of God and Christianity the psychological realism.
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– 4 –
Modern mysticism
The various ‘God after God’ conversations are set within the modern era. Here there is a remarkable 
difference between the sacral world(view) of Christendom and the modern world(view) that succeeds 
it in the secular age. And though it is in the process of being succeeded by a post-secular world(view), 
the ‘God after God’ conversations take place late within the secular world(view) as having let go of 
the God-concept of Christendom. Within the secular era there is a quest for what mysticism ‘is’ as 
people wrestle with the depths of religion, their social expression and historical development, within 
a world(view) that may host but no longer supports sacral world(view) s.
The modern quest for what mysticism ‘is’ kicks off with an early essentialism and thereafter 
continues between Constructivists and Essentialists. The Constructivists provide a rebuttal to early 
essentialism on the basis of generalizations and a lack of proper grounding in the actual mystical texts 
and insufficient hermeneutic. Yet recent Essentialists have, perhaps inadvertently and deliberately, 
countered the Constructivists with some serious research. These later researchers do not, however, 
explore Christian mysticism by relying on the texts of Christian mysticism. They, oddly, do precisely 
what they accuse Constructivists of doing. They do, however, offer a Buddhocentric understanding 
of mystical experience as the cornerstone of all mystical experience and identify like introspective 
practices in all religions leading to contemplative universals.
4.1 EARLY ESSENTIALISM
Kourie explains the phases in the study of mysticism (1992) starting with William James (1842-1910) 
covering “religious experience” from without and broadly, guided by the needs and requirements 
of the social sciences (1902) while Evelynn Underhill (1875-1941) focused on mystical experience 
from within, with the lens of passionate devotee focusing her work (1911). Bridgers notes that each 
emphasised and set the research on two different trajectories – James the head and Underhill the heart 
(2012:27-28). In retrospect their contributions are complementary whilst simultaneously symptomatic 
of modernity which stresses objectivity and description over personal experience with the former 
viewed as objective and reliable and set against the latter as subjective and unreliable. Mysticism 
has then from the very beginning been defined less clearly and specifically than generally. These 
works were followed by Huxley’s The perennial philosophy (1945) and together mysticism has been 
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popularly defined in relation to their work and as somewhat at odds and ill-fitting with the sacral and 
secular world(view) s.
From the start the study of mysticism has focused on two different trajectories – studies 
contextualised around the multi-disciplinary sciences as objective and third-person explorations 
and studies contextualised around the practices of people engaging in first-person explorations. This 
author understands ‘mysticism’, ‘spirituality’, ‘experience’ and ‘religious experience’ somewhat as 
synonyms that collude with and elaborate on one another while have their own identities and that 
conversations with them must incorporate both third-person and first-person contributors. Yet, as 
Cupitt notes (Cupitt 2008:12), the very words used as “experience”, “religious experience”, “religion”, 
“spirituality” and “mysticism” are defined in modernity and have not well translated the meaning 
of those same words as used in other world(view) s. These words were defined by modern people 
in a modern world(view) for modern reasons and purposes. And the meaning of these words have 
shifted tremendously through history. Therefore, what religion ‘is’ varies from religion to religion 
and from sacral to secular ages within even the same religion (Krüger et al. 1996:3) along with what 
God ‘is’ (Krüger et al. 1996:4). What each of these ‘is’ cannot be limited to any one era alone. And 
their meaning cannot be reduced to a definition only accepted by Modernity. Each is a complex and 
diverse phenomenon connected as much to people as to their institutions and world(view) and even 
to the transcendent as impersonal and personal. As noted by van Kaam (van Kaam 1984:9), the 
religious and ideological faith traditions and their explanatory theories and philosophies make such 
ultimate meaning and symbols available in ways that ‘are not anti-rational but instead transrational 
as inspirational and applicable’ across consecutive world(view) s. Each, as noted by Krüger (2018: 
loc.544/13538), makes ‘religion’ a ‘world orientation’ with an ‘exceptionally radical and integral 
intention’ that is communal with respect to religion focusing on the social and historical accruals 
of faith and individual with regard to mysticism as individual spiritual practice oriented toward 
engagement with the transcendent. And it is in recognition of this commonality and the goals of 
modern thinkers that an early essentialism emerges and works its way into public thinking. This is 
countered late in the 20th century by constructivists.
The Constructivists mapped the range, nuance and diversity of mystical phenomena and experience 
resulting perhaps in a plurality of mysticisms as arising from the broader data recognised as mysticism. 
The Essentialists differ in seeking to identify whether there is a common core to all religion and what 
such a core may be. The result is that the Essentialist moves us toward an abstracted essentialism 
as a mysticism perhaps divorced from the actual mystics and certainly from their faiths while the 
Constructivists move us toward a concretised pluralism as mysticisms in the plural perhaps leading us 
away from what’s common and shared in values, practice and experience.
Where early essentialism is rooted in the work of James, Underhill and Huxley, it developed further 
and popularly and relies on the notion of a ‘sui generis’, meaning self-evident, ‘religious experience’. 
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And though for a while it seemed that such religious studies identified a common core to all religion, 
a shared and perennial experience and all religions and their mystics concluded to be doing the same 
essential thing and communicating a shared and essential message.
In turn the Constructivists mapped the landscape and found that the Essentialist assumptions did not 
faithfully represent the reports of the mystics. They explored Mysticism and philosophical analysis (1978), 
Mysticism and language (1992), and Mysticism and sacred scripture (2000). Here the Constructivists 
use the data of mystical reports to challenge the early essentialist assumption that there is a common 
mystical core shared across all religion. The early essentialist assumption that there is a common core, 
as critiqued by Constructivists, is not supported by the data and any such perennial assertion is therefore 
unfounded. Where the early essentialists pointed us toward a common experience through common 
practices the Constructivists showed that there are a variety of mysticisms and that within faith traditions 
that mystics play a conservative role. The Constructivists showed that the assumptions of the early 
essentialists are unfounded.
The dialectic tension between early essentialists and Constructivists continues into a new era 
that is not only a post-secular but also offers new academic paradigms such as spirituality as an 
academic field (cf. Waaijman 2002) and the more recent contemplative studies (cf. Komjathy 2018). 
Both spirituality as practice and mysticism as experience are receiving attention along with their 
connection to each other, their faiths, and other faiths. As this interest in spirituality and mysticism 
has evolved it has done so in keeping with scientific investigations into the neurobiology and social 
and hermeneutic contextuality of people and further explorations of religion enabling more recent 
Essentialists to respond to the Constructivists. It is necessary for us to understand the quest of the early 
essentialist and the quest of the Constructivist as sharing a common paradigmatic foundation within 
a particular but consecutive world(view) and that the 'God after God' conversations in relation to 
Christianity spirituality/mysticism may serve as a contribution to the early and recent Essentialist and 
Constructivist exploration of spirituality and mysticism even as they in turn contribute to Christian 
spirituality and the quest for what Christianity ‘is’.
This is important considering the intersectionality of contemplative studies, early essentialism, 
Constructivism, spirituality, religion and mysticism as interrelated fields.
4.2 THE QUEST OF THE CONSTRUCTIVISTS
The Constructivists surely agree that the goals of mysticism are good but view the work of the 
contributors as “manifest strong biases and problematic presuppositions about what mysticism 
is and how it should be studied - biases which colour their investigations from the outset and 
which significantly diminish the value of their results” (Katz 1978:2). It is in light of this that the 
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Constructivists seek to address ‘technical work’ and related issues enabling an understanding of the 
mystical material itself.
Their quest is that of mapping the diversity of the mystical/spiritual phenomena. Where the 
early essentialist moves us toward an abstracted essentialism the constructivists move us toward a 
concretised pluralism, albeit lacking the confessional insights and specificity of the early essentialists. 
There is thus an insider-outsider reflection among the Buddhist-descended introversive mysticisms 
coupled with third-person reflection of the observer of religion as constructivist even if insider-outsider 
differing in the sense of the former’s practice in contrast with the latter. This has been highlighted by 
Komjathy (2018).
Constructivism, however, lacks the confessional impetus and insights of the essentialists as people 
of faith and mystical experience. There is thus an insider-outsider reflection among the Buddhist-
descended and introspective mysticisms that couples well with the third-person outsider observation 
of religion as Constructivists. But the Constructivists, lacking the impetus of like confessionalism, 
are unable to discern the mystical experience in like manner. Nevertheless, Constructivism perhaps 
provides a better picture to us of what the diversity of mysticism may come to include. As noted 
by Katz (2000:3):
“The quest, for the Constructivists, appears to be the mapping of the diversity of the 
mystical/spiritual phenomena. This paradigm, which is most simply described as 
“contextualist” repudiated the older “early essentialist” model, which argued that (a) 
mystical experience was essentially independent of the sociocultural, historical, and 
religious context in which it occurred and (b) all mystical experience, at its highest and 
purest level, was essentially the same.”
4.2.1 SPECIFICS OVER GENERALISATIONS
The Constructivists are concerned with the generalisations of early essentialism with the concern 
that the mysticism it puts forward is too abstracted and generalised. The mysticism of the essentialist 
is either a new expression of mysticism or perhaps the reduction of mysticism to that of a particular 
world(view). In either case, it is not representative of the mysticism of all the world’s faiths. In the 
thinking of the Constructivist, the mysticism of Essentialism is not rooted in or representative of the 
wider phenomenon of mysticism and cannot be maintained.
Katz et al. differ from the Essentialist in understanding that the Christian seeking Christ, the 
Hindu seeking Ātman-Brahman, and the Buddhist seeking Śūnyatā don’t necessarily experience the 
same thing and lend their ultimate commitment to it. Though the Constructivists speak of contextual 
conditioning and mystical traditions guiding people to experiences, said traditions are not viewed as 
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determining such experience. Rather, the individual seeking Christ through Christianity and Christian 
mysticism as ascetic and contemplative stands a reasonable chance to encounter Him, or not, than 
Ātman-Brahman or Śūnyatā; the individual seeking Ātman-Brahman of encountering Ātman-
Brahman, or not, and not Christ or Śūnyatā; and the individual seeking Śūnyatā of encountering 
Śūnyatā, or not, than Ātman-Brahman or Christ. The mystic and their tradition’s intentionality along 
with their faith’s guidance do not determine who or what they encounter while perhaps narrowing 
the odds through the efficacy of their tradition and the application of their practice along with the 
respective access to the impersonal and personal transcendent that is the object and focus of their 
respective faith traditions.
The Constructivists would surely agree that the mystics across traditions share common introspective 
itineraries, i.e. contemplative practices as interoceptive training, but would rather explicate than 
eradicate ergotrophic, ecstatic and visionary experiences. In the above example, the early essentialist 
would argue that Christ is somehow Ātman-Brahman while also Śūnyatā without necessarily being 
able to justify how they are the same. But would the ordained Christian priest or pastor agree? Would 
the Hindu temple priest or Pujari conducting worship agree? Would the ordained Buddhist monastic 
or bhikkhu agree? Certainly not. And their disagreement is not only because of their respective faiths 
and theological and institutional commitment. They may disagree based on faith, but this cannot by 
implication be taken to mean that they would agree based on first-hand experience. And though they 
would agree that there are commonalities, including practices and values and perhaps even that such 
experiences are one and the same, they would not necessarily be correct in so agreeing.
Yet to argue such without exploring the relationship of the mystic to their religious text is to “neglect 
the significance of sacred scriptures in the descriptive studies and the analytical discussions of these 
works” (Katz et al. 2000: 7). (Though this appears not to be the case in recent Essentialist works (cf. 
Rose 2016: loc.4440/8498)). 
Constructivism therefore argues against early essentialism while making space for it; early 
essentialism argues against Constructivism and makes no space for it. And while there is agreement 
in introspective practices, early essentialism only arrives at a common core mysticism by radically 
delimiting what mysticism ‘is’. According to Smith (1983: 248), the Constructivists are clear that:
“there is no apprehension of what we have encountered or undergone which is not at the 
same time mediated in some form of expression, and the only forms of expression available 
are those which determine the individual’s historical situation. Current discussions of the 
nature of scientific knowledge centre on the interpenetration of fact and theory; if this is 
so in fields where the greatest precision of thought is possible, how much more must it 
hold in the sphere of religion, and especially in mysticism, where there occurs a struggle 
to express what many believe cannot be said at all! We must rid ourselves of the illusion 
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that there is ‘raw’ experience and recognize unavailability of any experience which is not 
in some way expressed and interpreted”
There appears to be a confessional gap, nuance and impetus within the Constructivists as objective 
that may be addressed through the confessional nature of Christianity as spirituality, religion and 
mysticism. The Constructivists, who take a broad approach, lack the confessional anchoring of a 
faith such as Christianity. And therewith Constructivism lacks an insider’s conviction and invested 
exploration of the tension between their faith as religion and mysticism and therewith spirituality as 
tied to either or both or none. The quest for what mysticism ‘is’ has not been exhausted by the work 
of early essentialists and Constructivists and though the Christians mystics have been explored it is as 
text in context and in translation between world(view) s and not as first-hand mysticism taking place 
around us.
4.2.2 MYSTICISM AS DIVERSE PHENOMENON
Mysticism is then, perhaps, a diverse phenomenon in relation to Ātman-Brahman, to Śūnyatā and 
Šeḵînâ. Here Constructivists aim to preserve mysticism as distinctively expressed in Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Christianity. Yet the Constructivists work with texts rather then presently available 
mystics. Their work, however, is aimed at enabling researchers to allow the mystics to speak for 
themselves about their mystical experience. Constructivism is not aiming to read mystics selectively 
or reductionistically.  Their aim is instead to understand and explain mysticism.
The Constructivists are then potentially Contextualists, meaning that the mystical experience is not 
understand as either singular but diverse. They recognise that the mystic constructs and articulates 
their mystical theology/philosophy in relation to the world(view) as standing within traditions and 
even serve as their exemplars. As such, they allow for a difference between the Self-realization (Ātman 
jñāna) and Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) without having the expectation that such needs to be conditionally 
co-constructed on an essential foundation.
4.3 THE QUEST OF THE ESSENTIALISTS
The quest, for the early Essentialists, appears to be:
1. To find something in common in people’s spiritual life despite the obvious differences 
between them. Finding the core, underlying and common or “essential” and foundational 
“experience” upon which religious thinking and institutions are developed. This desire is 
M.Th. Timothy Victor Student #: 3182-738-1 69
rooted in the pluralism of and within religion as enabled by globalization and the desire to 
find some unity past all our divisions (cf. Katz 1978:1).
2. To find something to give meaning in light of the crisis stemming from Modernity. Finding 
the shared practices and habits that serve as formational, guiding practitioners across 
world(view) s toward that “essential experience”. This appears to be related to the broad 
existential crises of the 20th century (cf. Katz 1978:1) that have not been solved. Here these 
habits for living and caring for oneself and others also enable a deeper living beyond the 
consumerism and materialism of secular society.
The later Essentialists drive the early quest of the early essentialists further toward their objectives 
offering as understanding of the essential experience and essential practices.
4.3.1 ESSENTIAL EXPERIENCE
The Essentialists have become quite specific about what the essential experience is. This is by way of 
responding to the Constructivist critique. Of particular importance is the distinction between mystical 
texts and mystical experience and the preference for their experience over what is perhaps in the text 
of Christian mystics. Here the Constructivists may be seen to prefer mystical texts and the Essentialists 
mystical experience. The Essentialists do appear to focus on a Buddhocentric mystical experience to 
the exclusion of others, in particular theistic experience.
Where the Constructivists argued there to be no unmediated experiences the Essentialists argue 
that there is a common or essential experience. Forman, for instance, argues for a Pure Consciousness 
Event as that common core and therewith the maturing of the mystic toward a Dualistic Mystical 
State (1999). Forman identifies Samādhi or Śūnyatā as that experience and speaks of such as the Pure 
Consciousness Event and notes the development of a state of dual awareness resulting in functional 
everyday living whilst attuned to the Personal Consciousness Event, i.e. a Dualistic Mystical State. 
In turn, Forman asks that we delimit the boundaries of mystical experience and study of mysticism 
to introspective practices and experiences (1999:4-6). Though Forman acknowledges that the 
Constructivists link belief to experience (1999:45) the Essentialists request that ergotrophic, ecstatic 
and visionary experiences not be considered as mysticism. The implication is that theistic experience 
and mysticism is effectively excluded on the basis of introversive experience being present. Here 
we then do find a common core to all mysticism as readily accessible and available contemplative 
practices and associated subjects albeit arriving at such through not admitting that which is intermittent 
and relational and which therefore proves problematic. We can measure the effects and processes 
taking place within the subject engaged in contemplative practice but can’t reproduce or control 
the contributions of God as a third-party. We can place the practitioner of the contemplative in a 
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laboratory for observation but can’t take that same collection of instruments and controls into the 
broader world. We also cannot reliably study theistic experience which appears to defy our capacity 
to control the experience and therefore replicate the experience.
Komarovski (2015: loc.569/6835) shows that emptiness as realised within the Tibetan Buddhism 
differs to the Personal Consciousness Event and that the causes and subsequent influences on the person 
likewise differ with Mascarello (Komarovski 2010: 10 in Mascarello 2015:79) recognizing such as 
associated with the “vague but vogue” debate around mystical experience(s):
"Komarovski shows both a mastery of the Tibetan literature and ingenuity in going 
beyond the Western interpretative models and basic assumptions regarding mystical 
experiences, borrowing from a distinct approach used by Tibetan thinkers. According 
to this different framework, the author suggests to shift the focus of analysis from 
mystical experiences per se to the conditioning processes leading to them, as well as and 
from the descriptive dimension to the practical one. This crucial refocusing discloses 
unexpected similarities between different traditions as well as making generalizations 
about mysticism more problematic."
We therefore have, with Forman, an understanding of the PCE and the development of the DMS 
as a common or essential element across religions as mysticism. And though others do not agree, 
this does not eliminate the theoretical relevance of Forman’s confessional request. This is because 
mysticism may still be seen as providing the basis for a new kind of unifying faith for those leaning 
toward a global culture; an emergent spirituality for a holistically minded person that may replace 
commitment to traditional religions. Katz and companions’ critique of the above and their exploration 
of the relation to mysticism in detailed works referencing the actual data of mysticism.
List 4.3.1.1 The Essentialist hypothesis of mystics as countered by the Constructivists
4.3.1.1.1 Where it is said that mystics are an elite transcending religion and doctrine, Katz 
and company show that they are examples supporting traditions and operationalising 
doctrines.
4.3.1.1.2 Where it is said that mystics cannot speak about the Transcendent meaningfully, Katz 
and company show that mystics speak volumes and thereby help introduce people to 
an experience of the Transcendent.
4.3.1.1.3 Where it is said that mystics are loaners, individuals and revolutionaries on the 
periphery of society and faith, Katz and company show that they are leaders, guides 
and models at the inner circle of their respective religions.
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Yet, though they work so hard at understanding what mysticism ‘is’, they are accused of not including 
their own personal experience and critique as “studying mysticism second-hand” (Forman 1999:19). 
And this is perhaps true, and contextually understandable within Modernity which requires a strict 
division between what is objective and what is subjective.
Forman’s position, as ‘first-hand’, is confessional and relies on personal mystical experience. It is 
Buddhocentric as descending from Buddhism in thinking and practice. And in light thereof, Forman puts 
forward a distinction between trophotropic and ergotrophic states and asks that we reserve mysticism for 
the former kind of experience along with the practice of meditation. Here the Personal Consciousness 
Event and associated introspective practices and trophotropic states and experiences provide a challenge 
to the Constructivists unargued assumption that there are no unmediated experience(s) (Forman 1999:1-
6; Katz 1983:4). However, this also perhaps results in the unargued assumption that extroversive 
practices and experiences and theism associated therewith are entirely constructed. As such, there is, 
according to the Essentialist, no Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) takes place.
The key to reconciling their perspective lies not in defining mysticism as one thing or another but in 
developing a model of mystical experience incorporating both the mystical experience of the introspective 
mystics exploring the inner natural of themselves and the cosmos and those whose mysticism is tied 
to the self-revelation of a personal, volitional, self-revealing Person. We must account not only for 
the variety of mysticism but also the variety of mysticism(s) within each religion. Here, again, we 
recognise the arrival at an ‘if’ in related to religion as sociological construction and spirituality as the 
individual in first-person present-continuous. We have not yet, then arrived at an ‘if’ with regards to 
mysticism. Instead, Buddhocentric contributors draw everything into Śūnyatā as variously expressed 
and Christocentric contributors into Christ as variously expressed. The intent is not here to focus on or 
critique the Essentialist position. Instead, its to understand that there is a solid logic to it that enables 
the Buddhocentric and post-metaphysical to agree on an ‘if’. (But as that ‘if’ is partial, meaning that it 
does not include the personal transcendent, that it remains an ‘if not’.) Let’s consider the logic of the 
Essentialists in arguing for an essential experience.
List 4.3.1.2 Essential experience
4.3.1.2.1 There is a link between Śūnyatā as the experience and Samādhi as a state of being 
therein and thereafter. Here the individual experiences of Śūnyatā are eventually 
transformative of the individual’s consciousness toward intermittent states of and the 
eventual state of Samādhi. Both Śūnyatā and Samādhi are beneficial with the former 
temporary and the latter enduring. Samādhi is the state of being consciously present 
in daily life while consciously aware of Śūnyatā (Forman 1999:27). No one holds that 
it is Śūnyatā that alone transforms an individual, but instead that the attainment of 
Samādhi is supported by living in same world(view) in a new way. This “new way” is a 
life of regular meditative practice which leads to Śūnyatā and Samādhi. The path itself 
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is a long and complex meditative, conceptual, therapeutic, devotional, and existential 
path and the goal is a permanent life change. Both Śūnyatā and Samādhi events are 
markers along the life path (Forman 1999:28). There is thus a relationship between 
meditation practices, the experience of Śūnyatā, the state of not being in Samādhi and 
the state of Samādhi.
4.3.1.2.2 The relationship between consciousness, unconsciousness, and conscious 
unconsciousness is complicated to understand and explain. We may think of our ordinary 
daily and waking state as that of consciousness, our ordinary sleeping state as that of 
unconsciousness, and the meditative state as the state of conscious unconsciousness. 
The state of conscious unconsciousness is one in which the consciousness persists 
without the mind and senses (Forman 1999:29). And being without the mind and 
senses, it is not linguistically mediated. As such, it is “consciousness aware of itself, 
experience such awareness of recognition, and must be analysed on its own terms” 
(Forman 1999:171). This is a mystical experience and does not arise from the senses 
and is not about the senses (Forman 1999:170). It is a Pure Consciousness Event, with 
the consciousness encountering itself (Forman 1999:171) not through the medium of 
language or culture or the senses but at a more foundational and fundamental level 
before those activities are operative.
4.3.1.2.3 Where the Constructivists hold that there is a relationship between mystical concepts 
and their references, Forman argues that the references seemingly point toward 
supporting different theological constructs but in fact can be shown to depart from 
the same essential experience. Forman builds on the notion that two individuals may 
radically differ in interpretation and explanation of the same experience. Hence Jean-
Paul Sartre, Bernadette Roberts, Hui Neng, Meister Eckhart  and Forman himself all 
share the same experience and express such variously (Forman 1999:157) (and by 
implication that others, like Komarovski and Mascarello will offer their own versions 
thereof). We can show that they share the same experience when referring, for example, 
to Sartre’s notion of “nonpositional consciousness” and Hui Neng’s wu-nien which 
mutually elucidate each other. The same experience is therefore spoken of as non-
intentionally conscious and nonpositional consciousness and Śūnyatā, as “empty of 
content”, and prajñā, “aware of itself reflexively”. All share similar characteristics of 
silence and self-awareness.
4.3.1.2.4 The Zen Abbot Daido Sensei Loori points out that there is an absolute Samādhi as 
well as a working samādhi (Forman 1999:21). In absolute Samādhi the individual 
is not conscious, experiences a loss of time, and returns to consciousness with the 
knowledge/understanding that they have not been sleeping (Forman 1999:23). In 
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working samādhi the individual is aware and responsive (Forman 1999:24). There is 
thus a dual state, of being consciously unconscious while intentionally active that is the 
essence of the Dualistic Mystical State. There is a state where the unchanging interior 
silence is reflexively aware of itself. Through practice this awareness can be carried 
over into daily living. The Dualistic Mystical State is the state wherein the unchanging 
interior silence is maintained concurrently with intentional experience in a long-term 
and permanent way (Forman 1999:151). We thus find the Essentialists identifying a 
common non-theistic experience as central to all religion(s) and mysticism(s).
4.3.1.2.5 Rose identifies like introspective practices and “concentration itineraries” associated 
with the core mystical experience of Śūnyatā and Samādhi in the Buddhist Jhānas, the 
Yogic Samādhi, and the Catholic Unio Mysica (union with God). This is celebrated as 
a “recovery of mysticism in the age of the constructivists” (Rose 2016). Rose assumes 
a minimalist sutta jhāna (Rose 2016: loc.1697/8498) as meditation without rigorous 
asceticism; distinguishes meditative yoga (rāja yoga), specifically Samādhi, from the 
physical and export yoga as exercises for the body (Rose 2016: loc.2277/8498). Here 
yoga is “meditation based and enlightenment oriented” (Rose 2016: loc.2312/8498); and 
“practical Catholic mystical theology” (Rose 2016: loc.3598/8498) and “reawakening 
of interest among Christians in ‘lectio divina’, contemplative prayer, and Christian 
meditation in and outside of the Catholic Church” (Rose 2016: loc.3616/8498) as 
pointing to a “spiritual experience shared by mystical traditions” (loc.3636/8498). We 
thus find that the Essentialists identify common introspective practices connecting 
mystics across religions to the same fundamental experience and state of conscious 
unconsciousness.
Forman’s request presents a significant and interesting challenge to the Christian faith not only 
as religion, and therewith social construction, and spirituality, and therefore commonality in 
contemplative practices, but in terms of mysticism, and therefore to whether or not there is one 
or two essential experiences. Essentialism therefore understands that the concept of revelation is a 
linguistic translation of Śūnyatā and Samādhi into various reports by mystics within their respective 
world(view) s. There is thus a disconnect between the experience of Śūnyatā and Samādhi and the 
religions as so incredibly diverse.
And though we may offer Diagram 4.3.1 Essential experience below as mapping the different 
faiths’ relationship to the same core or essential experience as Śūnyatā, how exactly this is arrived at 
through shared introspective practices requires some explanation. 
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Diagram 4.3.1 Essential experience
In the diagram above we illustrate that the underlying experience of Śūnyatā is tied to the introspective 
essential practices of meditation as found in different world(view) s. The focal object is perhaps found 
to be various expressions of the same underlying reality.
4.3.2 ESSENTIAL PRACTICE
The Essentialism of Forman and Rose is conceptually complex, with Rose in particular reconciling 
Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity around the developmental stages of the practitioner of meditation. 
Though Shear notes that meditation is practiced variously with different goals (reference), Essentialism 
reconciles them around the meditative landmarks in Hindu, Buddhist and Christian thinking. Rose’s 
conceptual and linguistic mastery is phenomenal, and little justice can be done to it here. Nevertheless, 
attempt to do so we must.
As noted earlier the common introspective practices, though diverse, are put forward. And therewith, 
a common experience is highlighted as that of Śūnyatā. These are both designed to counter the rebuttal 
to early essentialism by the Constructivists. Here one could not easily argue that Forman and Rose do 
not ground their Essentialism in a concrete reading of mysticism as diverse expressions understood 
as reconciled in meditation and the development of the mystical consciousness of the practitioner. 
The Essentialists focus on the essential practices and make use of mystical texts to support their 
focus on a specific kind of mystical experience. The Essentialist relies on theistic mystical texts to 
find a conjunction between their experience of Śūnyatā and Christian mystics silence and absence 
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of God and their commensurate dark nights. (The Essentialists, however, do not explore neither the 
experience of God within the Christian stream as texts or as presently available mystical experience.)
Rose picks up on Forman’s confessional request and impetus and finds just the required contemplative 
universal across mystical practice in the “concentration itineraries” of the Buddhist Jhānas, the 
Samādhi23, and the Catholic Unio Mystica. We may take this to mean that, for the Essentialist, that the 
Hindu experience of Self-realization (Ātman jñāna) as in Advaita Vedanta as expressed by Adi Shankara 
(188-820 CE) is that the self is Ātman-Brahman, the Buddhist experience of Enlightenment (bodhi) 
in relation to Emptiness (Śūnyatā) as expressed by Masao Abe, and the Judeo-Christian experience of 
God’s self-revelation in relation to God’s activities in Person (the manifest presence of God (Šeḵînâ) as 
expressed in Scripture and by numerous Christian mystics including those available today to somehow 
be the same. This is celebrated as a recovery of mysticism “in the reign of the constructivists” (2016). 
Here Forman notes that the same experience can be expressed in various ways (Forman 1999:47-48), 
relying on common contemplative practices. This fits the assumptions and requirements of modernist 
science where the requirement of replicability and the like attainment of the Personal Consciousness 
Experience and Dualistic Mystical State can be supplied by introspective mysticism but not by 
ergotrophic mysticisms and relies on the latter being excluded in favour of introspective mysticism 
within the orbit of ergotrophic mysticisms such as Christianity. Clearly this supports the essentialist 
assertion that the same experience can be expressed in different ways (Forman 1994:47-48) and clearly 
these three experiences are viewed as essentially the same experience albeit expressed variously across 
three mystical traditions. Again, there is a further synergy here in the work of Komjathy (cf. 2018)24 
and the proposal of contemplative studies as a new field related to the study of religion, spirituality and 
mysticism.
The quest of the Essentialists for what mysticism ‘is’ continues healthily in the dialectic tension 
between Essentialists and Constructivists. The conversation concerning Mysticism/mysticism is 
furthered toward delimiting mysticism. A convincing argument is thus developed by Essentialists 
where mystics across religions are shown to share the same introspective practices which in turn 
lead to a perennial experience that is expressed variously as Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity. 
Considering this, what can be made of the Constructivist’s quest?
Given that proponents of the Essentialist position are, however, Buddhocentric or Buddhist-
descended thinkers, their work is perhaps also confessional. Perhaps not confessional in a dogmatic 
sense of trying to tell others what to believe but perhaps confessionally inviting others to what they 
have found. There is, after all, the weight of a paradigm of thinking behind Essentialism.
Rose therefore agrees with Forman that Hindu, Buddhist and Christian arrive at the same core 
experience of Śūnyatā through Meditation or introspective practices. We may model this in Diagram 
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4.3.1 Essential experience above and explore the contemplative universals as tied to the development 
of the consciousness of the individual in Diagram 4.3.2.2 Correlated meditation landmarks adapted 
from Rose (2016: loc.1974, 3822, and 4253/8498 below).
A complete discussion of Rose’s Contemplative universals in Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity 
lies beyond the focus and scope of this dissertation. We do, however, offer Diagram 3.1.3.2.2 
Correllated meditation landmarks below.
A brief discussion of these correlated contemplative universals follows below by way of 
understanding the complexity of making such a claim in a pluralistic environment.
List 4.3.2.2 Correlated meditation landmarks
4.3.2.2.1. The proposal that the Christian mystical experience is in fact of Śūnyatā and 
Samādhi and that such is reported as the Unio Mystica (relational union with God) 
in Christianity without there being any Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) involved as the 
activity a transcendent Person. This means that, according to the Essentialist, that the 
Christian Scriptures considered as a faithful witness to a personal God are in fact 
a conditionally misconstructed report of Śūnyatā and Samādhi. Hence a solipsistic 
loop between the religion of Christianity and the Scriptures must continue in such a 
manner that virtually all Christians do not experience Śūnyatā and Samādhi. And those 
that do, such as Dionysius and Meister Eckhart, have masterfully woven Śūnyatā and 
Samādhi into Christianity as the Unio Mystica (relational union with God) rather than 
God’s relational Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ). It is, however, hard to consider Šeḵînâ as 
synonymous with Śūnyatā. If the key mystical experience of Christianity is of Christ 
drawing near in Person to speak and act, that differs significantly from Śūnyatā as 
arduously arrived through long practice and training. And this experience of Šeḵînâ 
differs to that of Unio Mystica as elaborated by Rose.
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Diagram 4.3.2.2 Correlated meditation landmarks
4.3.2.2.2. The proposal that the Hindu mystical experience25 is in fact of Śūnyatā and Samādhi 
and not of Self-realization (Ātman jñāna) as in Advaita Vedanta as expressed by Adi 
Shankara (788-820 CE). Note that this is not the experience-less Brahmanism as 
critiqued in the Tevijja Sutta, but a re-assertion of Brahmanism through the framework 
of Advaita Vedanta. It is equally hard to consider Ātman jñāna as synonymous with 
Śūnyatā. For Ātman jñāna is the realization that one is not the temporal self but in fact 
the internal or deeper self is the eternal, transcendent and enduring Ātman-Brahman 
dressed up in our humanity as embodied. We are the eternal Self experiencing an 
earthly life as our historical self. How can the fundamental truth be Śūnyatā when it is 
Ātman-Brahman?
4.3.2.2.3. Essentialism therefore relies not only on what Christianity puts forward as Šeḵînâ 
or Hinduism as Ātman-Brahman but on the contemplative practices and introversive 
experiences. Here these practices become a divide or multiply by zero across the 
diversity of religions. Essentialism draws on the availability of mystical reports of texts 
to identify like reports of conscious unconsciousness and Śūnyatā and on that basis 
rejects the rest in Christianity and Hinduism related as respectively Self-revelation 
(Šeḵînâ) and Self-realization (Ātman jñāna).
The analysis above is, perhaps, not fair. Anyone familiar with Rose’s work will know that the 
Essentialism does not take place in relation to the eligion and its doctrines. (These doctrines are 
all jettisoned.) Essentialism looks to the individual and their relation to the object of the respective 
25	 This	concept	may	be	further	developed	and	only	a	cursory	understanding	is	put	in	play	by	the	researcher	here.
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faith as a real relationship with an idea provided by a religion in a world(view). And in terms of this 
there are milestones in the contemplative universals. Hence, to the lack of Self-realization (Ātman 
jñāna) in Hinduism and the lack of Šeḵînâ as tied to the Unio Mystica (relational union with God in 
relation to Christianity is not a concern that needs to be picked up in Essentialism. Here Rose (2016: 
loc.3771/8498) notes:
One does not have to be a “religious particularist and mystical constructivist” (Rose 
2016:3653/8498) to ask questions such as those above. Instead, one only has to offer 
a mystical experience in keeping with the broadest of Christian revelation theology to 
do so. “From a contemporary neurobiological perspective, Poulain’s felt sense of grace 
in the arising of mystical states can be attributed to bottom-up processing of the basal 
ganglia while the volitional attempts to remaster recollection can be attributed to the top-
down processing of the left prefrontal cortex…”
Here there must then be a particularist and constructivist overlay that determines that Christians interpret 
the mystical experience as supportive of Unio Mystica (union with God) and Hindus as Self-realization 
(Ātman jñāna). The commonality then lies in the neurobiological foundations of the individual and 
the introspective practices themselves. And mysticism therefore transcends the “prevailing cultural, 
intellectual, social, and theological norms and influences, whatever they happen to be” (Katz in Katz et 
al. 2000:7). As such, Christians articulate Śūnyatā as Unio Mysica (union with God) and Hindus as Self-
realization (Ātman jñāna). The constructivists are then correct in asserting that “meditation literature” 
is the foundation of all things mystical across the religious diversity of humanity (Gimello in Katz et al. 
1978: 171). Rose (2016: loc.4440/8498) shares his intent:
I hope to move toward establishing the reality of religious experience and its power to 
ground a philosophy of religions capable of providing a foundation of the religious life 
and, more fundamentally, for a meditatively grounded metaphysics.
The “religious experience” that Rose seeks to ground Essentialism in may be represented as per 
Diagram 4.3.2.3 The believer in religious context below:
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Diagram 4.3.2.3 The beli ver in religious context
Here the Essentialist request functions analogously as a divide by zero or multiply by zero (X ÷ 0 
= 0; X x 0 = 0). From the basis of Christian mystical theology, especially as going back to Meister 
Eckhart (Forman) and Augustin-François Poulain (Rose 2016: loc.3599/8498), the role of apophatic 
theology as the 'via negativa' or 'way of negation' appears to support Śūnyatā or Emptiness in a 
manner that effectively denies Christian cataphatic theology or 'via positiva' or 'way of affirmation'. 
But, more importantly, it  completely excludes even the possibility of Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) and 
Self-realization (Ātman jñāna) or the necessity to explore each. The Essentialist request represents the 
secular age’s impetus trajectory as moving away from society as governed by religious institutions 
and science and philosophy as determined by metaphysics and from our beliefs being determined 
by religion. But there is perhaps too much of a “let’s throw verything away” when speaking of the 
relational presence of God.
4.4 THE MODERN QUESTS FOR WHAT MYSTICISM ‘IS’
The initial explorations of mysticism by the likes of James, Underhill, Otto and Huxley, among others, 
resulted in mysticism as an abstraction. Here the notion of religious experience as ‘sui generis’, as 
self-explanatory and existing on its own rights independent of human reason and experience. And for 
a while ‘religious experience’ ends up being impossible to express and explain to any ne who does 
not share the self-explaining experience thereof. Thus, you knew because you know and could not 
know if you did not know. Their explorations were, however, poorly and improperly grounded in the 
actual data of mystic experience(s) and mystical reports (Forman 1999:31-32). Essentialism finds the 
commonality of Emptiness in Christian mystical theology and a corresponding development of the 
mystics’ consciousness. Here the symbols of religion are helpful to the respective mystics within their 
world(view), but their world(view) is essentially “empty” and therefore, the world(view) matters not. 
Instead, the essential practice and experience is key and somehow ends up expressed in and through 
the language and symbols of Christian Scriptures and mystical theology.
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That Essentialism only works with Christian mystical texts, finds what is shared or in common as 
essential and discards the Christian mystical experience. The Essentialist request, as exemplified by 
Forman and supported by Rose, is a modern expression representative of modern concerns. Yet it is one 
that Christianity, as rationalism, has no response to. This is because of the dysfunctional relationship 
between faith and experience within the Christian world(view). (We shall explore this later.) Forman 
requests that we delimit “mysticism” to introversive experience and contemplative practices alone 
(Forman 1994:4-6). The Essentialists understand there to be an essential foundation, one that’s 
experiential, upon which all mysticism and religion is established. Yet though the Constructivists 
hold open the potential for multiple experiential foundations and mysticism, Christianity is, generally 
speaking, unable to provide anything to counter. 
Presently the Essentialists are putting forward a good case and should we accept their assertions 
and requests then we end up accepting the Śūnyatā of Eastern and Western thinking but not the 
Ātman-Brahman of Hinduism or the Christ of Christianity. We can agree with the Essentialists on the 
common practices and the common spirituality of people across world(view) s without having to also 
make the religions and the mysticisms fit into the same box. The horizon is, after, incredibly wide and 
much depends on the direction you are facing and then head toward.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Though early essentialism, Constructivism and Essentialism make great strides toward helping us 
understand what mysticism ‘is’ there is a difference between mysticism as a essential and abstracted 
concept and in the plural as diverse, nuance and complex. The modern quest for what mysticism ‘is’ 
shifts in view from the religions and their doctrines to the shared experience and practice of people 
and, more recently, to the similarities in the development of the consciousness of the individual.
These conversations are ‘God after God’ conversations that take place within the modern era, where 
the-death-of God enables us to focus on religions as conditionally constructed within a world(view) 
and as having a history. And within this era we are developing tools and methodologies enabling the 
exploration of shared practices and individual psychological developments across the world’s faiths 
and their histories. We can recognise that Essentialism does well to identify and explain the essential 
practices and experiences within the religions while recognizing that it does not well understand or 
explain theistic objections such a narrow box for what mysticism ‘is’.
The 'God after God' conversations taking place in relation to mysticism support the objective non-
realism of God as coupled to the psychological realism for Hindus and Christians. Again, there is no 
exploration of the objective realism of God. Instead the common ground of objective non-realism 
is taken not as a bridge toward objective realism but as a divide or multiply by zero, resulting in 
objective non-realism coupled with the contemplative universals.
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Modern Christianity
The various ‘God after God’ conversations in philosophy and the quest for what mysticism ‘is’ 
are perhaps driven more by God’s absence within Christianity and a backlash to faith without 
experience/evidence and offer post-theistic trajectories that we can follow. Yet the absence of God, 
in the sense of Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) may be hard to understand in a religion ostensibly all about 
knowing God. It is also particularly problem if God-absence is fundamentally problematic.
Considering the arrival of philosophy at non-realism and the conditionalism of world(view) s, 
and the Essentialism argument for correlated mediation landmarks and recognition of essential 
experience and practices, what does Christianity make of the experience of God, the absence of God 
and God-absence? Here we explore Christianity after Christendom, mode the Christian world(view), 
and gain an understanding of Christian rationalism as succeeding Christian metaphysics. Christian 
thinking revolves around the church and God’s special revelation. As noted by Erickson (1985:153):
“Because man is finite and God is infinite, if man is to know God it must come about by 
God’s revelation of himself to man. By this we mean God’s manifestation of himself to 
man in such a way that man can know and fellowship with him.”
Erickson well summarises the need for God as transcendent, and therefore never reachable, to 
reveal Godself to creatures. The customary understanding is that God’s general revelation has been 
made available to “all persons at all times and in all places” and that this differs from Gods’ special 
revelation. In the latter, God has provided “particular communications and manifestations of himself 
to particular persons at particular times, communications and manifestations which are available now 
only by consultation of certain sacred writings” (Erickson 1985:153-154).
5.1 CHRISTIANITY AFTER CHRISTENDOM
We are challenged when speaking about Christianity as it is broad, nuanced, complex and somewhat 
attached to the consecutive geographic world(view) s. Yet here we speak about Christianity as 
a world(view) developed over consecutive world(view) s from the very beginnings in Christ and 
the ‘ekklesia’ as founded ahead of and thereafter within the institutional church, Monasticism, 
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Christendom, and the institutional church continuing as Catholicism and Protestantism within the 
secular age and modern era.
The Christian world(view) may be rooted to the historical Christ as Incarnation and his ongoing 
work as Risen Lord and the ‘ekklesia’ as an historical people, but it transitions from a sub-culture 
within the Graeco-Roman world(view) relying on Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ). It develops into the 
Christian world(view) we have today beginning from its adoption as the official faith of the Roman 
Empire and establishment as the formal and institutional expression church.
5.1.1 MODELLING THE CHRISTIAN WORLD(VIEW) 
The complex relationship and intertwining of Roman Empire and Christian faith plays out in history 
as modelled below in Diagram 5.1.1 The Christian world(view) below. Here the sacral, secular and 
post-secular ages provide hermeneutic contextuality for the 'God after God' conversations with 
a recognition of internal developments within the institutional expression of Christianity and the 
underlying changes of the world(view) in relation to the Roman Empire and historical periods or 
ages. This model allows for flexibility in terms of overlaps and consecutive developments.
List 5.1.1 Consecutive Christian world(view) s
5.1.1.1 The Patristic era. The patristic era follows Christ, the apostles and the early ‘ekklesia’ 
to overlap with the formal adoption of Christianity across the Roman Empire into the 
Monastic era. During this period Christianity is a spreading religion unregulated by 
the Empire and not governed by a formal institution. The patristic era of Christianity 
here is understood as the momentum of the early church. So, speaking generally and 
imprecisely, there is a period following the death of the apostles and the adoption 
of Christianity by the Roman Empire. Here we recognise that Christianity becomes 
dependent-yet-independent and there is a transition from the early church within the 
empire toward the institutional expression of the Church thereafter as official public 
religion of the Roman Empire.
5.1.1.2 The Monastic era. The monastic era is one that follows from the early desert fathers 
and mothers. Monasticism was integral to the continuation of the early church within 
the institutional Church. Gregory the Great (540-604) officially instituted Monasticism 
with Benedict of Nursia (480-550) providing the guidelines regulating the life of monks 
living communally under an abbot. The church was able to survive the fall of the 
Empire due to its earlier dependent-yet-independent construction. Here Monasticism 
serves as the institutional framework of the western Church till the institution of the 
Church within Christendom. During this period, Monasticism served as places of 
knowledge, learning, and culture.
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5.1.1.3 The era of Christendom. A later Christendom as the Holy Roman Empire with its 
Holy Roman Church emerges to consist of the now-Christian people in a particular 
geopolitical construct. Where Christianity had earlier insisted on independent-
dependence it now becomes synonymous therewith. The close association between 
the governance of society and faith remains till at least the 1500s, though perhaps 
continuing till the modern era in the 1800s and even today in various forms. During the 
later Medieval Era, as in Christendom, the monastics continue contributing to society 
through the developments of the New Mysticism and call for the reformation of the 
church. Retrospectively where the partnership between Church and Empire first enabled 
the faith it here defines the faith. And as with the institution of the church, the monastic 
institutions also find themselves in need of reform resulting. Their reform leads to new 
expressions of Christian mysticism as the new mysticism that is also somewhat post-
monastic as middle-way between vocation as monk and secular vocations. Here there 
is a relationship between the institutional church and monasticism as hosted therein 
and representative thereof.
5.1.1.4 The Formal Church era. The later transition from Christendom as the sacral age to 
the secular produces the present era of the church that is paradigmatically centred on 
and defined by the institutional church. Around the 1500s various changes in society, 
and calls for reform of the church, result in the religious institutions and affairs shifting 
from the main stage of daily life into increasingly privatised beliefs and familial life. 
This is first with the church continuing as institution under the patronage of the modern 
state, as in the various orthodox churches, by way of example the Catholic (such as the 
Orthodox churches such as Russian Orthodox or Greek Orthodox) and Protestant (such 
as the English Orthodox or Anglican or German Orthodox or Lutheran). Subsequently 
the Protestants have, like the Orthodox, multiplied beyond their original national and 
geographic constraints. Here we also find recent expressions of the church as officiated 
for-profit and not-for-profit business as recognised by the state/nation. However, 
Catholic and Protestant share in common the institution of the church as well as the 
'ekklesia'.
When exploring Diagram 5.1.1 The Christian world(view) below we can see how they can be read 
as though Christianity is synonymous with the institutional church. Christians first emerged as a 
vital people (ekklesia) and then came to be defined by the institutional church under the patronage 
of the Roman Empire. And thereafter Christianity comes to be synonymous with the church through 
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complex historical developments. The result is that the Person and work of the Spirit as the relational 
presence of God (Šeḵînâ) considered vital by the early church and Christian mystics as monastics, 
is eclipsed by the church as institution and the institution of monasticism and this remains the case 
today. Where the experience of the Holy Spirit as an active Person (Šeḵînâ) was vital to Christianity 
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Diagram 5.1.1 The Christian world(view)
When reviewing Christianity through the lens of God’s silence and absence in the 'God after God' 
conversations we must bear in mind the experience of God (Šeḵînâ) is not considered essential and 
where faith ‘sans’ or without experience, or faith in God without and independ nt of corresponding 
experience, is established and promoted as mature and true faith. This, however, merits further 
attention and exploration.
5.1.2 CHRISTIANITY AS SACRAL WORLD(VIEW) S
What Christianity is as Catholicism and Protestantism may be considered as much the descendants of 
Christendom as the early church. The secular age succeeds Christendom with the monarchies and the 
institutional churches of the various Roman Empires continuing within an increasingly modern and 
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secular world(view). Where Catholicism and Protestantism continue after Christendom it is as they arise 
in relation to and in the context of the secular age. As such, they are modern ventures where the State and 
the Church continue playing the whose on top game only now with the State in charge. 
Here the sacral world(view) is Christian- Aristotelian and comes to be replaced by rationalism 
within the secular age. Cupitt (1998:30) notes that objective rationalism and absolute monarchy were 
combined into a tight system of hierarchy as a world(view) that can be seen to be expressed in the 
Christian-Aristotelian cosmology. The result being a clear chain of command: God, Christ, the Pope, 
the King, the church, and the State authorities – all with no room for criticism or innovation. Instead, 
its a matter of absolute truth and absolute power and absolute value wherein the individual submits and 
accepts one’s place in the all-powerful, all-knowing system.
The close association between the Roman Empire and Christianity results in the institutional 
church defending the science and politics of the Empire during the Copernican Revolution and 
Protestant Reformation. We explore this in List 5.1.2 Contributions toward the modern Christian 
world(view) below.
List 5.1.2 Contributions toward the modern Christian world(view)
5.1.2.1 Geocentrism wins out over Heliocentrism. The Copernican Revolution displaced 
the cosmology that lasted over 1,500 years which innovated on an earlier cosmology 
wherein the work of Aniximander (6th century BCE) had already shown the world to 
be round. Back then the geocentrism is defended by Plato (c.428 - c.3347 BCE) and 
Aristotle (384-322 BCE) against the Heliocentrism of Aristarchus of Samos (310-230 
BCE). Heliocentrism is then rejected again by Hipparchus of Nicea (190 BCE - 120 
BCE) and geocentricism completed by Claudius Ptolemy (100-170 CE).26 The later 
Christian-Aristotelian geocentricism is, then, the world(view) of the Romans which 
adopts Christianity as the religion of the Empire.
5.1.2.2 Christianity is adopted by the Roman Empire. Christianity went from a persecuted 
faith and people within the Roman Empire to a tolerated faith jointly issued by Galerius 
(250-311 CE), Constantine I (272-337 CE) and Licinius (c. 263-325) as the Edict of 
Tolerance (311 CE), followed up by the latter two in the Edict of Milan (313 CE) 
respectively for the Western and Eastern Empire, and then adopted as the faith of the 
Empire at the Edict of Thessalonica (380 CE). In a short space of time, Christianity 
when from tolerated to legal to adopted then from a tolerated faith to adoption as 
the religion of the Empire only to become synonymous with the Western Empire as 
the later Christendom of Charlemagne (742-814 CE), reigniting both Empire and 
Church. Christianity was adopted by the Empire and, in turn, imbibed its world(view), 
embraced its hierarchy and taught its science. This was later developed into the 
26	 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aristarchus-of-Samos;	https://www.ancient.eu/Aristarchus_of_Samos/;	https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristarchus_of_Samos
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Christian-Aristotelian cosmology as expressed by Dante Alighieri (1262-1321) in The 
Divine Comedy (1320). The Roman Empire had adopted Christianity as its religion and 
geocentric model as its Science and Christianity, in turn, adopted both and supported 
it through scant biblical references. There was a quid pro quo within Christendom 
wherein the science of the Empire supported its politics and religion and they, in turn, 
supported the Empire.
5.1.2.3 Christendom succeeds the Roman Empire. The Western Empire fell to the Visigoths 
(around 480 CE) and was later recaptured by the Eastern Empire. During this period 
Christianity’s earlier independence enabled it to succeed the Roman Empire and play 
a significant role in society and its success resulted in it coming to be considered 
synonymous with the recaptured and re-established Empire as Christendom (c. 800 CE 
onwards).
5.1.2.4 The church continues as Catholicism and Protestantism. The church remains 
unified in the Eastern and Western Empire until The Great Schism (1054) where it 
continues as Western Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, while the Eastern Empire is 
sacked by Crusaders (1204) somewhat ending rather than rescuing the Eastern Empire 
and severely impacting any reconciliatory hope between the church in the East and the 
West. During this period, there is a tension between the church and mystics in Western 
Catholicism. This lead to the church banning the laity from reading the Scriptures in 
the vernacular at The church Council of Toulouse in 1229 AD and at The Council of 
Tarragona of 1234. Though there are arguably mitigating circumstances for this, the 
‘devotio moderna’ was central to the development of an alternative Christianity to the 
church within Christendom and a middle way between taking celibate and monastic 
vows and vocation or maintaining a family and secular vocation.
5.1.2.5 Several revolutions take place within Christendom in the 16th century. A number of 
revolutions took place within Christendom which includes the Copernican Revolution 
bookended by Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543) publishing De revolutionibus 
orbium celestial (1543) and Isaac Newton (1543-1727) publishing Philosophia 
Naturalis Principia Mathematicus (1687) with the new era of observational physics 
spearheaded by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) enabling the observation of Venus and 
therewith securing consensus within and beyond the scientific community regarding 
the planets as imperfect planetary objects rather than perfect spheres made of æther. 
The revolutionary nature of the Copernican Revolution is best explored against the 
earlier Christian-Ptolemaic cosmology as explored in the Christian-Aristotelian 
cosmology below. It is in this same period that the Protestant Reformation took place 
as championed by Martin Luther (1483-1546) in Wittenberg (1517) and John Calvin 
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(1509-1564) in Geneva (1541) with the Catholic-Protestant schism officiated between 
at the Edict of Worms (1521) as the rejection of Luther and the Reformation.
This short exploration of consecutive western world(view) s brings us to the secular age and Christianity 
in the modern world(view) as descending from consecutive world(view) s. Here Christianity, as 
world(view), also sees successive expressions of the institutional church leading toward a paradigm 
shared by Christianity as Catholicism and Protestantism.
5.1.3 THE SECULAR AGE
The secular age is an historical era. At the core lies the crowning of reason, with reason prevailing 
over superstitions, control and abuses of the sacral world(view) s and their religions. The modern 
expressions of the Christian faith shares the same historical and geographical spaces as the secular 
age and modern era. A thorough exploration of this lies beyond the scope of this work, but it is 
important that we distinguish between the modern era as epoch and modernity as an ethos.
List 5.1.3.1 Distinguish between The modern Era as epoch and Modernity as ethos:
5.1.3.1 The modern Era. Began with the 16th century and European Renaissance (14th to 18th 
Centuries) and the Age of Discovery (15th to 18th centuries) and includes significant 
revolutions from the 18th century including the French Revolution (1789-1799), the 
American Revolution (1765-1783) and the Industrial Revolution (1760-1840). This 
also includes the Great Divergence (19th century) where the New World overcame 
pre-modern constrains and where Western Civilization was broadly and competitively 
established. In turn, this laid the foundations for other cultural centres modernizing.
5.1.3.2 Modernity. Is a philosophical and intellectual outlook, which is a collection of 
paradigms built on the Enlightenment and tied to the sciences, the social sciences, and 
to the post-industrial secular urban life which challenges the respective premodern 
environments and reshapes them through modernization. As such, modernity is often 
adopted when environments modernise, resulting in tension between their respective 
pre-modernities and modernities.
As a faith, Christianity has during the modern era wrestled with itself in an effort to reform and 
redefine itself as modern faith rooted in a long-standing history as a people united in Christ across 
cultures and languages.
M.Th. Timothy Victor Student #: 3182-738-188
5.1.4 CHRISTIANITY WITHIN MODERNITY
Within the secular age there is often dichotomy between Reason and Experience. Reason focuses 
on the objective, the empirical; Experience on the subjective, the un-empirical. The result is that 
Reason is considered primary and reliable and enable us to leave behind our sacral and superstitious 
world(view) s. The result is a change from living in relation to what is established to what is reasonable, 
from accepting the way the world is to building the world anew. Reason is, however, often contrasted 
with Experience. And Experience is in turn linked to metaphysics, revelation and faith as distinguished 
from the empirical and veridical.
The Christian faith developed in relation to the Roman Empire and spans centuries of thinkers rooted 
in a world(view) and using the thinking tools of that world(view). In the transition from sacred to 
secular the faith gives up its reliance on metaphysics and instead comes to rely on Reason. The benefit 
thereof lies in establishing Christianity in the University. Here theology develops into new expression 
after scholasticism as academic fields. The second key benefit of transitioning from metaphysics 
to reason lies in enabling the institutional church to continue as dependent-yet-independent. This 
is both as the orthodox faith of people, such as the Russian Orthodox or English Orthodox, and 
denominations as Europe expands but also as not-for-profit businesses.
Yet within this secular the institutional church experiences no need for the relational presence of 
God (Šeḵînâ). Such ends up being related to Experience. And instead the Tradition and Word of God 
come to be aligned with Reason over Experience as objectively given.
5.1.5 THE CHURCH AS WORLD(VIEW)
To hold to a faith such as Christianity is to live within and interpret the world through a paradigm. And 
a paradigm is something that the members of a community share (Kuhn 1970:176), yet communities 
exist at various levels with sub-groups existing in relation to a broader or banner community 
(1970:178-179). Furthermore, both normal religion and revolutions are community-based activities. 
In order to understand them, one must unravel the changing community structure of the practitioners 
over time (Kuhn 1970:179).
Barbour (1960:215) reflections that Christianity is at once such a community built around the 
memory of the person of Christ where the church as loving community is the context of the Christian 
life and thought. The institution may of course become an end in itself, a static organization pursuing 
its own self-interest and bound so tightly to its past that it is unable to meet new challenges (Barbour 
1966:216), but what the church ‘is’ has long been the very thing that divides the broader community 
into sub-communities.
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We must recognise that there is a conjunction between the church as loving community, as the 
'ekklesia' or people, and the church as institution, the church as structures and offices. We may divide 
broadly between the church as Orthodox and as Protestant. Doing so allows us to recognise that the 
church as Orthodox includes those sub-communities united in the memory of Christ and divided 
as Western Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Oriental Orthodoxy, and Independent Orthodoxies; the 
church as Protestant includes sub-communities divided from Western Catholicism as post-Catholic 
denominations, such as Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Calvanist, etc., and the rather large number 
and groupings of independent churches and movements. But it is perhaps most important to note that 
both Orthodox and Protestant are Christian on the basis of membership in a formal body sharing the 
memory of and identification with Jesus the historical man and risen Lord.
Barbour (1966:213) notes that knowledge has a social character, children learn language embodying 
concepts that affect the way they organise experience. There can be ‘one-scientist as a field’ nor ‘one-
devotee as a religions’ and no ‘lone-individual as society’. For it is the corporate life of a community 
that transmits a structure of ideals, standards, presuppositions, and patterns of behaviour. We all enter 
community through processes of acquiring distinctive attitudes and by becoming incorporated into 
the community (Barbour 1966:214). What Christianity ‘is’ may then be recognised as an ongoing 
sacral world(view) set within a broader secular world(view).
5.2 REVELATION
Erickson (1985:153) well summarises the need for God as transcendent, and therefore never reachable 
or findable, to reveal Godself to creatures (Šeḵînâ). The customary understanding is that God’s 
general revelation has been made available to “all persons at all times and in all places” and that this 
differs from Gods’ special revelation. In the latter, God has provided “particular communications and 
manifestations of himself to particular persons at particular times, communications and manifestations 
which are available now only by consultation of certain sacred writings” (Erickson 1985:153-154) 
which enables people to now “enter into redemptive relationship with him” (Erickson 1985: 175). 
Here “revelation” is understood as “revealing what is covered” in the sense that transcendence hides 
and obscures God who therefore makes Godself knowingly present (Erickson 1985:175) making 
general revelation inferior to special revelation though the latter builds on the former and each 
mutually require each other (Erickson 1985:177).
Here Erickson (1985:181) recognises the “modes or modalities” of special revelation as “historical 
events, divine speech, and the incarnation” and bundled into the Scriptures as the 'Word of God'.
List 5.2.1 The paradigm of special revelation includes
5.2.1.1 Inspiration. “The supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit upon the Scripture writers 
which rendered their writings an accurate record of the revelation or which resulted in 
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what they wrote actually being the Word of God.” (Erickson 1985:199). Catholics hold 
that this is the case for the Ecumenical Church Councils too. For Reems, “inspiration is 
the giving of revelatory information by whatever phenomenal means and illumination 
the giving of understanding to phenomenal revelation” (Reems 2015:6).
5.2.1.2 Inerrancy. “This is the doctrine that the Bible is fully truthful in all its teachings.” 
(Erickson 1985:221).
5.2.1.3 Authority. “The Bible, as the expression of God’s will to us, poses the right supremely 
to define what we are to believe and how we are to conduct ourselves” (Erickson 
1985:241) as in the “right to command belief or action” as an “external authority” 
(Erickson 1985:242). This is, however, the case as Scripture for Protestants. Catholics 
understand the Tradition, and there with the Pope, to exercise this right. In particular, 
this is the “primacy of Peter and the See of Rome” (Ray 1999: loc.58/6757). Protestants 
hold that tradition has judicial authority and can “assist us to understand the Scripture 
and its application” but should never “displace Scripture” (Erickson 1985:258) and 
Catholics agree with this. However, where Protestants hold Scripture as primary 
Catholics hold Tradition as primary and therewith tied to Scripture. For Catholics, 
“history has a clear voice, but does not force itself upon us uninvited ... and waits to be 
discovered” (Ray 1999:  loc.58/6757) and understands the “primitive Church” to have 
been “bequeathed to us by the apostles” (Ray 1999: loc.72/6757).
Revelation – whether Tradition or Scripture – is necessary because the Fall separated humanity 
from God. Humanity therefore needs special revelation in addition to general revelation due to the 
limitations of humanity (Erickson 1985:176). The “objective of special revelation was relational” 
with the “knowledge about God for the purpose of knowledge of God” and is also remedial (Erickson 
1985:176). Here Erickson argues that “the direct presence of God, the most direct and complete form 
of special revelation, was lost” with the Fall and therefore special revelation is remedial in bringing 
us back to God (Erickson 1985:177).
Speaking in the broadest sense about revelation one would find it hard pressed to find a Protestant 
disagreeing with Erickson or Catholic with Ray. One would, however, find Catholic and Protestant 
disagreeing with each on which is primary, whether Tradition and Scripture or Scripture alone, but not 
on the sufficiency of revelation. For the Catholic, Tradition is sufficient and therewith Scripture; for the 
Protestant, Scripture. Reems (2015:3) notes that:
“The divide between Roman Catholic and Protestant understanding of Scripture as 
revelation lies in what place in the hierarchy of revelation each gives to scripture, to wit is 
M.Th. Timothy Victor Student #: 3182-738-1 91
it first among equals (prima scriptura), a final judge over all its brothers (sola scriptura), or 
merely one of many brothers, as is the accepted view in Roman Catholicism.”
Speaking practically, special revelation is understood to be sufficient for a knowledge of God and 
therewith a saving relationship with God. This may be mediated by faith when receiving the Eucharist 
as Catholic and Word of God as Protestant, but these are understood to be the real presence of God.
Yet though the term ‘revelation’ is not present in early Christians creeds and is not found in the 
Scriptures it is nevertheless a long-standing paradigm within Christianity. The actual term 'revelation' 
begins to enter into writing in the period of the Enlightenment. It is then a recent and modern concept 
noted by Dulles (1992:xix)  as arising in response to Deism. The Reformation and Copernican 
Revolution of the 16th century serve as the historical precursors to the Enlightenment of the 17th 
century. Here the secular age puts forward Reason as the successor to Metaphysics and together with 
Christianity crowns it king of science, politics, philosophy and theology.
Christianity, according to Dulles (19982:3), holds as given that:
“a permanently valid revelation concerning [Godself] in biblical times, a revelation that 
has deepened progressively through the patriarchs, Moses, and the prophets, until it 
reached its unsurpassable climax in Jesus Christ. The Christian Church down through the 
centuries has been committed to this revelation and has sought to propagate it, defend it, 
and explain its implications.”
The idea of revelation is pervasive in the Bible and Christian theology, but it has been taken for 
granted and only recently come under scrutiny. Only in recent centuries has it been explored. First in 
the 16th century the Protestant and Orthodox both appealed to Revelation to support their positions 
against Deists. The result, according to Dulles (1992:4) is that:
"By the end of the nineteenth century the Christian churches were equipped with a 
systematically complete doctrine of revelation as a deposit of truth built up in biblical 
times and reliably transmitted through the Bible and church teaching. Among Christians 
who still adhere to this doctrine, revelation is seen as foundation to the religious life of the 
individual, to the mission of the church and to the method of theology."
The Christian individual holds to an attitude of faith in the sense of a believing response to the revealing 
word. The church sees itself as commissioned to safeguard and herald the revelation committed to it 
by Christ (Dulles 1992:4), addressing all humanity in the name of the revealing God. And theology 
can be contrasted with the philosophy of religion in being a disciplined reflection on faith and also of 
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revelation (Dulles 1992:5). Christian theologians agree on the centrality of revelation (Dulles 1992:5) 
despite contemporary difficulties against revelation (Dulles 1992:6-8) as protest against Christianity 
without revelation (Dulles 1992:8-14).
List 5.2.2 Revelation as problems
5.2.2.1 Traditional notions of revelation are considered mythical, as stories, which are based 
on primitive modes of thought that cannot be accepted by modern man (Dulles 2002: 
loc. 167/242).
5.2.2.2 Revelation (Šeḵînâ) is something people do not experience. They are told about 
revelation by the Bible and Church, but these are reports and not revelation (Dulles 
2002: loc. 167/242).
5.2.2.3 Revelation imprisons one within a ghetto toward absolutism, cutting those who 
subscribe to the notion off from dialogue with science and philosophy. Viewed as such, 
revelation dehumanises others as the outsiders (Dulles 2002: loc. 167/242).
Dulles (1992:13) notes that the ‘notion of God is, for Jews and Christians, intertwined with the conviction 
that God is free and personal, that he acts on behalf of those whom he loves, and that his actions 
include, already within history, a partial disclosure of his nature, attributes, attitudes, and intentions. The 
acceptance of revelation is, therefore, of fundamental importance to the Christian faith.’
5.3 THE CHURCH
According to Dulles (2002: loc.167/242):
“In all Christian ecclesiologies, the church is intimately connected with divine revelation. 
If there were no revelation there could be no faith in the biblical and Christian sense, nor 
any worship, nor any church. If people accept the church at all, it is because they find 
in it a way of communion with God who freely emerges from his silence and discloses 
himself to me”
The church is the sole guaranteed provide of the Eucharist and the Message and the institution of the 
church is what Christ established and continues to build. The church, however, has a complicated history. 
The church is often viewed as “the collective dimension of the Christian life” (Erickson 1985: 1025). 
There is, however, much recognised confusion about what the church ‘is’. This is partly because the 
word is used to refer to “an architectural structure”, a “particular body of believers”, a “denomination 
or distinctive group” (Erickson 1985:1026). Erickson notes that “at no point in the history of Christian 
thought has the doctrine of the church received the direct and complete attention which other doctrines 
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have received” with it being notes as recent as at “the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam in 1948, 
Father Georges Florovsky claimed that the doctrine of the church had hardly passed its pretheological 
phase” (Erickson 1985: 1026, referencing Colin. W. Williams, The church, New Directions in Theology 
Today, vol.4 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969) p.11.). Traditionally, the church was viewed as a divinely 
ordained institution as distinct from the world and as intended to transform it. This view, however, 
remains popular. The attention, however, lies mostly with the concrete expression of the institution of 
the church (Erickson 1985: 1028). Many believe that the “Church is (or ought to be) what it was at the 
beginning (or what it first became)” (Erickson 1985: 1029).
With regards to the nature of the church, Erickson says that “Each community, however small, 
represents the total community, the church” (Ericksen 1985: 1033). The church is ‘the people of God’ 
(Erickson 1985: 1035), ‘the body of Christ’ (Erickson 1985: 1036), and ‘the temple of the Holy Spirit’ 
(Erickson 1985: 10389). To this we may add the church as “institution, communion, sacrament, herald 
and servant” (cf. Dulles 1974). Here the church is the realm of God or kingdom of God (Erickson 1985: 
1041, referencing Ladd, Jesus and the kingdom (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp.259-60). The 
church is understood to have originated at Pentecost (Erickson 1985:1048).
In theory, then, the nature of the church is that is the people and not an institution such as a race 
or a geopolitical nation. However, the actual outworking in history is such that Catholics argue for 
the institutional church as established in Rome under the Pope as apostolic successor to Peter as the 
church. Speaking practically, whenever a Protestant speaks of a church it is concretely expressed 
as a Denomination or a not-for-profit business. Whenever an individual is converted to Christianity 
they are counted as a member of an institutional expression of the church and expected, more or less, 
to attend and participate in that institutional expression of the church. We may define the church 
as the ‘ekklesia’ but in practice it is the institution of the church that is paradigmatically central. 
Hence the focus is on attending the Mass, for Catholics, and Worship, for Protestants. To be out of 
the institutional church is viewed as a waning commitment to the faith and to God. The institutional 
church is therefore viewed as necessary for Christians.
Yet the notion of the church as a mystical body is present today and erodes the institutional view 
(Dulles 2002: loc. 171/242) and focuses on personal communion with God. This view also subordinates 
the proposition notion or aspect of revelation to its capacity to establish personal communion with 
God (Dulles 2002: loc. 169/242). Here the church as mystical body supersedes the institutional and 
transitions us from the notion of the church as mediating and transmitting revelation to being those who 
have already received revelation gathering to worship God (Dulles 2002: loc. 171/242).
We may model the relationship between general revelation, the individual believer, special revelation, 
and the priority of Tradition and Scripture to Catholics, the Word of God to Protestants, and the respective 
collapse of the ‘real’ presence of God in the Eucharist and Message in Diagram 5.3 modern revelation 
theology respectively for Catholics and Protestants below.
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Diagram 5.3 modern revelation theology
5.4 CHRISTIAN RATIONALISM
There is perhaps a dichotomy between Re son and Experience within Modernity that results 
in the explication of Scripture in relation to Reason and the enculturated practice of faith being 
paradigmatically centred around the Eucharist and Message with a constellation of supporting 
activities such as worship, other sacraments, community, service, etc.
The Reformation guided by those modernizing Christianity within Modernity have perhaps 
translated Metaphysics as Rationalism. Guided by rationalism, it is not the silent worship of Fox 
or the practice of the Presence (Šeḵînâ) (such as Brother Lawrence’s) that defines the institutional 
chu ch after the Reformation. Instead what prevails is personal transformation through reading and 
preaching of the Word that becomes central. It is established and recognised that Luther’s experience 
of reading and lecturing Romans 1515-1517 enabled him to reach his conclusion regarding salvation 
by grace through faith alone. Over time, reading the Scriptures as the Word of God is linked to faith 
and coupled with all the certainties of rationalism. Notable contributors inadvertently linking Scripture 
and faith to reason alone may include, but not be limited to, the likes of Martin Luther (1483-1546), 
John Calvin (1509-1564), Charles Hodge (1797-1878), B.B. Warfield (1886-1902). Over time they 
argue for Scripture as the Word of God and, over time, the message becomes central to Reformation-
descended churches. Though thinkers such as Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) and Walter Brueggemann 
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(1933-present) don’t entirely agree with the above, they’re generally overridden by general consensus 
among evangelical Christians. One can readily see the foundations of contemporary evangelicalism 
as rooted in Pietism as personal devotion and as embracing Scripture as the Word of God. Christian 
rationalism is entirely related to Scripture and rationalism becomes the foundation of faith. This is 
understandable as the entire current of modern society is guided by rationalism.
Classical theology distinguishes between Special Revelation, understood as God’s self-revelation in 
particular times and places to particular people culminating in the Jesus-event and the Scriptures, and 
General Revelation, understood as God’s vague- and indirect-revelation at all times and in all places 
and through all things. But there is a dichotomy between “faith” and “experience” in Modernity wherein 
Reason is coupled to Special Revelation along with all the connotations thereof while Experience is 
increasingly coupled to General Revelation along with all associated denotations. The modern faith, as 
reconstructed, is practiced as paradigmatically centred on Reason and Special Revelation.27
Through modernity classical theology transitions toward Evangelical-Protestant theology, an 
investigation of the faith in light of the challenges of Modernity and an expression of the faith according 
to the requirements of the modern Era and Modernity. When considering recent explorations of revelation 
in Christian thinking we must surely note lack of relational presence (Šeḵînâ).
List 5.4.1 Christian rationalism
5.4.1.1 Tyson (2008:246) explores and critiques the “onto-theological assumptions 
underpinning” modernity and postmodernity, which distinguishes ‘reason’ from 
‘faith’. Here ‘reason’ is understood as that which is knowable, to the senses and their 
technological extensions allowing scientific verification while ‘faith’ is understood as 
speculative, as unavailable to the sense and unverifiable scientifically. It is this an 'a 
priori' assumption that makes the exploration of “epistemology and transcendence” 
difficult (Tyson 2008:246). Through Modernity “perception becomes fundamental 
to all kinds of knowledge” (2008:257). Yet, as noted by Keener above. Modernity 
harbours a subconscious anti-supernaturalism that excludes and explains away any 
data (Keener 2011), thus excluding originating theistic experience from exploration in 
any empirical sense, while continuing with the assumption that religious experience is 
un-emperical and reliant on ‘sui generis’ religious experience. The result, according 
to Tyson (2008: 258) is that the Transcendent and any experience thereof, such as 
Šeḵînâ, becomes practically unverifiable and unexplorable. Any attempt to explore 
the Transcendent as true and meaning sets “reason against reason” (Tyson 2008:258) 
or perhaps better sets “the Reason of Modernity” against “the reasoning of and about 




M.Th. Timothy Victor Student #: 3182-738-196
epistemology but does not focus on originating theistic experience, that is the tangible 
experience of God present to speak and act.
5.4.1.2 Spencer explores how Christian theology comes to link the knowability about God to the 
Jesus-event to Scripture as primary witness to said event as “analogy” (Spencer 2015) 
and makes such knowing about God synonymous with knowing God. Yet the coupling 
of Special Revelation to Jesus-event and analogy is with Modernity both “(in-)adequate 
and inevitable” (Spencer 2015:19). By saying that God has spoken in analogy and event 
(Spencer 2015:19) the notion of analogy becomes central and is essentially Christological 
(2015:20) and “doctrine of revelation as event” becomes intrinsically coupled with 
the “concept of theology as second-order witness to event” (2015:21). Christians see 
God as having answered the question of “Who is God?”, “What God is like?”, “How 
may we know God?”, and “What is God doing?” personally and directly to the Jesus-
event seen as confirming humans as ‘imago dei’, as the image of God, allowing for said 
revelation in Jesus to be the reliable, definitive, exclusive self-revelation of God. Hence, 
for Christians, it is Jesus-event coupled with the Scriptures which stand to as primary 
witness to the event which become the sole source of revelation form the backbone 
of Special Revelation. The infinite and transcendent God is thus not inaccessible but 
rather accessible via analogy and event in Jesus and via Scripture as witness to Jesus-
event. Christianity is thus able to develop within the modern Era and Modernity around 
the Rationalism, Scientism and Special Revelation coupled together. Spencer makes 
headway on our speak-ability about/of God but on the subject of the experience-ability 
of God. Again, the key takeaway from Spencer is the unavailability of Šeḵînâ and the 
sufficiency of Scripture as the Word of God.
5.4.1.3 Schrijvers notes that the incarnation is an ‘ontic figure who fills the gap between the 
conditional, this world, and unconditional, the transcendent’ (2016:218), though this 
leaves us with an epistemological conundrum in relation to modern and post-Modern 
philosophy. Schrijvers (2016:218) notes that:
  But to make things even worse, let me conclude with one more aporia: it is not certain 
whether it is because of this philosophical idea of incarnation that one, once, started to 
speak of a divine Incarnation, or, on the other way around whether it is because of the 
divine Incarnation that now speaks of philosophical and contingent incarnations.
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Though Tyson makes headway regarding our “onto-epistemological foundations” and Spencer on 
our speak-ability of and about God, it is Schrijvers who draws us toward understanding that these 
explorations are conceptual and should not be mistaken for an exploration of originating theistic 
experience itself. As modern Christianity focuses on the Special Revelation didactically in relation 
to Scripture as Revelation and centres the practice of the modern Christian faith around the Message, 
i.e. what does Scripture say/teach/mean/encourage/etc., in relation to faith and living, there is little 
surprise then that the belief in the God of faith is interpreted as premodern pareidolia, as seeing 
patterns of connection, when applying evolutionary theory to the emergence of the Scriptures and as 
pareidolia when asking on what foundation this God is believed in a modern world.
Krüger (1995:44) thus argues that, in operation, ‘revelation is thus an aesthetic appreciation or 
appraisal’ of scripture, history, and church and (Krüger 1995:30) is a fideistic leap from text to 
belief in God. This is akin to Schrijvers critique of Marion’s phenomenology, that is that it is “a 
phenomenology without phenomenon” (Schrijvers 2016:209) in the sense that Krüger’s revelation is 
revelation without revelation?28 
According to Krüger, the God of revelation is viewed as a faith-construct derived propositionally 
from Scripture and not the some-One the faith engages as present to speak and act29. Is this theistic 
notion of revelation one that originally stemmed from revelation itself or a notion of revelation alone 
that is read back into the Jesus-event and Scriptures? Irrespective of the philosophical problem, the 
ancient Buddhist parallel picks up from an historically similar chicken and egg scenario in relation 
to Brahmanism. This can be seen to remind us that, whatever the root, it remains a problem going 
forward that is related to experience itself. To quote from the Tevijja Sutta, and ancient Buddhist text. 
Quoting from Krüger’s (1989: 15) translation:
Vāseṭṭha, so in fact Brahmā has not been seen face tot (sic) face by any of the brahmans 
learned in the Three Vedas, nor by one their teachers, nor by any of the teachers of their 
teachers, nor by any one seven generations ago. Nor did even the ancient sages say: ‘We 
know, we see, whence and wither Brahmā is.’ These brahmans versed in the Three Vedas 
therefore really said: ‘We teach the path to companionship with what we do know and do 
not see (while claiming that this is the straight path, the way leading the person following 
it, directly to companionship with Brahmā).’
Within the secular age it has been valuable to couple Special Revelation to Scripture and Scripture as 
Reason is coupled with Science. The result has been gaining clarity toward Scripture as a reliable text, 
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grounded. However, as the secular age struggles with ‘experience’ practicality in relation to philosophy, 
theology and science there is been insufficient investigation into originating theistic experience and its 
relation to faith and to the practice of the faith. The result has been insufficient exploration of Šeḵînâ.
There is little wonder then, given the above evaluation of revelation, that the modern essentialist 
views revelation through the lens of evolutionary theory as applied to social, religious and linguistic 
development, finds evidence of ‘religious experience’ as the Personal Consciousness Experience 
and the Dualistic Mystical State, and links such to common introspective practices across diverging 
and seemingly irreconcilable faith traditions. For Christians have not yet explicated the relationship 
between the originating theistic experience reported in Scripture and the phenomenological 
equivalent thereof in their ongoing faith. And, if it is from Christians that Krüger and others have 
understood there to be a leap from text to faith, then Christians must take responsibility for explaining 
the relationship of the God of faith and the God of experience. For how can Essentialists arrive 
at any other conclusion regarding revelation as post-experiential editorial layer over the raw and 
common ‘religious experience’ when no such experience of Christ is meaningfully available, has 
been sufficiently explored and explained, or is included in the institutional church and the practice of 
the Christian faith?
Central to the theory/theology of theistic self-revelation is the notion that the Self-revealer is Christ 
continue to offer his own testimony in contrast to the theory that theism is the result human socio-
cultural-linguistic faith construction in relation to the inexplicable transcendent. Within the secular 
age, Christians responded variously to the charges of Reason. We could consider fundamentalism, on 
one extreme, or liberalism, on the other extreme. Where Christian fundamentalism/fundamentalists 
do not take the questions of the secular age seriously we must also recognise that neither the 
Conservative nor Liberal Christians take revelation in its primary sense of Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) as 
primary, necessary or available. The result is that the Reformed mainstream well serves as a baseline 
for exploration alongside the Protestant-Evangelical. As explored above, the Reformed-Evangelical-
Protestant faith has largely dealt with revelation in relation to Reason. Yet the 'God after God' 
conversations among postmodern philosophers and Essentialists are fairly critiquing Christianity for 
the lack of Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) in the faith. They can do no other than conclude on the non-
realism of God.
It is here perhaps helpful to draw on some contributions related to reason and experience:
List 5.4.2 Developing notions of religious experience
5.4.2.1 Taves (2011) notion of ‘religious experience’ is problematic, which ought by now to 
be a given, and argues for an “attributional approach” and paradigmatic shift toward 
“experience deemed religious” that is complex and nuanced. 
5.4.2.2 That the “experience deemed religious” is not necessarily congruous with the religion 
itself for a religion arises and redefines strongly connected to “experience deemed 
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religious” (Taves 2011:1156)  but then, curiously, moves away there-from to the 
practices centered non-experientially, for instance on “the authority of texts, traditions, 
unbroken lines of transition” (Taves 2011: 1150) resulting in the creation of “...a 
relatively closed, self-authenticating system is created, such that, within the confines 
of the system, practices deemed efficacious by the group lead to the specific religious 
goals and the goals are, by definition, realised when the practices are enacted” (Taves 
2011:1124).
   Tave’s work is particularly informative as we can recognise this exact pattern in the 
counter-cultural turn to God within the secular age, where we see that the pursuit 
of and engagement with Christ, i.e. experience, plays a vital role in the spread and 
adoption of the modern Christian faith during the Great Awakenings and Revivals but 
that the Reformed faith, as enculturated within Modernity and centred on Reason, fails 
to resolve the experience of God and incorporate such into the practice of the faith, 
resulting in the modern faith meeting for second-order activities related to but not 
comprising experiential engagement with God.
5.4.2.3 Hollenback explores the connection between “mystical illumination”, the “contextuality 
of mystical experience” and “the psychological and parapsychological aspects of 
mystical experience”. In particular Hollenback (2000: loc.4810) notes that:
   “While I acknowledge that many mystical experiences utilize the hallucinatory, fantasy-
fabricating activities of the mind and that there are numerous, significant continuities 
that link mystical states of consciousness to dreaming, imagining, and even hypnotic 
trance, I maintain that mystical experience often operates so as to transfigure the dream-
fabricating and imaginational activities of the mind so that they generate something very 
different from “ordinary” dreams or fantasies. They transform the imagination into an 
extraocular organ of perception and knowledge.”
 Hollenback’s exploration is helpful in establishing a phenomenological link between 
Jesus-event and analogy and the role of Scripture as ambassadorial witness to and 
representation of Jesus. The Jesus-event becomes the definitive revelation of who God 
is and what humanity can be and was created for, but this is not linked to the experience 
of God. For instance, Jesus stated, “I tell you, the Son can do nothing by himself; he 
can do only what he sees his Father doing, because whatever the Father does the Son 
also does.” (John 5:19, NIV). Jesus did not simply read Scripture as revelation but 
experienced the companionship of his Father, of the YHWH of Judaism as his God the 
Father. Similarly, the Apostle Paul’s stated, “My message and my preaching were not 
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with wise and persuasive words, but with a demonstration of the Spirit’s power” (1 
Corinthians 2:4, NIV), again linking the self-revelation of God to experience rather 
than just to Scripture and Jesus-event. There is an early experiential-verificational link 
between the good news of the kingdom of God in support thereof that remains open to 
exploration. 
 The result is that:
 a)   The meaning of God can be fabricated imaginatively
 b)   The meaning of God can be fabricated, however faithfully and accurately, in 
relation to Scripture, but may still exist entirely as mental construct
 c)   The meaning of God can be constructed in relation to Scripture and Experience
 d)   That for all its gains there is a loss between modern philosophy and Christian 
theooogy in not being able to distinguish 1.3.1 from 1.3.2 and ground 1.3.3 as 
important.
5.4.2.4 Dulles (1992) provides us with insight into Doctrine of Revelation in relation to 
Revelation as Doctrine, Revelation as History, Revelation as Inner Experience, 
Revelation as Dialectical Presence, and Revelation as New Awareness.
   Dulles notes that there are significant challenges to the notion of revelation stemming 
from ‘philosophical agnosticism, linguistic analysis, modern epistemology, empirical 
psychology, biblical criticism, the history of Christian doctrine, comparative religion, 
and critical sociology (1992: 6-8). Perhaps most informative is Dulles’(1992:3) 
summary of the problem of revelation:
    “The great Western religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – are 
based on the conviction that the existence of the world and the final 
meaning and value of all that it contains ultimately depend on a personal 
God who, while distinct from the world and everything in it, is absolute 
in terms of reality, goodness, and power. These religions profess to derive 
their fundamental vision not from human speculation, which would be 
tentative and uncertain, but from God’s own testimony—that is to say, 
from a historical given divine revelation.”
   Dulles (1992:8-9) poses the question of what Christianity is apart from religion and 
proposes that:
    “In a reconstructed Christianity, one could imagine, “revelation” could 
be conceived as a mythical way of describing sudden and transforming 
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insights that rise from the exercise of the latent powers of the human 
mind. In such a perspective the Scriptures would be valued as preserving 
the memory of the struggles and discoveries of a religiously gifted 
people. Jesus would be understood not as God incarnate but rather as a 
remarkable religious leader whose teaching could be revered as uniquely 
disclosive of God, at least to the community of his own disciples. The 
church would then be seen as the place in which the memory of Jesus is 
specifically preserved, in which the Scriptures are read with veneration, 
and in which efforts are made to cultivate a life conformed to the wisdom 
contained in the Jewish and Christian traditions. Christian faith would 
mean an attitude of mind characterised by special confidence in the 
biblical heritage as being a reliable path to spiritual growth.”
Dulles puts into words what Christianity is being viewed as by early essentialism, the Essentialists, 
and an ancient-contemporary critique of fideism. Yet this is also what  Christianity amounts to when 
consider modern Catholicism and modern Protestant-Evangelical faith. For when God is ‘met with 
by faith’ and ‘not by experience’ then there is no equivalent expectation of special revelation as God 
present in Person. The result is that Christianity meets ‘about God’ in relation to religious and faith 
activities and then considers God to have been met with.
Though Christianity claims special revelation in relation to Jesus-event and Scripture there is no 
special revelation taking place for anyone or any expectation thereof. Christianity is, then, somewhat 
at odds with its earlier mystical roots where God’s relational presence was key.
In the absence of the clear experience of Christ, classical theology is an insufficient argument for 
the reality of Christ to atheists or even people raised as Christians. Speaking about faith as apart from 
experience is to make a saving faith something apart from a relationship. The practice of Christianity 
here essentially amounts to a rational pursuit for knowledge of Christ and faithfulness in character 
and public service to others in representation of Christ.
5.5 MODERN CHRISTIAN SPIRITUALITY
A recent study conducted by Willie Botha, David Bulger, and Karl Teichart is subtitled Research on 
Christian leadership training needs in South Africa. The results were surprising to the researchers. They 
had conducted polls ahead of the study which in no way indicated what the primary need emerging 
from the study would be. The surprise conclusion is that Christian leaders rate their number one need as 
intimacy for God (Botha et al. 2016: 78). In fact (Botha et al. 2016: 82) say that:
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“When looking at the ‘Intimacy with God’ subject, the trend ... shows that, generally 
speaking, the longer a responded had been in ministry, the more likely he or she would 
express a need for development and growth in intimacy with God.”
Though this may sound like ‘the right thing to say’ it is a study on the unmet and future training needs 
of Christian leaders (Botha et al. 2016: 5). The report, in response to the study, is titled A Cry for 
Intimacy with God. Speaking objectively, in light of this research, we can acknowledge that God-
absence is significantly prevalent across churches throughout South Africa and that it is likely that 
similar reports can be gathered throughout the modern world.
Given that even those leaders within Christianity committed to running the faith and nurturing 
the faithful are recognizing their God-hunger as related to God’s absence, it is not surprising that 
Essentialism, Cupitt, Caputo and Kearney confirm the absence of God through their observations30. If 
even the leaders of contemporary Christianity recognise their God-hunger as tied to their experience of 
God’s absence, then that’s quite an indictment on a faith defining itself in relation to God’s availability 
and activity. The assertion that “God is” as not simply a confessional assertion that Christians can let 
go of. This confession that “God is” serves as pivotal, axiomatic and central to the Christian faith. The 
core foundation of the Judeo-Christian faith is intrinsically tied to the understanding and acceptance 
of the fact that a particular, transcendent and self-revealing some-One entered the experience of actual 
historical person,s made promises and fulfilled them over the course of generations across various 
cultures, and produced in cooperation with them a faithful written testament that’s foundational to the 
faith and its practices.
And it is this assertion that has driven an ongoing “God after God” conversation within Christianity. 
And throughout the experience of God’s presence is tied to the mystics preceding Modernity and 
within it is widespread in connection wit the Great Awakenings (also Renewal or Revival) where God 
is experienced as drawing new in Person to speak and act. The bridge between the ‘God after God’ 
conversations focus perhaps less on God’s absence than the possibility of God. Yet this discussion 
takes place in relation to a largely Orthodox Christianity, now Catholic and Protestant, that’s descended 
from the Reformation.
Modern Christianity is the Christian after Christendom as now Catholicism and Protestantism. It 
is also metaphysics translated as rationalism. As such, neither Christendom nor Christianity make 
the experience of God, and therewith mysticism, their focus. The focus is on the institution of the 
church, making the Reformation a Magisterial Reformation and not a paradigmatic redefinition of 
Christianity.
The thinking of Christians in Modernity runs on a parallel line to that of postmodern philosophy and 
the philosophy of religion. Within Modernity philosophy is working out the implications of letting 
go of metaphysics, but we do not find politics or mainstream Christian thinking doing this. Here the 
30	 The	discussion	on	Essentialism	precedes	this	and	a	discussion	on	Cupitt,	Caputo	and	Kearney	will	follow
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metaphysics of Christendom is worked out as the rationalism of modern Christianity resulting in a 
“faith apart from works and apart from experience”.
Where postmodern philosophers come to agree with Eastern philosophy on Emptiness, and perhaps 
even science at a deeper ontological level on Śūnyatā, Christians first translate the metaphysics of 
Christendom into the rationalism of Modernity as support for the institution of the church. Where the 
postmodern philosophers are still on the track of deconstructing Christianity the Christian thinkers 
remain on track translating metaphysics.
Christian spirituality ends up being relegated to character formation even when translating the 
contemplative and ascetic practices of earlier mystics for modern people. One is hard-pressed to 
find acknowledgment of Christian mysticism within non-academic works on Christian spirituality. 
Christian mysticism is not well explored as a critical conversation partner with modern Christianity. 
Christianity is instead expressed within Christianity as in keeping with the institution of the church 
and not in keeping with monasticism. This is partly because monasticism came to be hosted as a sub-
culture within Christendom under the church and Protestants rejected monasticism.
Though Foster notes the “spiritual bankruptcy” of himself and his congregation and realised that a 
minister what he “said had no power to help people” as they were “starving for a word from God, and 
I had nothing to give them. Nothing.” (Foster 1978:2%). As such, Foster recognised exactly the same 
kind of spiritual malnutrition within himself as has recently been notes as a lack of “intimacy with 
God” (Teichart et al. 2016:78). Willard notes that when experiencing such that “... most Christians 
had been told by me as by others to attend the services of the church, give of time and money, pray, 
read the Bible, do good to others, and witness to their faith” (Willard 1999: loc.18/251). This did not 
result in a life of engaging God. In fact, “please and sound schemes of Christian education, church 
growth, and spiritual renewal came round to this disappointing result” (Willard 1999: loc.18/251).
The answer is put forward as the spiritual disciplines, as the exercises of Christ and the spiritual greats 
within Christian history. Foster categorises the disciplines as “inward” (our own walk - meditation, 
prayer, fasting, study), “outward” (our interface with the world - simplicity, solitude, submission, 
service), and “corporate”(shared with others - confession, worship, guidance, celebration) (cf. Foster 
1972). Willard categorises them as “disciplines of engagement” (connecting us to the needs of others 
and God’s heart and has in the world - solitude, silence, fasting, frugality, chastity, secrecy, sacrifice 
(Willard 1999: loc.158/251)) and “disciplines of abstinence” (teaches us that we are human beings 
not human doings and detaches us from the “hurry, clutter and busyness” to connect with God - study, 
worship, celebration, service, prayer, fellowship, confession, submission (Willard 1999:158/251)). 
In contrast, Calhoun views the disciplines as “intentional means of opening space in our lives for 
the worship of God and that such is effectively embodied” (Calhoun 2015:22; also Willard 1999: 
loc.19/251) and connects the spiritual disciplines to our “desires” (Calhoun 2015:13-16) and the 
“rhythms of life” the rhythms of life in ordered monastic communities (Calhoun 2015:19), as “constant 
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channels and disciplines of grace”. These disciples are viewed as “ways to keep the company of 
Jesus” (Calhoun 2015:20) and through which we are transformed into the image of Jesus (Calhoun 
2015:11) or Christlikeness. These disciplines are viewed as “constant channels and disciplines of 
grace”. These disciples are viewed as “ways to keep the company of Jesus” (Calhoun 2015:20) and 
through which we are transformed into the image of Jesus (Calhoun 2015:11) or Christlikeness. The 
mystics are drawn on as people “who knew God” (Foster 1997:3%) and their disciplines appropriated 
for modern people. These practices are viewed as training Christians toward Christlikeness and tied 
to our reading of the Scriptures, reflection upon them, appropriating the practices for ourselves and 
then enacting or practicing them till they become habits.
Christian spirituality often focuses on character formation and faithful living while notions of 
companionship, or perhaps even intimacy, with Christ becomes relegated to great Christian saints 
and mystics and is not considered normative. Christian spirituality is thus susceptible to precisely the 
critique levelled by Gotama to ancient Brahmanism, that it is the pursuit of the unknown-Transcendent 
rather than a some-One.
Foster takes the divine paradigm as the imitation of Christ, of being like Christ to become like 
Christ in character.
List 5.5.1 Foster’s streams
5.5.1.1 The divine paradigm for humans is the imitation of Christ. Here there’s a reflection 
on the life of Christ (Foster 1998: loc.2/273) and brings together all the Christian 
traditions (Foster 1998: loc.3/273).
5.5.1.2 The contemplative tradition is that of a prayer-filled life, a discovery of and return 
to the inner sanctuary of the soul where we meet with and are accompanied by God 
(Foster 1998: loc.23/273) This is the presence of God (Foster 1998: loc.24/273). This 
is the inward-outward contemplative journey that Christian mysticism may be reduced 
to (Foster 1998: loc.23-57/273), albeit understood as the “steady gaze of the soul upon 
the God who loves us” (Foster 1998: loc.48/273). With our access to Christ mediated by 
Tradition and Scripture, the “steady gaze” requires a deeper exploration not conducted 
here.
5.5.1.3 The holiness tradition the discovery is all about the virtuous life (Foster 1998: 
loc.59/273) of holiness of heart and life (Foster 1998: loc.96/273), training into godliness 
valuable in this life and the next which has the contemplative practice of prayer as its 
foundation (Foster 1998: loc.59/273). Ultimately it is about being “response-able” as 
doing what needs to be done appropriately within relationships and society (Foster 
1998: loc.82/273).
5.5.1.4 The charismatic tradition is the discovery of a Spirit-Empowered life or the charisms 
also understood as the gifts of the Spirit and the nurturing of fruit by the Spirit (Foster 
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1998: loc.98-123/273). It is the recognition that we live our lives in cooperation with 
God, shaped by the reality of God’s reign, expressed as life in and through the Spirit of 
God (Foster 1998: loc.125/273).
5.5.1.5 The social justice tradition is the discovery of a compassionate life enabling people to 
live better in the world and improve the lives of others including the social structures 
of society (Foster 1998: loc.136/273). God calls us to a life of social justice: personal, 
social, institutional. And this call is for the benefit of all peoples (Foster 1998: 
loc.182/273).
5.5.1.6 The evangelical tradition is the discovery of the Word-centred life focused on 
proclaiming the Gospel and its best paired with the social justice movement (Foster 
1998: loc.186/273). The evangelical tradition includes: the proclamation of the gospel; 
the centrality of Scripture as a faithful repository of the gospel; and the confessional 
witness of the earthly Christian community as a faithful interpretation of the gospel 
(Foster 1998: loc.218/273). The Bible is given to us as the Word of God written and 
is the infallible rule of faith as illuminated and guided by the Spirit (Foster 1998: 
loc.232/273).
5.5.1.7 The incarnational tradition is the discovery of the sacramental life as the daily or 
ordinary life (Foster 1998: loc.236/273). The incarnational tradition is concerned 
with the relationship between spirit and matter, with God manifesting through the 
material means of ourselves (Foster 1998: loc.236/273). Our embodied self becomes 
the tabernacle of the Holy (Foster 1998: loc.271/273).
Christianity bases its pedigree on the church and not monasticism or mysticism. The practice of the 
Christian mystics is stripped of asceticism (Willard 1999: loc.130-150/251). The classical aesthetic 
is an athlete training their body, mind, and spirit and not one who contrasts the enjoyment of life 
punishment impoverished punishment (Willard 1999: loc.148/251). Here “ascetic” is taken from 
“askesis” and means “exercise and training” (Venter 2018: Ms.154). The monastics withdrew from 
the world in order to be in it and not to escape it (Willard 1999: loc.147/251). And Protestants have 
rejected “works of salvation” in favour of “grace for faith and salvation”. Protestantism ties the 
spiritual disciplines to the attaining forgiveness from God and avoiding punishment by God rather 
than as “exercises unto godliness” (Willard 1999: loc.144/251). The result is now having to regain 
contemplative vital and vitalizing practices. Therefore Willard (1999: loc.18/251) says that:
“For the serious churchgoing Christians, the hindrance to their spiritual growth is not 
unwillingness... I could no longer deny the facts. I finally decided their problem was a 
theological deficiency, a lack in teaching, understanding, and practical direction. And the 
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problem, I also decided, was one that the usual forms of ministry and teaching obviously 
do not remedy”
The spiritual disciplines differ from the usual teaching of the church in that they are embodied 
practices (Willard 1999: loc.19/251). Christians do not lack for knowledge or understanding or effort, 
but rather lack for the practical means for living spirituality. For Willard, “our spiritual growth stems 
from what we do with our lives, from the habits we form, and from the character that results” (Willard 
1999: loc.20/251). In fact, for Willard: “Full participation in the life of God’s kingdom and in the 
vivid companionship of Christ comes to us only through the appropriate exercise in the disciplines 
for life in the spirit” (Willard 1999: loc.26/251).
List 5.5.2 Willard’s understanding of formative spirituality
5.5.2.1 Formative training enables a new power as the individual breaking with their past 
life and the living into their new life as entering kingdom of God, accompanied by a 
release of forgiveness. Therewith both repentance and forgiveness are given by God 
(cf. Psalms 90:3; 85:4; Acts 5:32; Rom.2:4; 2 Tim.2:25) (Willard 1999: loc.39/251).
5.5.2.2 This is accompanied by a developing transformation of the individual’s character along 
with their attitude and personality (2 Cor.5:17; Rom.5:1-5; 2 Pet. 1:4-11) (Willard 
1999: loc.39/251).
5.5.2.3 A significant, extra human power over the evils of this present age and world, exercised 
both by individuals and the collective church (Matt. 28:18) (Willard 1999: loc.39/251).
This can only result from a positive view of the body, of this life and of our relationships (Willard 
1999: loc.41/251). In fact, according to Willard (1999: loc.42/251), the:
“Human body was made to be the vehicle of human personality ruling the earth for God 
and through his power. Withdrawn from that function by loss of its connection with God, 
the body is caught in the inevitable state of corruption in which we find it now. To readjust 
our view of the possibilities of our body and the spiritual life the body can experience... 
who we are and what spiritual life is”
Instead of being opposed to the body and this life in the world, the spiritual life is a deep embrace of 
the body and everything and everyone in this life. Instead, the practice of the spirituality disciplines 
is meant to expose “and put to the death the false self, the old sin nature, to uncover and nurture our 
new nature in Christ, our true self”. Their withdrawal was not “ontological (“the world is evil”) but 
eschatological (God’s kingdom has come), and thus missional (as witness to the world)” (Venter 
2018: MS: 154). Drawing on the Christian mystics is curious.
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List 5.5.3  Contradictory relationship between the mystics and their usage in modern 
Christianity
5.5.3.1 Though the Christian mystics are drawn on as great examples of what Christians can 
and ought to be, they are not explored in terms of their mystical theology or their 
immediate experience of God. Instead their practices are drawn on as potentially 
revitalizing the Christian faith.
5.5.3.2 Christian mysticism has long been considered taboo, with the ideas of the mystics not 
being discussed. Ponsonby, by way of example, considered mysticism to have arisen 
as a reaction to the “arid and abstracted philosophical theology of scholasticism” 
(Ponsonby 2015:34). And further that movements viewed as focusing on the interior 
life of the individual than on the ecclesiastical structures and sacramental externals of 
the church resulted in the elevation of personal visions over Scripture and therewith 
the “loss of control of the Scripture and the rather iconoclastic rejection of many of 
the church’s structures” with the result being that of significant “deviations from the 
historical faith” (Ponsonby 2015:37).
5.5.3.3 This means that the spiritual disciplines are viewed as invitational opportunities for 
conversations with God through facing the deeper or inner self or nature of the self. 
But this must take place within the church and one’s relationship with God is primarily 
in the context of and through the medium of the church.
This, however, does not make sense. On one hand those seeking an authentic and vibrant spirituality 
for Christians are selling the very practices of the mystics to us on the basis that they produced 
exemplars of the faith–people who really knew God and where Christlike in character. Yet more 
systematic theologians argue that these same mystics hold dangerous teachings that will lead us astray 
if we make the interior life our priority. This is possibly due to contemplative prayer being revived in 
recent decades and the prejudice of Western Christians against mysticism declining. Mysticism has 
been viewed as “esoteric spirituality, ‘deeper life’ elitism, legalistic asceticism, and the fear of New 
Age/Eastern mysticism” (Venter 2018: MS: 51).
There appears to be no recognition of the development and contributions of the new or vernacular 
mysticism leading up to and overlapping the Reformation (cf. McGinn 1998, 2005, 2012) or the 
contributions of the mystics to the Reformation. Instead, everything is credited to Luther. et the 
most significant influences on Luther are perhaps John Tauler (c.1300-1361) and Theologia Deutsch 
(c.1300s). These also influenced Pietism, as coined by Spener (1635-1705) in Pia Desideria (1675) as 
well as Arndt’s (1555-1621) True Christianity (1606-1610).
Anthony of Egypt (251-356) was perhaps the first to articulate the threefold path with Pseudo 
Dionysius (early 6th century) the first to make use of the phrase “mystical theology”. The threefold 
M.Th. Timothy Victor Student #: 3182-738-1108
path of an ascetic-mystic paradigm was thus established early in Christian thinking (Venter 2018: 
MS:154).
Apophatic practice was an important part of Christian meditation (Venter 2018: MS:155) serving 
as two distinct types of prayer in Christian spirituality. Here meditation is understand as “mental 
effort, using all our senses and faculties in our experience of God” and contemplation the stilling and 
silencing of the same (Venter 2018: MS:51). The former is cataphatic or “positive/affirmative” and 
the latter apophatic or “negative/emptying”. The themes of Christian spirituality are similar to those 
of Christian mysticism:
List 5.5.4 Similar themes in Christian mysticism and Christian contemplative spirituality
5.5.4.1 Inner transformation. Accomplished through the disciplines. This may be roughly 
equivalent to the Via Purgativa or “Way of Purgation” in the West and “prayer of the 
lips” in the East. This is the “purification of the body/soul” (Venter 2018: MS:153). 
The purpose of this stage is to purify us from our sinful vices by training us toward 
Christ’s virtues (Venter 2018: MS:155). When considering Christian spirituality today, 
it is the imitation of Jesus and therewith the beginning of the contemplative ascetic life 
as understood by the church fathers (Venter 2018: MS:158).
5.5.4.2 Self-awareness. Attained through the disciplines. This may be roughly equivalent to 
the Via Illuminata or “Way of Illumination” in the West and “prayer of the mind” in 
the East. This is the “illumination of the mind/intellect” (Venter 2018: MS:153). The 
purpose of this stage is illuminate the purified mind by shifting from active practices 
to passive enlightenment (Venter 2018: MS:155).
5.5.4.3 Openness to God. Our innate need expressed as availability. This may be roughly 
equivalent to the Via Unitiva or “Way of Union” in the West and “theosis” in the East. 
This is the “union of heart/mind with God”. Here “theosis” is ‘the union with God by 
participating in the divine nature, without confusion of the divine and human persons’ 
(Venter 2018: MS:153). Here God is contemplated directly and the mystic experiences 
unmediated mystical knowledge of God in apophatic union with the Father as more 
intimate yet more distant (Venter 2018: MS:155).
Venter notes that the above is also known as “the Trinitarian way, because is through the Son 
(purgation) by the Spirit (illumination) to the Father (union), in keeping with Trinitarian theology 
from the 4th century onwards” (Venter 2018: MS:153).
However, modern Christian spirituality as contemplative spirituality is at once the very 
beginnings of a practical mysticism and therewith the Way of Purgation. It is encouraged under 
the curation of the church as a means of addressing the meaninglessness of Christianity. However, 
the active, affirmative, sensoral or cataphatic dimension can readily be viewed as an aesthetic 
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alone. Here Christians have a cataphic aesthetic focused on Christ with the contents of their 'lectio 
divina' drawn from the library of Christian history. Considering the argument of the Essentialists, 
Christianity appears to agree. There is no clarity here that “God is and can be known” and no 
practical exploration of the Šeḵînâ as a foundational element to monotheism. Here though reported 
earliest in Judaism it is central to the origin Christianity and Islam. Surely one could accomplish the 
same “character transformation” toward Buddha-likeness or Brahma-likeness through a cataphic 
practice in relation to the 'lectio divina' drawn respectively from the libraries of Buddhists and the 
Hindus instead of the Christians? modern Christian spirituality then shares in God-absence.
5.6 CONCLUSION
Where modernity proved incapable of addressing deep human needs the institutional church is viewed 
as an alternative to society. And as an alternative it addresses those deeper needs by drawing on a 
long heritage of practices and the library of Christian contributions. Within this library one can find 
inspiration for living and therefore know God by knowing about God.
Yet when reflecting upon modern Christian theology and spirituality it lies in agreement with 
Modernity and Essentialism. The concept of non-realism applies equally to values as to Christian 
and religious beliefs. They are all predicated upon a library of texts and the deeper psychological 
needs within people. And as such the deconstruction of Christianity does not reveal the God who is 
but that God is not. For all the certainties of modern Christianity the institutional expression of the 
church makes little to no provision for relational engagement with God. And though the faith is being 
reviewed by those exploring what Christianity ‘is’, the newer expression of communalism serves more 
as the institutional church in translation than an approximation of the “ekklesia tou theo”. We thus 
find that modern Philosophy, Essentialism, Christian Theology and Christian Spirituality all agreeing 
on the absence of God and mutually supporting each other in that agreement. Christianity then serves 
more as the metaphysics of the Christian-Aristotelian world(view) in translation as rationalism and 
institutionalism than as relating to God.
Within modern Christianity the metaphysics of Christendom is replaced with the rationalism of 
the secular age. Christianity does not rely on God's objective realism as its foundation. Instead, 
Christianity relies on psychological realism coupled with Tradition and Scripture as its objective 
foundations. This results in a faith secured against a modern and secular rationalism and the pluralism 
of religions. Yet the faith must be appraised as somehow at odds with the vital and foundational 
dimension of Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ). It is here that anatheism opens the question of God on its own 
terms rather than as facing a neo-Kantian court of reason that already concluded on God's objective 
non-realism. It is with this in mind that we pick up the next chapter.
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– 6 –
Anamnētheism
There are various ‘God after God’ conversations that have taken place within the secular age. These 
include: (1) modern philosophy which arrives at the “Emptiness” of the “self” and our world(view) s 
including their religions and is agreed upon by Eastern and Western philosophy; (2) Essentialism 
which argues for a common development of the human consciousness through introversive practices 
and experiences across the diversity of consecutive and parallel world(view) s; and (3) Christian 
rationalism which serves perhaps as metaphysics in translation in the post-Christendom institutional 
expression of the church as Catholicism and Protestantism, their associated theologies in relation 
to each other and Modernity, and modern Christian spirituality as contemplative and formational in 
keeping with Essentialism. In common lies the absence of God.
And though all seem to agree on the absence of God not everyone agrees on the God-absence 
within people. Practically speaking, it matters not whether people believe God is real or not real so 
long as we arrive at the same values and character formation is embraced as progressive, harmonious 
and enabling and fundamentalism rejected as regressive, disharmonious and disabling. These 
streams agree on the God-absence and therewith require metaphysics and rationalism to support the 
institutional church whether supported by Tradition or the Word of God.
The returning question of God follows the ‘God after God’ conversations afresh on its own terms 
and merits exploration toward a Christianity or mysticism after the secular age. 
6.1 VARIETIES OF ANATHEISM
The anatheism of Kearney31 is a ‘God after God’ conversation supported by Caputo as an openness 
and availability. It is a religion without religion that leaves behind the metaphysics of the sacral age 
and the rationalism of the secular age along with the religious institutions that have developed in 
relation to them and followed on from each other pretending to be the same. 
As understood by Kearney (2011, 2016), is neither the choice for the dogmatic theism of Christendom 
and Christianity nor the militant anti-theism of the secular age. It is, instead, ana-theism as in a new 
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after the ‘God after God’ conversations that have preceded. It is open to the fluidity of society without 
having to seek the certainty and stability promised by the Enlightenment. It is perhaps undecided 
and open. But it differs from the amnetheism of Cupitt, taken from the Greek ‘amnesia’ and meaning 
‘forgetting’ or ‘losing the memory of’.
A third type of anatheism to consider is perhaps that of anamnētheism taken from ‘ anamnēsis’, 
Greek for “remembering” or “recalling that something has been forgotten”. This is like remembering 
or recalling that someone who has been present is now absent, who has been speaking has fallen 
silent, and who has been in close proximity is now distant. It is in this sense that we here begin a ‘God 
after God’ conversation in keeping with God’s relational presence (Šeḵînâ). The conversations to 
date have followed on from God’s absence, but there are enough cracks in modern certainty to allow 
the question of God to return. And here it doesn’t have to be explained on the basis of the terms and 
conditions of modernity dichotomises objectivity and subjectivity and, in a cyclopean sense, never 
permits the returning question of God to be investigated. Here we seek to open such an investigation 
recognizing that space does not permit us to complete such an investigation. Doing so is at once 
unfair, irresponsible and incomplete. Yet it is entirely necessary that it be so. After all, the sacral era 
of the Western and Christian world(view) s endured for 1200 years and that of modernity for the last 
500. They are complex and nuanced world(view) s co-constructed by various contributors and some 
of them, no doubt, some of the greatest thinkers to date. To offer an anamnētheism as though complete 
would, then, be absurd and arrogant. Nevertheless, it would be equally absurd to adopt one of the 
world-religions. Cupitt (2011: loc.873/2281) notes that:
“All of the three ancient faiths that claim to be universal are in practice found to be 
rooted in, and to privilege, one cultural area, one ethnic group, one language and one 
local tradition. But full-scale globalization of the newest kind threatens in due course to 
assimilate and swallow up all our received differences of national, religious and ethnic 
tradition. Every great religion everywhere will soon be no more than a tourist attraction, a 
set of local folkways, stuff that (frankly) nobody any longer dreams of taking seriously.”
This kind of anatheism is a recollection of the God who has been forgotten in the Christianity of 
Christendom and of Modernity. It is a recollection without having to adopt the Christian religions. 
We are not seeking to establish or support the Christianity of Modernity as now Catholicism or 
Protestantism on its rational and institutional terms nor the Christianity of Christendom on its Christian-
Aristotelian terms. It is, instead a hermeneutic of retrieval in order to stand alongside the mystics not 
as repeating a rationalised ‘askesis’ toward Christlikeness but as a religion without religion shaped by 
the invitation that is followed by a waiting and longing for the relational presence of God.
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The new era of philosophy follows the 1960s and the-death-of God as a continuing outworking 
of the Copernican Revolution during which science and religion divorced following the-death-of 
metaphysics. Postmodern philosophy comes to agree on Emptiness with Eastern Philosophy following 
Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Yet it also agrees that the dichotomy between empiricism and 
experience and science and religion are no longer serving us as well as they did earlier in Modernity. 
Instead the recognition is that as defined within Modernity we are not able to explore ‘spirituality’, 
‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’ on their own terms. Instead, these have been explored on the terms set 
by one or another, usually Western, group. Hence the collapse of all religions first into Christianity 
and later all religions into Buddhism. Or the reduction of God to a purely subjective experience as a 
projection of human consciousness.
With thinkers such as Cupitt, Caputo and Kearney wrestling with what mysticism ‘is’, they perhaps 
represents the beginnings of a mysticism ‘after’ modernity. Here Cupitt offers a way forward without 
metaphysics, rationalism and a realist understanding of God; Caputo a hermeneutics in agreement 
with Cupitt and Kearney32; and Kearney an anatheism as in a new expression of theism not rooted 
in metaphysics or rationalism but instead in the relational context of the individual in the context of 
their lives.
6.2 GOD-ABSENCE
It would appear that the ‘God after God’ conversations we have explored all share a selection bias, 
albeit one that is understandable and acceptable. Their appraisal of Christianity as devoid of God-
experience is not without merit and it appears that modern Christianity is not seeking to address 
this. These authors all appraise Christianity in light of God’s absence and offer relevant post-theistic 
trajectories in light thereof. Though they do not take into account the prevalent God-experience 
among Christians, it is because Christianity as a whole is not characterised by such. 
6.2.1 GOD-ABSENCE AS SPIRITUALITY
The spirituality of the Essentialist, and even of Christianity, appears to agree that God is not objectively 
real. This is because the objective availability of God is discounted in modern Christianity. As such, 
God’s relational presence as Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) has little to no place in modern Christianity and 
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expression of their faith. They both, then, make God-absence key to their respective expression of 
spirituality.
For Cupitt (1998:4) language “is the interface between subjectivity and the public world. It is with 
language that we construct the inner and outer world”. This is the same for Caputo and Kearney as 
building on Heidegger. Cupitt proposes a/the “religion of Being” (Cupitt 1998:6) and Caputo puts 
forward retrieval of what is traditionalised (Caputo 1987: 96), the repetition of the “reproductive 
process of reactivating the founding acts of the first geometers” (Caputo 1987: ) as less “the way 
historical people ‘dwells’ than “the constellation of art, science, and political arrangements within 
which they live out their lives” (Caputo 1987: 236). There is thus a difference in the way in which life 
is lived out by people in different world(view) s. Caputo’s “play” thus approximates Cupitt’s be-ing 
and be(com)ing and each mirror’s Kearney’s anatheism, which is not surprising given that both work 
from Heideger’s Being and Time (1927) (cf. Tracy in Kearney 2016: loc.220/287). And we wrestle 
with how to get from the way in which life is given to us within a world(view) and therefore the way 
in which we are the subjects of our world(view). Both seek to get us past the world(view) s that have 
determined our world(view) s, as in Christendom and Modernity, to a new way of be-ing as makers of 
a new world(view). The goal is to be like “Meister Eckhart, Kierkegaard and Husserl, Heidegger and 
Derrida” and also Cupitt and Caputo’s “great masters of disruption, of thinking through and thinking 
against the grain of everyday conceptions” (Caputo 1987: 268).
Where Cupitt seeks to rid us of God after our conceptions of God have collapsed, Caputo desires 
that we are rid of our “conceptions which we have devised about God” (Caputo 1987: 268) in order 
that we may be “confronted then with the truly divine God (der göttliche Gott) who refuses to submit 
to this human nonsense” (Caputo 1987: 269). Here we are not supposed to be making the “belief for” 
or “belief against” the focus as in the religions rooted “an intellectual position we take with regard 
to the world, but a way of immersing ourselves in that world” (Rollins 2015: 11). By this Rollins 
means that our beliefs are not the point and that we can assert our beliefs and therewith expose our 
unbelief (Rollins 2012: loc.494/1969). We can let go of whatever ideas we fixate about God “and ‘go 
after’ God again” (Kearney 2016: loc.17/287). According to Kearney (2016:loc.8/287), we can let 
go of the idea of the “... sovereign and divine superintendent of the universe” in order to “enjoy the 
possibility of opening oneself, once again, to the original and enduring promise of the sacred stranger, 
an absolute other who comes as a gift, call, summons, as invitation to hospitality and justice.”
Cupitt moves to a non-realist view of God (Cupitt 2011:890/2281) following on from the-death-of 
God, Caputo toward an “openness” (cf. Caputo 1987) along similar lines to Kearney who offers us 
an ana-theism (Kearney 2010: loc.3/248). Here ana- is a prefix as in “anew” and therewith as “God 
after God” and perhaps better “God after God” (Kearney 2016: loc.6/287) as moving “forward and 
not backward”as a return to God again and after the loss of God (Kearney 2016: loc.7/287).
M.Th. Timothy Victor Student #: 3182-738-1114
Yet Kearney puts into words the fact that we have long been forced to choose between two poor 
options. One is “dogmatic theism”, which Cupitt calls a “nostalgic realist theology” (Cupitt 1984: 
loc.4738/5689) and even militant fundamentalism, and the other an militant atheism” (Kearney 2010: 
loc.3/248). Instead, Kearney offers us a third alternative as “ana-theos, God after God” (Kearney 
2010: loc.3/248), where there is space to play between “anatheistic theism and anatheistic atheism” 
(Kearney 2010: loc.183/248). Kearney (2010: loc.166/248) says regarding anatheism that:
It is not some new religion, but attention to the divine in the stranger who stands before 
us in the midst of the world. It is a call for a new acoustic attuned to the presence of the 
sacred in flesh and blood. It is amor mundi, love of the  life-world as embodiment of 
infinity in the finite, of transcendence in immanence, of eschatology in the now”
To some extent this is a “recalling of the past and anticipating the future” (Kearney 2016: loc.14/287) 
with the acceptance that the “God who has already come is always still to come” (Kearney 2016: 
loc.17/287). In summary, Kearney (2016: loc.17/287) states:
In sum, the anatheist God is one of perpetual departing and arriving, conjoining negative 
capability with constant rebirthing of the divine in the ordinary. For me, this double sense 
of leaving and returning is the heart of the sacred. And it may express itself either spiritually 
(as a general gracious openness to “something more”) or religiously (involving creedal 
commitments and devotions). Anatheism can be either an anatheist theist or an anatheist 
atheist, but whichever one chooses–belief or nonbelief–anatheism remains a wager.”
Between Cupitt and Kearney we move from God-absence in Cupitt’s amnetheism and God-absence 
in Kearney’s anatheism. There is thus a conjunction between the two. The anatheist, however, does 
choose God-absence alone as the substance of their spirituality. If that is the case the, speaking 
practically, there’s no difference between the amnetheist and anatheist. Yet the anatheist does not 
seek an amnetheism, a “forgetting of God” only to remain in the God-absence of modern Christianity 
and have God as “real for me” as predicated upon their heart and mind. The amnetheist does not 
choose to stand in God-absence and make such their spirituality, but instead chooses to let go of God 
completely. The anatheism of Kearney, however, stands in God-absence but does not seek to make its 
home there. The anatheist can respect the value and role of God-absence in the spirituality of others, 
including the Christian and amnetheist. But what’s most important is that the anatheist is open to 
the impossibility of God and therefore vulnerable to the possibility that God may not exist and the 
impossibility that God may. Yet the post-Christian, as in the individual letting go of Christianity of 
modernity with its faith despite and in the face of God-absence, can seek the presence of God for 
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themselves and others. They can seek the presence of the God who has already been present to others 
before Christendom and within it. They can seek the presence of the God who was present to those 
before Christianity as Catholicism and Protestantism and within. As a postmodernist one can readily 
step past or beyond the Christianity of modernity, and therewith stand as post-Christian. Yet one does 
not have to establish their new reality as entirely dependent on the emptiness of the self, society and 
cosmos. One can stand as non-positionally open to God, as inviting God to draw near in Person. 
One can stand alongside those Christian mystics who had a mystical theology in Christendom and 
those who did not in the modern era. There is much room in this new and emerging world(view). It 
can include those who stand between the cracks of the religions and the space in-between as a non-
positional position. And it can also include those who stand after the Christianity of Modernity in the 
same cracks and spaces as non-positionally open to the God who was and is and is to come. Here 
one can choose to stand within Christianity as having great faith with their spirituality inextricably 
bound with God-absence. Yet to choose God’s relational presence is to stand beyond the Christianity 
of Christendom and the modern Christianity that is now Catholicism and Protestantism. It is to stand 
as no-longer-a-Christian as non-positionally open to God.
For the Christian who seeks a Christianity after the Christianity of Modernity (which itself is the 
Christianity after Christendom. We may note the divide in thinking as per Diagram 6.1.1 God-absence 
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Diagram 6.2.1 God-absence in modern thinking
6.2.2 GOD-ABSENCE AS SELECTION BIAS
With the divorce between science and religion following the Copernican Revolution it is easy to 
understand that those deeply co itted to metaphysics are as unlikely to hear those committed to 
empiricism and vice versa. However, their respective specialties and niche languages differ from 
one another. This makes it difficult to translate what either says to the other as the same words can 
carry completely different meanings. As long as one holds to the ‘belief for’ and the other ‘belief 
against’ there is little hope of investigating the ‘experience of’ the transcendent whether impersonal 
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or personal. There is, however, a growing body of material that indicates that there is a selection 
bias among modernists, whether Christian or non-Christian, that keeps us from the actual mystical 
experience reported in a variety of world(view) s.
Szasz explores The Legend of Ulysses in Schizophrenia: The sacred symbol of Psychiatry (1988) 
which we take here to serve as an example of the kind of selection bias we see in the ‘God after God’ 
conversations relying on God-absence.
Szasz refers to the legend of Ulysses overcoming the Cyclopse by convincing a Cyclops to let 
him operate on his eye33. Ulysses tells the Cyclops that his name is “Nobody” and then proceeds to 
blind rather than heal the Cyclops. When the Cyclops shrieks in agony, his fellow Cyclopse call to 
him asking what is wrong. The poor Cyclops, being blinded by Ulysses, responds that “Nobody is 
blinding me!” His fellow Cyclopes consider him crazy, resulting in Ulysses and company escaping 
(Szasz 1988: Loc.447/2364).
List 6.2.2.1 The success of Ulysses/Odysseus on a curious collection of events:
6.2.2.1.1 That the Cyclops understands his name to be “Nobody” and not Ulysses or Odysseus.
6.2.2.1.2 That the semantic structure of the Cyclops’ complaint is received by his fellow 
Cyclopes as “Nobody is blinding me!” rather than, “A man who calls himself Nobody 
is blinding me!” Using Ulysses name would’ve elicited a response from the Cyclopes 
while using “Nobody” in place thereof turns Polyphemus’ cry for help into the absurd. 
Alternatively, had Polyphemus cried out with the latter, it would have not sounded 
absurd. Here there is a clear connection between the language used and a corresponding 
response.
6.2.2.1.3 That the Cyclopes form the judgment solely based on the received report rather than 
checking in on Polyphemus in person. Had any other Cyclops looked for themselves, 
they would have seen the facts differing from the absurdity of Polyphemus’ cry as they 
receive and understand it.
The structure of the above argument applies equally to claims related to any non-empirical experience 
and any empirical argument available is taken to trump phenomena experienced in relation to the 
transcendent.
List 6.2.2.2 Szasz’s logic applied to the problem of God
6.2.2.2.1 When the point of departure is that God “is not” then any God-experience is considered 
absurd 'a priori” as the actual experience is already predetermined as being projection 
and pareidolia. The judgment has already been passed ahead of the exploration of the 
actual data. The phenomena of God-experience are simply not admitted.
33	 In	Homer's	Oddysey,	the	Roman	hero	Ulysses	is	known	by	the	Greek	name	Odysseus.	The	story	differs	only	in	that	the	drunk	
Cyclops	Polyphemus	is	blinded	with	a	wooden	stake	when	passed	out	rather	than	when	operated	on.
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6.2.2.2.2 Claims related to God-experience are, however, naturally tied to the approximation of 
sensory experience. Humans are, after, very much embodied. The result is that 'hearing' 
and 'seeing' are tensioned as analogous-yet-experienced against over-literalised. The 
result is that any meaningful appraisal or evaluation of such experience and phenomena 
become nearly impossible. As such the data is not admitted and excluded on the basis 
of the world(view) of Christendom already having been thrown out and therewith 
God-is-dead and all claims spurious and dubious.
6.2.2.2.3 The report of God-experience is, however, questioned not on the strength or legitimacy 
of the phenomena themselves but rather excluded on the 'a priori' determination that 
any claims related to God “drawing near in person to speak and act” are predetermined 
as absurd. The result is that extroversive experience and practices are excluded as 
legitimate and therewith excluded from the exploration of mysticism. As such, the 
God-experience is not admitted to investigation, is predetermined as absurd, and so 
we never work out how to explore said data and distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate.
The result is that any exclusion of God-experience is not only unwarranted and absurd, but 
predetermined by our inherited worldview. This selection-bias is recognised by many wrestling with 
God-absence and -presence. Such a refusal to admit data is, in fact, “not scientific” on the basis of the 
demands for “scientific proof/evidence”. This selection-bias is recognised by many questing for what 
mysticism ‘is’.
List 6.2.2.3 Countering selection bias in modern thinking:
6.2.2.3.1 Klimo (1988:7) succinctly notes the breadth of data sources for extroversive experience 
of the Transcendent:
   “Channeling, like mysticism, is a phenomenon that has been part of human 
experience as far back as human records go. It appears to be an essential element 
in the origins of virtually all great spiritual paths. It is not just a curiosity of 
current interest based on a resurgence of inner voices, visions, trance seances, 
and automatic writing. Rather, the phenomenon is an important aspect of human 
consciousness a crucial experience for human beings in all cultures and times, 
even though we do not yet understand its origins or mechanisms. As old as 
the phenomenon of channeling is, however, it has always been controversial ... 
because in examining channeling we are dealing with our underlying and often 
unconscious assumptions of the nature of reality.”
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6.2.2.3.2 Essentialism considers primordial theistic experience to be superseded by a-/non-
theistic faith. Hollenback notes that this is a bias against extroversive experience 
with such being viewed as an “inferior type of mystical consciousness” (Hollenback 
1996:Loc.119) which must be superseded by the introversive mysticisms. Hollenback 
views this as “unduly restrictive” and “ethnocentric” (Hollenback 1996:Loc.124). 
Hollenback notes that the mystic’s influences plays a role in how they perceive and 
interpret their experience and participate in the practice of their faith (1996:Loc.96) 
whilst noting that we’ve “paid less attention to the psychological mechanisms that 
cause this close fit between the content of the mystic’s experience and his or her 
underlying theological and mythological matrix” (1996:loc.99).
6.2.2.3.3 Krüger considers such a delimitation as unduly restrictive and seeks an idea-type 
mysticism inclusive of introversive and extroversive practice and experience (Krüger 
2006:271). Krüger (2006:271) seeks to:
   “Include both the (hyper-)active and the extremely passive states of consciousness 
in the concept of ‘mysticism’. I (Krüger) also find that it is unnecessary to pitch 
the ‘constructivist’ and ‘PCE’ approaches flatly against each other, as Forman 
and his team do. They can be coordinated: the kind of topic addressed by 
constructivism/culturalism.”
6.2.2.3.4 Keener34 notes that our modern epistemology is not just restrictive but holds an 'a priori' 
anti-supernaturalism as a criterion of authenticity. The result is the exclusion not only 
of the experience of Christ but also of scientifically and medically verifiable evidence 
supportive thereof, for instance of miraculous healing in the name of Christ.
6.2.2.3.5 Kuhn notes that we have ‘metaphysical paradigms’ or models. Here we find shared 
commitments to such beliefs, but such beliefs are not necessarily shared by scientists 
in different disciplines. For instance, chemistry in the 19th century did not require 
belief in atoms. We are then dealing with preferred or permissible analogies and 
metaphors (Kuhn 1970:184). Here the assumption of theism is “that God is” and that 
of Modernity “that God is not”.
6.2.2.3.6 Deer notes that the commitment to biblical objectivity as though Christianity is solely 
determined by the Scriptures without experience, is considered purely reasonable 
and objective.  Yet, “the truth is, that we tow our brains around behind us to justify 
what we already believe” (Deer 1993:45). We all have reasons why we believe and do 
things, and our Scriptures are only some of these reasons. Sometimes our scriptures 
34	 In	a	public	lecture	in	2017	on	his	book	Miracles:	The	credibility	of	the	New	Testament	accounts,	Volume	1	and	2	(2011)
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ore religions are not even the primary reason for our beliefs or our practices, no matter 
how much we protest to the contrary (Deer 1993:46). Deere (1993: 55) says that:
    "If you lock a brand-new Christian into a room with a Bible and tell him to 
study what Scripture has to say about healing and miracles, he would never 
come out of the room a cessationalist. I know this from my own experience. 
Prior to my conversion at seventeen years of age, I had no training in theology, 
in the Scriptures, or in Christian history. Immediately after the Lord saved me, 
I began to devour the Scriptures. I read them day and night and memorized 
them. When I began to ask my newfound Christian teachers about the miracles 
in Scripture, I was taught that God no longer did these kinds of things through 
human agency. I was taught that the real miracle, the one that really mattered, 
was the conversion of the lost. Since godly people whom I respected told me 
this, and since I saw no miracles in my own experience to counter this teaching, 
I accepted it as true. I gave myself to evangelism and promptly forgot about 
praying for miracles and healings."
 The primary reason why contemporary Christians do not believe in miracles is simply 
that they have not seen them and are taught that they no longer happen. And though no 
cessationist bases their belief on Scripture alone but relies on present and past history for 
supportive evidence. Cessationism is then an argument from the lack of experience (Deere 
1993:55). People often hold to a cessationist position because that is the general consensus 
where they believe and live out their faith.
 A second reason for not believing in miracles is because of the revulsion evoked by the 
misuse, or perceived misuse, of spiritual power in churches and movements. These are, 
however, personal and negative experiences rather than biblical reasons (Deere 1993:56). 
The result is that “the real or perceived absence of miraculous gifts is not an argument from 
Scripture, but an argument from experience” (Deere 1993:58).
Rollins (2012: loc.570/1969) notes that we are addicted to certainty and to belief in God and belief 
that God is not. As soon as we are free of the beliefs, whether “that God is” or “that God is not”, we 
are then free to open to the im-/possibility of God.
As soon as we release ourselves from anti-supernaturalism we’re free to explore the prevalence of 
originating theistic experience. It would seem that during the same period that many are highlighting 
the absence of God-experience that others are noting the prevalence thereof.
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None of these authors can be faulted for not including God-experience. In fact, it would seem that 
Christianity is a faith in crisis, a faith in need of its own God after God conversations. In Chapter 5: 
modern Christianity we have explored Christianity as paradigmatically guided in faith and practice 
by Rationalism. And, as we all know, Rationalism is at odds with experience. The critique above is 
entirely valid wherever Rationalism is the foundation of Christian faith and practice and wherever 
such is disconnected from the relational presence of God. 
To recognise this bias within the secular age is to recognise that there is a systemic ‘if not’ in 
relation to definition what spirituality, religion and mysticism ‘is’. This is partly due to the pluralistic 
context wherein different religions point in different directions. But it is also due to the pluralism 
within religions, meaning that anyone stepping forward to offer an ‘if’ is quickly beaten down not 
only by people of other faiths but also by people within their own faith category. Arriving at what 
mysticism ‘is’ requires overcoming the inherent biases and assumptions of Modernity characterised 
by the divorce between science and religion. And thereafter, overcoming the translation of religions 
from their expression in their respective sacral age to their respective expressions in the secular age. 
And then, one must also overcome the variety of a faith categories expressions within the secular age.
Such revelatory reports related to channeling, empowerment and the charismata as are dismissed 
before admission as data within the secular age. They have been predetermined as fictions and 
reports of such dismissed prejudiciously. Yet there is enough of them to cast doubt on the certainty 
of Modernity. We may not yet have a complete understanding of their neurological and social 
foundations but their continued contributions encourage a review of our Cyclopsean dismissals. As 
modern people reported relying on data and evidence, we should not forget that such was available 
with regard to the geocentrism for around 1700 years prior to the Copernican Revolution. It was not 
the presence of the data but its acceptance that was key. Aristarchus of Samos offered a Heliocentric 
model of the universe in the context of Plato and Aristotle. Yet this new model was deposed based 
on the strength of argument and acceptance of the geocentric model. It is perhaps similarly then that 
the earlier “ekklesia tou theo” as the people who are religious without religion are absorbed into and 
develop the religion of the institutional Church as Christianity. Here a new model of being religious 
is replaced with the accepted model. Perhaps Rome’s greatest achievement over any people is its 
conquering and enduring reign over the Christians within its empire.
However, as explored below, the Christian claim is not to “revelation” as a property of Scripture 
and Tradition but rather to “the revelation as reported in Scripture” as marker or pointer to a specific 
some-One that is self-revealing or manifesting (Šeḵînâ) which means “becoming knowably or relational 
present”. That some-One can be known directly and immediately, and we can distinguish the reliability 
of such experience in relation to this revelation as distinct from a relationship that’s fideistic. If it were 
not for this phenomenological category, presently available and well reported in history, we could readily 
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reconstruct Christianity apart from revelation. However, given the prevalence thereof an investigation into 
originating theistic experience is potentially contributive to Christian spirituality and practical theology.
It would appears that humans have an innate spirituality rooted that’s neurobiologically rooted 
in the very framework of the human being, yet the true substance of spirituality allegedly relates to 
God-absence. And it is in this God-absence that the Eastern and Western mystics are linked together 
through an inward journey where the true self is distinguished from the false self and engaged at the 
internal boundary to transcendence.
What spirituality, religion or mysticism ‘is’ can therefore not be connected solely with transcendent 
or divine Source(s). It appears that humans are capable of being spiritual when practices religion 
without the need for connection with a transcendent Person. In addition, our forebears needed religion 
more than our contemporaries due to their lack of knowledge and capacity for controlling their world 
and livelihood. It appears that humans have evolved cognitively and socially beyond the need for 
religious consolation and direction. Instead, we can develop an entirely this-worldly spirituality 
that’s supported by our religious heritage and not tied to their beliefs just as easily as one that is not 
dependent on such.
It would appear that humans have evolved beyond the need for religion and theism. And even 
those participating in a theistic faith of some kind benefit from religions apart from the reality of their 
respective Source(s). And those that hold to their beliefs and precepts are being reviewed, with many 
God after God conversations fruitfully leading to transformed living whether in keeping or through 
abandoning traditional faith beliefs and practices.
Yet this God-absence relies on selection bias and fails to account for warnings against false prophets 
and false apostles in the long-standing Judeo-Christian faith tradition. In particular, let’s be aware that 
(1) the recognition and admission of God-absence is confessional. Whether reading Kearney, Cupitt, 
Rollins, Krüger or Forman, we are exploring the confessional admission of those wrestling with theism 
and God-absence. And that (2) the review of God-absence is selection bias. Each author’s focus on 
God-absence alone may be accepted as a selection bias guided by the secular world(view), for there are 
numerous claims that may serve as data. This does not, however, reduce their contributions. Instead, 
each shows us how faith and faithfulness is tied to commitment and, whether God ‘is’ or ‘is not’, people 
can live as inhibited or enabled by their faith.
We may model the self-revelation of spiritual beings as per Diagram 6.1.2 Personal revelation below. 
Here Šeḵînâ is properly reserved for God alone and personal revelation becomes a broad category. 
And both God and intermediaries are involved in personal revelation.





























































































































































Diagram 6.2.2 Personal revelation
6.2.3 GOD-ABSENCE AND HERMENEUTIC CONTEXTUALITY
Krüger (2006:1) believes that:
“Religi  has urned out to be the greatest disillusionment of all. The corruption of the 
best of the worst. You have come to a point where all the familiar pious words sound like 
inescapable, deafening noise. You are in need of silence. ....  It is not about religion, at 
least not religion in an institutionalised sense.”
The postmodern person stands not within a world religion that has prov n local with high ambitions, 
regional with global aspirations, and ethnic with the aim of ascending over all the world’s peoples. The 
various crisis related to religion and politics or economics are really all too human, as “manifestations 
of human crisis” (Krüger 2006: 26). The postmodern person stands not only after these religions in 
the aims of humans have failed in their sacral eras but also after the failure of our humanism in the 
hands of people. I  is, perhaps, a “(non-)position” and an “in-between-ness” (Krüger 2006:7). “The 
way – the method – that we follow in these reflections connects the way of silence and the way 
of intellectually and academically informed speech and writing... and it speaks about mysticism” 
generally (Krüger 2006:5).
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But this gap is not only one between religions but also between our experience of Śūnyatā, which 
includes “radical non-substance (anatta) and emptiness (suññata)” (Krüger 2005:22) and Šeḵînâ and 
the problems of language and meaning so well highlighted in Modernity. Yet the modern thinking is 
recent and evolutionary thinking. It understands there to be a problem and that the problem is hard to 
resolve for the insider wholly committed to their faith and the outsider to their non-faith. In essence, 
the problem lies not between the “real” and “non-real” but in the constellation of relationships and 
which star is central. Here our challenge is to get beyond our “belief for” and “belief against” as 
“conceptions we have devised about God” (Caputo 1987:268) in order that we may be “confronted 
then with the truly divine God (der göttliche Gott) who refuses to submit to this human nonsense” 
(Caputo 1987: 269). Here we are not making the “belief for” or “belief against” the focus as in the 
religions rooted in “an intellectual position we take with regard to the world, but a way of immersing 
ourselves in that world” (Rollins 2015:11). Our beliefs and unbeliefs are intensely and integrally 
related and show through in our behaviour (Rollins 2012: loc.494/1969). Here we instead can let go 
of whatever ideas we have about God “and ‘go after’ God again” (Kearney 2016: loc.17;/287). Here 
we can recognise a difference between the expression of the psychological need of our forebears for 
security and ourselves for meaning without having to choose one defined, historical and perspectival 
position or another. The postmodern can, perhaps, even simply agree with Lawrence that “Having 
found in many books different methods of going to God, and divers practices of the spiritual life, I 
thought this would serve rather to puzzle me than facilitate what I sought after” (Cosimo, Inc. 2006: 
loc.153/754). And having so agreed, forego all the world(view) s’ religions and practices and simply 
apply themselves to the pursuit of God – the post-modern ana-theist simply responds to the need, the 
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Diagram 6.2.3.1 Getting inside of the text (hermeneutic contextuality)
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In the diagram above the anatheist in the post-secular world(view) allows for contextuality to facilitate 
the interpretation of writings and events in the secular and sacred world(view) s. In each world(view) 
we access later through texts we must be aware of the transitions from metaphysics to rationalism 
to hermeneutics, of mystical theology to Scripture to exploration, of the transition in meaning of 
experience and the interplay with ‘expérience’, and of the shift from what is conceived as mystical 
experience to renewal to openness.
And though Cupitt moves to a non-realist view of God (Cupitt 2011: loc.890/2281) meaning that the 
ontological essence of God is that God exists only as an idea predicated upon human consciousness, 
Kearney’s ana-theism is a move “forward and not backward” as a return to God again and after 
the loss of God as real (Kearney 2016: 7). This is not to choose between the “belief for God as 
real” or the “belief for God as non-real” either. It is to recognise a split and conjunction between 
“something and nothing – between ‘being’ and ‘not-being’” (Krüger 2006:22). This too is “human 
nonsense” related to Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ and the conditionalism of our world(view) s and temporally 
complicit religions who make universal claims from what we recognise as precarious historical and 
geographic vantage points. It is, instead, to understand that our spirituality, religion and mysticism 
are interconnected. Yet what has lain at the forefront of the constellation has been the religions. With 
them falling down we have replaced our religions with humanisms, only to have them come crashing 
down and threatening to take them with us. With modern science, and Essentialism, our spirituality 
as embodied and practiced comes to the fore. But again, this focuses on the human side to such an 
extent that it comes to eclipse both the religion and the mysticism. Our hermeneutic contextuality 
then recognises a problem with the constellation of spirituality, religion and mysticism and aims to 
recover the mysticism that is lacking in our religion and spirituality. Our mysticism and religion are 
“vitally connected” (Krüger 2006: 9) along with our “meditation” (Krüger 2006: 10) taken to mean 
through the filter of Essentialism as our spirituality. And our contextuality must become a con-text-
uality (context/-uality) and serve as a text alongside the literature texts we draw from for our 'lectio 
divina' as incorporating reflections and meditations. By this we mean not only that we read the great 
literature texts but also the text of our lives, of our times, and of our relationships. Here we engage in 
a slow reading not only of the text but as allowing the text to read ourselves.
The hermeneutic context and hermeneutic contextuality is then about conjunctions and disjunctions 
and about discernment and wisdom for living rather than the historical and personal accruals and 
acquisitions. We may, perhaps, consider Diagram 6.1.3.1 Hermeneutic contextuality above. Here the 
understanding of their conjunction and disjunction is such that we incorporate: (1) the radical non-
substance (anatta) of our religions as world(view) s; (2) the Emptiness (suññata) of the individual; and 
(3) our mysticism as including the transcendent, from our perspective, as impersonal, unknowable and 
substantially non-existent (Śūnyatā) and personal in the sense of drawing near in Person in order to 
know us and be known by us (Šeḵînâ).
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We are then, in terms of conjunction and disjunction, trying not to get to the relationship between 
religions and mystics concepts and their referents as the impersonal and personal transcendent but also 
to the relational engagement and evolution of the individual in light of the impersonal and personal 
transcendent. These concepts are, however, broad and require no small amount of research. The anatheist 






























































































































































Diagram 6.2.3.2 Hermeneutic contextuality
6.3 CONJUNCTIONS AND DISJUNCTIONS
Anatheism encourages a deep retrieval (cf. Caputo) or inner text (cf. Cupitt) understanding of the 
relational presence of God. Such an exploration lies properly beyond the scope of this dissertation, but 
we can make a beginning thereof. Such a retriev  differs to the realistic view of dogmatic theology 
which is rationalistic and disconnected from the experience of God. Yet it differs in that it both agrees 
and disagrees with the non-realist view of God. Here we can recognise that God may serve as an idea 
or ideal and as projection. Yet as such may prove to stand between one and relational engagement 
with God (as fideism) or as enabling a pursuit of Christ akin to what is reported in Scripture. 
6.3.1 THE “EKKLESIA TOU THEO” AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CHURCH
Christianity may be recognised as a banner term for a bewildering complex, diverse and nuanced 
collection of formally constituted and managed communities that share in common an historical 
anchoring in the Jesus-event and His early followers. But the word “church” is inextricably bound 
with Christianity. Yet it is used imprecisely as “an architectural structure, a building... a particular 
body of believers... a denomination, a group set apart by some distinctive” (Erickson 1985: 1026). 
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The question of what the church ‘is’, or what the “nature” of the church is, follows late after the 
Copernican Revolution and Reformation in the 16th century as a recent 20th and 21st century 
phenomenon. Many are convinced that the institutional expressions of Christianity have long departed 
from their “biblical roots” (Viola 1997: 36) and are “seeking new ways to renew and reform the 
church” (Viola 1997: 88). These reflect the calls that led to the Reformation of the 16th century. There 
is the recognition that the “first churches were simple Christian communities; legally speaking, most 
of today’s churches are corporations” (Jacobson 2016: 9). In fact, Halverson (in Jacobsson 2016:8) 
notes that:
In the beginning the church was a fellowship of men and women centering on the living 
Christ. Then the church moved to Greece, where it became a philosophy. Then it moved 
to Rome, where it became an institution. Next, it moved to Europe, where it became a 
culture. And, finally, it moved to America, where it became an enterprise.
The key difference perhaps lies between the church as “persona ficta or fictitious person” that 
“exist[s] in perpetuity” (Jacobson 2016: 161) and incorporates people into itself (Jacobson 2016:164) 
and as the people in whom God is present in the world(view). The images of the church in Scripture 
include “the people of God” (2 Cor. 6:16). “the body of Christ” (1 Cor. 12:27), and the “temple of 
the Holy Spirit” (1 Cor. 3:16-17, 19) (cf. Erickson 1985: 1034-1041). We recognise that though 
the institutional church defines the church in the same manner, that these images are transposed 
onto the institution of the church. And herein lies the problem. To deconstruct the institution of the 
church is often taken to speak against the church as the people of God. With the church following on 
from Pentecost it is inextricably personal and ties the relational presence of God (Šeḵînâ) to people. 
The later establishment of the formal or institutional church following the Edict of Thessalonica 
(380) results in a conjunction between the ‘ekklesia’ and the institutional church. Anamnethēism 
encourages us toward a disjunction between the institutional church and the ‘ekklesia’ and therewith 
a recapturing of the presence of God (Šeḵînâ). All present-day branches, expressions and versions 
of the institutional church are rooted in the continuity between the ‘ekklesia’ as established by 
Christ (following Pentecost) and the Edict of Thessalonica (380) where the formal institution of 
the church comes to define Christianity. And as such, anamnethēism is thus post-Christian and 
pre-Christian. For if Christianity is defined in relation to the institutional church then its a return to 
what Christianity ‘is’ before the institutional church and therewith ‘is’ after the institutional church. 
To speak of the church as constituted in relation to the presence of God (Šeḵînâ) rather than the 
institution encourages a review of the conjunction and disjunction of God’s relational presence to 
the institutional church and what is offered as modern Christian spirituality.
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6.3.2 CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN REFORM
The calls for the reformation of the church is a complex process within Christendom that culminates 
in the third great schism of Christianity. It took place when mounting calls for reform amounted to 
nothing only to steamroll first under Martin Luther (1483-1546) in 1517 and then in Geneva under 
John Calvin (1509-1564). Western Catholicism later reformed within as the Counter-Reformation 
beginning with the Council of Trent (1545-1564) and continuing through the Patent of Toleration 
(1781) and onwards to the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) which defines Western Catholicism 
as it is today.
The Protestant Reformation is, however, the culmination of a grassroots call for Reformation. And 
it is appraised, in retrospect, as a Magisterial Reformation where the governance of the institutional 
church transitioned from Christendom and the Christian-Aristotelian world(view) to the modern 
world(view) and Reason. Yet as both Catholicism and Protestantism, it is Christianity ‘after’ 
Christendom.
The Reformation was enabled by numerous contributions and is itself at least three diverse streams 
that continue in the present.
List 6.3.2 Three streams of the Reformation
6.3.2.1 Magisterial reformation. The reformation is really a Magisterial Reformation wherein 
the institutionalised expression of Christian continues after Christianity as the church 
now under the leadership of Rome as Catholics and the Scriptures as Protestants. At its 
core, the Magisterial Reformation draws on already proven reforms only to retain the 
institutional understanding of the church.
6.3.2.2 Social reformation. The Social Reformation is a critique of and uprising against the 
Reformation, which lost out to the Magisterial Reformers who remained rooted within 
a hierarchical world(view). The renewed call for Reformation by the likes of Viola is, 
perhaps, in keeping with the social reformation and the kingdom of God becomes about 
social justice in this world(view) in and through institutional structures.
6.3.2.3 Spiritual reformation. The Spiritual Reformation asks what had really been 
accomplished with the Magisterial Reformation and wrestles with what Christianity 
‘is’. It looks to the contributions of the Christian mystics leading into the Reformation. 
Thereafter the Magisterial Reformation is quickly critiqued by Pietism following by 
a number of Awakenings/Renewals. These have, however, to date not successfully 
Reformed from the paradigm of the church .
The mystics from around 1300 to around 1500 were enormously influential in encouraging the 
Reform of Christianity in Christendom. These include mystics from Germany, Netherlands, England 
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and Italy (McGinn 2005: ix) who contributed many of the reforms incorporated into Catholicism and 
Protestantism today. McGinn explores the question of whether the reformation marked the end of 
the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern Era or whether it was a co-contributor alongside 
the Renaissance (McGinn 2016:1-3) and related calls to reform the church since the 1400s (McGinn 
2016:4). McGinn (2016:11) notes that:
"Most of the movements associated with what has been called Catholic Reform were 
bottom-up, feeding off religious developments that began in the fifteenth century, such as 
the modern Devotion (devotio moderna) and various renewals of the religious orders. In 
the sixteenth century, Catholic Reform is especially evident in the genesis of new forms 
of religious life designed both to correct the abuses found in established religious orders 
(e.g., the Capuchian reform of the Franciscans) and also to initiate new ways of living the 
gospel in the world. The most important of the latter was the formation of the Jesuit Order 
between the time of the conversion of Ignatius Loyola in 1522 and the order’s gaining 
papal approval in 1540... [yet] Ignatius’ original aims were apostolic and spiritual, even 
mystical in nature."
McGinn understands mysticism to be more significant and present within modern Christianity than 
his exploration is able to demonstrate (McGinn 2016:x). This is partly complicated by the rejection 
of mysticism by Christians, with Adolph van Harnack (18150-193) noting that “Mysticism as a rule 
is Rationalism worked out in a fantastical way, and rationalism is faded mysticism” (in History of 
Dogma, around 1885-1900). Protestantism opposed mysticism “based in part on an inadequate view of 
the mystical element of Christianity, taking it as a monolithic phenomenon based on ‘mystical union’ 
(unio mystica) conceived as a mingling of God and the human creation” (McGinn 2016:4).
In a sense, the unio mystica is not present among or accepted and developed by Protestantism. Nor 
do we find mystical visionaries demarcating the classic process of illumination, purgation and union 
as mainstream forerunners within modern Christianity. This is understandable with the reformation 
resulting in questions of certainty - how to be saved, how to read the Bible, how to locate the true 
church - central throughout doctrinal quarrels from the 16th century onwards (McGinn 2016:15).
But when Christian mysticism is taken not as a continuation of and argument for mystical theology 
but as the desire for relational engagement with God, then we have a hermeneutic tool for identifying 
Christian mysticism whether it involves a mystical theology or not. Within Christendom the monastic 
was schooled into mystical theology and expressed their relationship with God through the language 
and world(view) they were situated within. However, modern Christianity has no mystical theology. 
And therefore, the link between pre-modern and modern mystics lies not in their sharing of a mystical 
theology but in their mutual desire for the relational presence of God. The result is a tension between 
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the mystics and Christendom leading into the Reformation and thereafter first between early modern 
individuals and later movements focusing on the relational pursuit of and engagement with God.
When Christian mysticism is not confined to monasticism and mystical theology and therewith 
phenomenally gifted thinkers pursuing union with God and encouraging others to do the same, then 
Christian mysticism can include poorer thinkers repeating such without the aid of a developed or 
developing mystical theology. Here Christian mysticism can be a mysticism without connection to 
the tradition of Christian mysticism and the heritage of thinking. modern Christian mysticism holds 
Scripture central and the Great Awakenings follow as God after God conversations within modern 
Christianity as a quest for what Christianity ‘is’.
6.3.3 CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM AND PROTESTANTISM
This is between a Christian mysticism without a mystical theology and the Christianity of the 
modern era. Our focus here lies with the Protestants and the mysticism of reformers seen as bringing 
Christianity to life in between periods where the institutional church is devoid of the love of God and 
corrupt and ineffective in the world.
Protestantism benefits enormously from the contributions of Christian mystics.
6.3.3.1 MODERN INDIVIDUALS
There are numerous contemplative individuals who stand out within the modern era, a few examples 
of early modern individuals are included here. This list is by no means complete.
List 6.2.3.1 Examples of modern contemplative individuals:
6.3.3.1.1 Philip Spener (1635-1705) coined the phrase ‘pietism’ in Pia desiderai published in 
1675. Spener’s thinking is surely representative of the Reformation while ahead of 
its time. During a similar period many others contributed a critique of Christianity 
following the Reformation and offered practical solutions. Nevertheless, Spener is 
among those deconstructing Christianity and wrestling for what Christianity ‘is’. 
Pietism may be seen as quickly following on from the Magisterial Reformation as 
evidencing that the desire for God, that God-hunger, is not addressed. Instead, the 
Reformation produces a Christianity that continues with the absence of God and with 
meeting about rather than with God.
6.3.3.1.2 George Fox (1624-1691) developed an experiential approach to Christianity that 
became the Quakers and includes the practice of silent worship. Though not a 
numerically popular movement today, it is an early movement that structured for the 
relational presence of God. It is an example of individuals practice of waiting on God 
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together. It too is a wrestling for what Christianity ‘is’ as seeking to meet with God 
rather than only about God. It is also but one movement among many. These, and those 
that encourage an experiential faith likewise address the God-absence within people 
whose faith is constructed around the absence of God.
6.3.3.1.3 Nicholas Herman (1614-1691), known as the Carmelite Brother Lawrence, was well 
known for his relationship with God. The Practice of the Presence of God is well read 
today. Lawrence is interesting in not being a learned monastic and does not argue 
with the sophistication of an academic mystic. Nevertheless, in a world wrestling for 
what Christianity ‘is’ it is evident that something thereof was recognised far and wide 
in Lawrence. And people are still drawn to Lawrence for insight into the relational 
presence of God.
These individuals35 are perhaps early modern and wrestle not with the philosophical developments in 
Western thinking but with the problems present in Christianity now as Catholicism and Protestantism. 
Their reading of the Scriptures encourages a quest for what Christianity ‘is’ and they arrive at the 
relational presence of God along with the mystics preceding them in Christendom.
6.3.3.2 MODERN MOVEMENTS
In addition to the contemplative individuals above there are large-scale happenings within modern 
Christianity tied directly to the immediate presence of God. These are all enabled by Modernity and 
by the movement of people in the modern era.
List 6.2.3.2 Modern awakenings
6.3.3.2.1 The First Great Awakening (1730-1755): Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), George 
Whitfield (1714-1770) and John Wesley (1703-1791) led the First Great Awakening 
throughout the thirteen colonies predating what is now North America. They built on 
the foundation of Puritanism, Pietism, Anglican Orthodoxy and Presbyterianism to 
transcend denominational boundaries and emphasised the providential outpouring of 
the Holy Spirit.
6.3.3.2.2 Second Great Awakening (1790-1840): Charles Grandison Finney (1792-1875) is 
considered the father of modern revivalism. The primary movement was through England, 
Scotland and Germany. Contemporary dispensationalism, Adventism, restorationism, as 
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6.3.3.2.3 Third Great Awakening (1855-1930): The result was the Social Gospel Movement, 
the Holiness Movement, the Nazarene Movement, and Christian Science. The abolition 
of slavery is linked to this Awakening.
6.3.3.2.4 Fourth Great Awakening (1960-1980): Though not universally recognised as a 
'great awakening', revivals during this period include Pentecostalism, the Charismatic 
Movement, and the Empowered Evangelicals. Each can be differentiated from the other 
but share in common the pursuit of an immediate engagement with God. Overall these 
movements contributed toward the ecumenism of the last century and the empowerment 
of lay/non-professionals as leaders in the institutional church and mission.
These movements cover the full range of the modern period after the individuals preceding them. They 
are, in effect, a large-scale expression of mysticism in relation to Šeḵînâ. Here we have contemplative 
preachers as people who have stood in the presence of God now preaching to others. They call people 
out of the world(view) divided between secular and religious. And they call people out to become the 
‘ekklesia’ from among people who are church-goers and among those that are not. Here we see a clear 
tension between the institutional expression of Christianity wherein the church is necessary and the 
Word of God sufficient and the relational presence of God. modern Christianity as Protestantism may 
be seen as divided or conflicted over the relational presence of God.
In Diagram 6.2.3.2 Time line of Renewals in the modern era of Christianity we note the schisms 
of the institutional church and the recent expression of what is considered as the renewal of the 
institutional in the secular age.
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Diagram 6.3.3.2 Time line of Renewals in the modern era of Christianity
6.3.3.3 THE DUALISTIC MYSTICAL STATE AND THE CHRISTIAN
There is certainly a shared introspective practice among the world’s religions wherein meditation plays 
a prominent role in the maturation of the mystics. We may thus accept meditation as an authentic and 
essential component of mysticism. Yet limiting mysticism to such alone is problematic, in particular 
because the notion of ‘revelation’ as in Šeḵînâ is rejected and replaced with a subjective and conditional 
interpretation of an experience. Yet, according to Shear (2006: xiii) the practice thereof is diverse.
“In modern English, the word “meditation” denotes two distinct types of mental activity. 
The first is that of thinking deeply about some topic. The second is that of practicing a 
procedure to allow the mind to leave all thoughts behind, experience its own inner source, 
and emerge refreshed, revitalised, and even transformed. This book is about ‘meditation’ in 
the latter sense.”
In this sense Shear’s exploration of mysticism helps differentiate meditation as the pursuit of Šeḵînâ 
as differentiated from Śūnyatā. And though Christians make equal use thereof we cannot reduce the 
Christian experience to Emptiness alone. The Šeḵînâ plays a prominent role not only in Scripture but 
also among contemporary Christians. Here, by way of example, we may consider a wide range of 
reports as data and leave epistemological concerns till later consideration.
Shear (2006L xvi-xvii) notes that there are significant differences in how meditation is used:
“Thus traditional meditation procedures can differ with regard to the mental faculties 
they use (attention, feeling, reasoning, visualization, memory, bodily awareness, etc.), the 
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way these faculties are used (effortlessly, forcefully, actively, passively), and the objects 
they are directed to (thoughts, images, concepts, internal energy, breath, subtle aspects 
of the body, love, God). They also often differ strongly with regard to how they relate to 
questions of belief. Some systems emphasise the need to hold particular philosophical, 
metaphysical, and/or religious views; others emphasise complete independence of all 
matters of belief. Different meditation traditions also often have very different goals, 
ranging from physical health and mental well-being to harmony with nature, higher 
states of consciousness, and experience of God. In short, even cursory knowledge of 
the many different mental activities, objects, contexts, and attitudes used by the world’s 
major meditation procedures makes it clear that it is a mistake to regard all these diverse 
procedures as being essentially the same.
Recognizing these differences is thus essential to understanding the procedures themselves. 
It is also necessary to understanding the significance of the considerable body of research 
on meditation.”
When contextualizing meditation we may agree on the contemplative universals with regard to the 
individual’s maturation and consciousness but such does not, inherently and of necessity, exclude 
Šeḵînâ. Here the Constructivists request that we responsibly interpret the great mystics rather than 
commit eisegetical crimes, the reading into the text of what we believe it ought to say. Here the 
Essentialists encourage us to go beyond the comparison of texts and experiences reported therein 
that may be interpreted as the same (Forman 1999:48). We may interpret the Personal Consciousness 
Event as a neo-Advaitan confirmation of Samādhi (Forman 1999:47-48). This does not immediately 
discount the experience of Christian mystics on the basis of such experience also being reported by 
them. In a similar sense to which Forman’s neo-Advaitan experience confirms Samādhi so too does 
the contemporary Christian’s experience of the Holy Spirit perhaps confirm Šeḵînâ.
There are numerous sources for the investigation of Šeḵînâ today. Some of these are noted in 
publications with the practice of “waiting on God” in Vineyard Churches (https://vineyard.org/), the 
New-Wine Movement (https://www.newwinemovement.com/), and the Alpha Course (https://www.
alpha.org/) contributing a broad and balanced practice that we may investigate further.
This practice is presently used as a support for the Christianity of Modernity, but as the essential practice 
is mystical it may be tied to followers of Christ preceding Christianity as Orthodoxy, Monasticism, 
Christendom, and more recently within the modern Era as Catholicism and Protestantism.
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6.3.4 SILENCE AND SOLITUDE
Christian mysticism as synoptic differs from Christian spirituality as modern based on whether 
the inter-locutional point of departure and return is the relational presence of God wherein the 
contemplative as monastic or preacher reflects Christ or the goal is the pursuit of Christlikeness in 
character and as formative spirituality. By ‘locutional’ here we have in mind ‘locution’ as in hearing 
the voice of God whether audibly or within the inner-senses. This is, however, not limited to hearing 
alone but to the full range of human senses.
Both Christian spirituality and Christian mysticism have in common the practice of withdrawing to 
solitude and resting, reflecting and meditating in silence. And both share an understanding of God’s 
silence and absence, but the role thereof is remarkably different.
In Christian mysticism there is an understanding that God is to be sought not as an idea and not 
given life as psycho-social construct, but as a Person. For each of the mystics and preachers mentioned 
above speak of God not as symbolic appreciation of a personal consciousness event (cf. Forman) or 
a deep perception of Śūnyatā as the Emptiness of the self, but as the inner silence and emptiness 
wherein God speaks. This is the inner silence and emptiness where the mystic arrives as freed from 
the world(view) and the social self as defined by, within, and in relation to their world(view).
Christian mysticism holds to relational engagement with God as locutional point of departure and 
return. The silence and solitude of the mystic is the locutional point of departure and return intersecting 
with the God’s absence and presence and God’s silence and voice.
What sets Christian mysticism apart from formal Christianity and Christian spirituality, even 
modern contemplative spirituality is the role of experience. And this is not just any experience, say 
the experience of God in relation to God as idea. It is instead experience in relation to God as a Person 
and therefore a relational experience and a relational spirituality. Here the experience of God breaking 
into the life of the mystic-to-be defines and provides a benchmark for God’s voice and presence. And 
through ‘askesis’, modern devotion or ‘lectio divina’ service to others in and beyond the church, they 
are tuning into the presence, activity and voice of God. These in turn become points of exploration and 
pursuit that stand as less important and meaningful apart from the locutional presence of God. Here 
the mystic and mystic-to-be undertakes an inner and inward journey distinguishing their hidden self 
from their social self. Here the authentic self is both the hidden and social self in relation to oneself, 
others and God. Yet in pursuing God they shed relational barriers in their lives to be with God.
Here we find the same elements of ‘askesis’, modern devotion or ‘lectio divina’, and service in and 
through the church as mystics, believers and contemplatives. This results in a renovation of the heart 
for each and everyone and, to some degree, a measure of greater and lesser compunction enabling the 
processes of purgation and illumination and even union with God whether real or non-real. Yet it is not 
in the presence of these as habits or activities but their constellational configuration. The paradigm of 
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the modern contemplative differs to that of the mystic and mystic-to-be because the former is focused 
on character formation toward Christlikeness and the other on spending time with God.
Here Christian mystics differ from Christians as believers and church goers and those who go 
that bit extra to adopt contemplative spirituality. And though the latter contemplative may transition 
toward a mystic-to-be, this is not necessarily their goal. And in the church paradigm the real presence 
of God is collapsed entirely and mysteriously into Eucharist and Word of God apart from experience, 
meaning apart from relational pursuit and engagement. These activities which are all important to the 
church become useful but not necessary and can in no way be conceived as sufficient for the mystic. 
Where the relational presence of God is collapsed so completely into the offers of the church by the 
church and God is known by faith, or rather known about, the mystic can include the Liturgy and 
Eucharist of Catholics or the Worship and Message of Protestants into their ‘askesis’ as practices 
wherein they seek the relational presence of God.
Gregory the Great would recognise the Word as enabling a glimpse of God and the imitation of 
Christ as a necessary pursuit of God (McGinn 1994:52). Yet argue that the presence of the Spirit 
is God’s immediate and internal relational presence (McGinn 1994:53). And therewith the mystic 
knows God relationally and experientially (McGinn 1994:58) making the faith as in the fideism of 
modern Christianity into something quite different to the faith of Gregory.
When considering the anatheistic or ‘God after God’ conversations we recognise that Cupitt’s serves 
amnetheistically and Kearney’s and Caputo’s anatheistically. But with the Christian mystics we discover 
that the anatheistic question is one that returns not only after Modernity but has returned before Modernity. 
Here the importance of solitude and silence in relation to the self  plays out very differently between the 
believer and the mystic or mystic-to-be. Thus, an important nuance emerges in terms of how ‘askesis’ 
is constellationally constructed within their world(view) as subculture within the world(view) of, say, 
Christendom or modern Christianity. For the believer is able to submit to religion and cognitively agree 
with all the creeds of the faith and all the practices and devotions while forgetting completely about God. 
The Christian theist as fideist and dogmatic theist can then practically stand as a practical atheist; the 
atheist as fideist and dogmatic atheist can equally stand as a practical atheist; the anatheistic atheist and 
anatheistic theist may, however, stand together as mystic-to-be to whom the question of God returns. As 
such, anatheism is an anamnethēism when considering Christianity mysticism. Where the absence and 
silence of God defines God for the believer it is God’s relational presences that defines God’s silence 
and absence for the mystic. And though both make use of solitude and silence in mimicking Christ, they 
make use thereof toward completely different objectives.
We then recognise a difference between the mystic’s expérience of God’s silence and absence and 
their expérience of their own self within that silence and solitude as compared to the believer. The 
mystic experience of such is in relation to God as having drawn near in Person. This results in a 
locutional departure from and return to God’s relational presence. God’s silence and absence evokes 
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a deep longing after God within the mystic and is locutionally defined by God’s having been present, 
by God having spoken and by God having touched. The mystic as having known God as lovingly 
and reciprocally present, comes to recognise that there is nothing that can satisfy their longing for 
more of God’s relational presence. And having come to realise this, they’ll pursue God no matter 
the cost and are willing to do so not only to the end of their world but even to the end of their very 
self, transition from an outward contemplation in action toward an inner contemplation and moving 
between the two. And they’ll later come to stand within their inner and hidden self within a solitude 
and silence as one having journeyed as far as they’re capable to stand now stripped naked of their 
social self down to their hidden self as standing humble, vulnerable and expectant that God will 
draw near. And here there is nothing that can satisfy as substitute for this longing deep inside, no 
further point they can journey, and nothing else they can do or achieve or say or offer. Stripped of 
everything their spirituality transitions from a trade and counter-trade. They offer everything and are 
abandoned deeply by God and to God. They are defeated by love to return to love. And it is here that 
they speak of Silence speaking and of Nothing as everything and Love as truly indescribable. And it 
is here, standing in a deep silence that Silence speaks from beyond Emptiness, from beyond Śūnyatā, 
from beyond ‘Nihilo’. In the thinking of Eriugena, Silence speaks from beyond Śūnyatā as Šeḵînâ 
and ‘proodos’, as coming forth from Silence and Nothingness to enfold the mystic into Godself, into 
Śūnyatā and ‘Nihilo’, as ‘epistrophe’ as returning to and as reclamation of the mystic into intimate, 
transcendent and eternal relational union. When leaving silence and solitude as having been returned, 
the mystic journeys as one forever redefined by a deep, intimate and abiding relational union having 
not only been radically impacted by ‘proodos’ and ‘epistrephe’ but as God relationally seated within 
the depths of their very self.
But as the believer has never experienced God’s relational presence to begin with they cannot 
recognise God’s silence and absence for the enriching poverty that it is. And how does the believer and 
speculative mystic evaluate silence? For the believer, God’s silence is not defined in relation to God’s 
voice or absence to presence or love to touch. For the believer’s God is valuable only inasmuch as 
serving to enable, inspire, guide and discipline through faith as correlated by projection, coincidence 
and even pareidolia. Where absence and silence serve as important markers in the mystic’s spirituality 
evoking deeper desire, such serves the believer as the solipsistic point of departure and return. We 
must recognise that for the believer, as typified here, that God has always been silent and absent and 
will always be. The believer’s God is dead in the sense of the-death-of God as not only silent and 
absent, but as never having existed to begin with. This is not to say that the relationship is not real, 
but to recognise that God is non-real. God can then only be seen and heard indirectly through the 
mediation of the church and found by faith somehow and mysteriously as present in the Eucharist and 
Word of God. God’s silence is however not the silence of one that has fallen silent, absence as one 
recognised as no longer present, love as no longer being shared. Instead, the silence of the believer’s 
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God is that of a mute, deaf and absent idol birthed in faith and raised entirely within the heart and 
mind of the believer as imaginatively constructed, even if such a construction is accurate in relation 
to Word and Eucharist as faith-paradigms within the church. For the mystic relates to God as a Person 
even as the believer relates to God as an idea, and so we should perhaps speak of God with an upper 
case “G” for the mystic or even as nothing between as “ “ and a lower case “g” for the believer or 
replace it with a more accurate “idol”.
Thus, there is a locutional conjunction between Word, Eucharist and Contemplation as tied to 
God’s relational presence for the mystic. Therefore the mystic cannot be content with the Word as 
Eucharist alone or the Message as Word alone. The mystic will be left longing for God’s relational 
presence no matter how immersed and invested in Word, Eucharist and Contemplation. They will be 
found wishing for God to disrupt the monotony of such religious and contemplative life by arriving 
in Person, for they have been taken in by Contemplation and not taken on contemplation. And though 
the mystic’s virtuous habits may be mirrored by the believer, surely even yielding the Christlikeness 
treasured by the church as the fruit of character confirming discipleship and validating leadership. 
But their response to God remains untested. How will they respond when God draws near? Will they 
run and hide in fear and shame or stand before God in fear and shame? An absence-only faith finds 
contentment in church services and the services of the church to others and does not want for the 
voice, touch and presence of a God who is silent and absent. Here the believer may go to church to 
receive the Word of God as mediated by Eucharist and message and understands God to have been 
received and met with in faith and in faith alone rather than experience, and even that they please 
God by all their good works and are declared righteous in God’s eyes by their saving faith in Christ.
There is thus a conjunction between the Spirit, Scripture and the ‘ekklesia’ as the people of God 
found within the church for the mystic and yet a corresponding disjunction. Here the relationship is 
as a constellation where the brightest star completes the constellation and draws it together. Here it 
is God that defines not the church as necessary but God’s relational presence; not the Tradition or 
Scriptures as sufficient but only God’s relational presence; and not the Eucharist and Word as hosting 
the presence of God but only God’s relational presence as experienced in Person.
The believer differs to the mystic in that the church is primary whether Catholic or Protestant. In 
fact, the very notion of the ‘ekklesia’ along with everything associated therewith is transposed over to 
the church. This is because the church is viewed as Christ’s body in keeping with the Fall-Redemption 
paradigm perhaps more associated with the “fall” of Jerusalem and Rome and Christendom. Mystical 
theology is more in keeping with the primary meaning of revelation in revelation theology as the 
relational presence of God that the special revelation of Christian theology.
The challenge for the mystic lies in their own shift from a non-real relationship with God as 
fiction to a relational spirituality including God’s presence, meaning God as one who draws near 
and withdraws from the mystic. This shift is complicated for the anamnethēist. Here the Christ of 
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Christianity can easily be a projected Jesus predicated upon a personal world(view) itself predicated 
on a host and secular world(view) and a hosted and religious world(view). The non-Christian may 
be viewed as born (natural birth) into a world(view) and “born again” (spiritual birth) into the 
world(view) of the institutional church and here Christ is “received by faith”. The Christian may 
be viewed as born (natural and spiritual birth) into a family and church and later confirmed in the 
institutional church with the “saving faith” shifting from the parent to the child. Yet, neither parent 
nor child may experience the relational presence of God. Instead, such a “secondary experience” is 
considered unnecessary and undesirable. Such an experience sets the “faith” of the mystic apart from 
the “faith” of the believer. How is the Christian raised in the world(view) of their family and religion 
to understand such an experience or make of it? Set within a modern world(view) where Christianity 
is defined by rationalism such an experience is not encouraged, sought or trusted. Here the mystic is 
assured that “feelings” and “experiences” are neither reliable nor enduring and therefore one shifts 
their trust to faith. We thus find a tension between Christianity as the host-world(view) to Christian 


































Diagram 6.3.4 Silence and solitude as practices for the mystic and believer
36	 There	is	certainly	room	to	explore	this	in	relation	to	Christendom	as	well	as	Catholicism	and	Protestantism.	The	reader	is	
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In Diagram 6.3.4 Silence and solitude as practices for the mystic and believer below we visually 
represent the difference between believer and mystic as explored here. Here we note that God may be 
experienced sub-consciously and consciously in Person and through intermediaries. These may all fall 
under the banner of Šeḵînâ. Yet here there is a difference between the believers very real relationship 
with God understood to be real and the real relationship with the Šeḵînâ where God is understood as 
non-real. There is thus an interplay between real as non-real and non-real as real that is philosophically 
complex in relation to their experience as tied to ‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’.
6.4 A PROPOSED MODEL
The ‘God after God’ conversations here include the philosophers, Essentialists, modern Christians, 
Christian mystics and anatheists. It recognises a difference between world(view) s, the complexity of 
religious diversification, and the return of the question of God anew and afresh of the modern era and 
Christianity as Catholicism and Protestantism therein. Yet it also recognises the difference between 
‘spirituality’, ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’. This leaves us with diverse and complex streams of conversation 
and thinking. Can we put them together?
Respecting the conjunctions and disjunctions we have all too briefly considered above, and the various 
threads explored in this dissertation, an anatheistic model is proposed below. It is both post-Christian 
and post-Buddhist in the sense that they are expressed variously in their respective sacral ages and the 
complex and plural secular age and modern era.
In Diagram 6.4 Silence, solitude and the transcendent below we attempt to do exactly that. We 
distinguish between: (1) the idea of God as existing entirely within the individual by faith and being itself 
non-real (annata); (2) the God of faith as distinguished from the becoming present of God (Šeḵînâ) and 
experienced through the internal senses; (3) the various kinds of Emptiness in relation to world(view) s 
(annata) with associated institutions and ideas, the person (suññata), and the Cosmos itself as space-time 
continuum (Śūnyatā). In the latter case, the mystic there is an interplay between the idea of God and 
the relational presence of God. Here God’s silence and absence plays a similar role in the believer and 
mystic. Yet this also differs between the two as the locutional presence and activity of God establishes 
a contrast within the mystic. Therefore the importance of Emptiness in the Christian mystic (Śūnyatā) 
should not be taken to exclude the relational presence of God (Šeḵînâ) by the Essentialist.
likely	well	familiar	with	the	tension	between	Christianity	and	the	Awakenings	within	Protestant	thinking	and	the	controversy	
of	the	Revivals.	These	are	rich	grounds	for	further	exploration.






















































of world(view)s as hosts and hosted
Traditional religion (sacral) and modern society (secular)
no longer determine answers for
the returning question of God.
Religion
Religion continue as framework
offering certainties concerning “God”.
Religion continues as institutions
and not-for-profit businesses.
Religions diversifiy and adapt in various ways





vitally  important for “real”
relationship with the transcendent God.
Such experiénce
is attained through Askesis.
2. “God”
Experiénce critiques between options of “real” relationship
with “not real god(s/-ess/esses)/God(s/-ess/esses)”
which the religions continue trying to provide in the
secular age.
3. “Self” and “not self”
Emptiness (suññata) of social/false self and
renewal as imago dei as private/authentic self.
These are, however, united in the same person
distinguishing the self as derived within and from
their world(view) and as re-newed through a
relationship with Šeḵînâ.
6. “Self” in Sacral Age
Here the person is given their place
in society and family with little
opportunity and freedom.
7. Prehistory
The longer and legacy stories
of how each sacred world(view)
came to be what they were.
A. The Sacral Age
The world(view) wherein everything is unified, usually under a
religious/spiritual framework. Here we understand
that the sacral age of each world(view) exists in isolation and
apart from the challenges of the future secular
and pluralistic age.
B. Transition
The catalytic transition from a sacred
to a secular society wherein the religions
continue as institutions and not-for-profit
businesses.
C. Secular Age
The catalytic transition from a sacred
to a secular society wherein the religions
continue as institutions and not-for-profit
businesses. Here there is a diversity
of world(view)s and people commute
between them while internalizing
their own world(view).
D. Thee Postsecular Age
A new people enabled by the secular age
to rise above their world(view)s toward
a global world(view) and draw
on the world’s heritage toward
the pursuit of the transcendent.
The secular age is itself a meta-world(view)
and host to sacral-world(view)s.
4. “Self”
The “self” is given by religious hosted
world(view) and society as host world(view)
which the individual commutes between.
5. “Faith”
Here faith is fideism as the commitment
to belief that “God is” or “God is not”
without corresponding experience
or empirical evidence.
Within a secular society the individual
is given a lot of choice with regard to







Diagram 6.4 A proposed model 
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6.5 CONCLUSION
Allowing the question of God to return on its own terms and afresh after the ‘God after God’ 
conversations offers an opportunity to integrate Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ.37 It encourages us to leave behind 
the sacral world(view) of Christendom and the secular world(view) of Christian rationalism to recover 
what Christianity ‘is’ as tied to the relational presence of God (Šeḵînâ). We furthermore need not choose 
between the religions as constructed in the past and a secular atheism. We can instead distinguish 
between the  institutional and experiential dimension within the religions and even secularism. And in 
embracing a first-person present continuous openness to the im-/possiblity of God we can invite God to 
drawn near in Person. Here various ‘askesis’, as practices and habits, related to Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ, can 
be drawn on. This is particularly necessary as the recognition of Emptiness finds agreement between 
Eastern and Western thinkers. This itself enables an ancient-present critique of theism as fideism and 
encourages a post-Christian and post-Buddhist recovery of Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ. Such an integration is, 
however, not foreign to Christianity. A hermeneutic exploration of Christianity enables the recognition 
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Inconclusion
This dissertation has been a thought experiment enabling us to build a model of spirituality, religion and 
mysticism for those to whom the question of God returns. It is intended to provide an orientation for 
those choosing anatheism as a third option, as not having to choose between a traditional religion and a 
modern atheistic secularism. Here various ‘God after God’ conversations have developed over time in 
relation to the-death-of God and following the divorce between science and religion in the Copernican 
Revolution. Yet the question of God returns again, afresh and anew on its own terms. And it returns to 
people who want-to-be a mystic today, who are often caught between the religious and secular and the 
gravity of the world(view) s. Here we have but begun to understand the complex conversations a mystic-
want-to-be may become lost within. A new ‘God after God’ conversation is in the early stages and will 
need to dialogue with the ‘God after God’ conversations of the modern philosophers, Essentialists, 
and Christians. These all overlap and yet become quite specialised in terms of the problems they focus 
on. Yet those to whom the question of God returns today is after these conversations. This makes it 
a challenging question in that it is strongly challenged by religious and secular world(view) s, yet it 
challenges these world(view) s less than it challenges the want-to-be mystic.
In Chapter 3: modern philosophy, we developed an understanding of how we see the world and 
the world we live in becomes our world(view). This enabled us to develop a model of a world(view) 
and work toward accepting three key, and consecutive, world(view) s as sacral, secular and post-
secular. Of vital importance is the understanding that religious world(view) s are not replaced in the 
changeover from sacral age to secular age, but instead diversify within the family and society. This 
provides a hermeneutic contextuality enabling a distinction between the expression of spirituality, 
religion and mysticism in the sacral, secular and post-secular age. Key developments in the thinking 
of modern philosophers draw on the-death-of God to develop a non-real understanding of God. 
This non-realism carries implications for our understanding of our selves, our world(view) s, and 
the Christian God-concept rooted in metaphysics and then in rationalism. This leaves us with the 
understanding that our God-concepts can play a significant role without our experiencing God as real. 
The ‘God after God’ conversations among modern philosophers help us understand that we can have 
a real relationship with a non-real God-concept, that we can relate to God as an idea.
In Chapter 4: modern mysticism, we explored ‘God after God’ conversations following the-
death-of God in relation to the pluralism of God-concepts. We understand that early essentialism 
sought to understand religion as a phenomenon. Two trajectories develop from the work of the early 
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essentialists: (1) the Constructivists concerned with issues in the work and conclusions of the early 
essentialists; and (2) the Essentialists who identify shared practices and a shared experience common 
to theistic (personal) and non-theistic (impersonal) mysticism. However, the Essentialist collapse 
personal mysticism entirely into their understanding of impersonal mysticism. This is perhaps as 
confessional and biased as it is helpful. It is also, perhaps, fair in light of modern Christianity where 
notions of revelation appear to share more in common with Essentialism than distinguish itself as 
personal mysticism.
In Chapter 5: modern Christianity, we explored and modelled the Christian world(view) s and 
its development from consecutive eras and institutional expressions of the Christian faith. This 
enables us to understand how Christianity in Christendom relies on and is near synonymous with 
the Christian-Aristotelian world(view). Yet what Christianity is following Christendom is near 
synonymous with the rational world(view) of the secular age. Here modern Christianity succeeds 
Christendom as Catholicism and Protestantism. On the foundation of understanding the institutional 
church to be necessary for Christians is added the sufficiency of Tradition and Scripture respectively 
to Catholics and Protestants. Here the real presence of God is collapsed into the services and services 
of the institutional church, perhaps specifically the Eucharist to Catholics and the Word of God to 
Protestants. Yet this God is only accessed by faith in and through the institutional church and not 
relationally or experientially. The notion of God’s Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) becomes reserved for 
special revelation as tied to Tradition and the Word of God but not to one’s practice of Christianity. 
And though a God-hunger is increasingly prevalent and the institution of the church challenged, 
in various ways throughout Christian history and today, these are sub-cultures within the broader 
faith. The faith is not paradigmatically defined by alternatives. It is, primarily, an institutional faith 
supported perhaps solipsistically and rationally. And though a modern spirituality is offered as drawn 
from the Christian mystics, neither their mystical theology nor their expectation of an immediate 
experience of God’s Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ) is offered. Instead, it is only their practices that are taken 
as character formation toward Christlikeness. modern Christianity, as ‘God after God’ conversation, 
supports the Essentialist hypothesis.
In Chapter 6: Anamnētheism, we recognised three kinds of ‘God after God’ conversations 
under the umbrella of Kearney’s anatheism: (1) anatheism as amnetheism, as the forgetting of God 
following the-death-of God and metaphysics; (2) anatheism as allowing the question of God to return, 
as recognizing the it returns anyway, and allowing it to do so on its own terms and afresh. Here there 
is no need to choose between a dogmatic theism rooted in a sacral age and world(view) or a secular 
anti-theism and atheism rooted in a secular age and world(view). Instead, one can pick a third option 
as repeating religion without religion; and (3) anatheism as anamnētheism, as remembering that God 
has been forgotten and recovered within Christianity and setting out to understand and do so as our 
selves without institutional reliance and support. In this latter sense we draw on the ‘God after God’ 
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conversations to enable a hermeneutic for drawing a model of spirituality, religion and mysticism that 
prioritises the individual in relation to the transcendent over the religions as conditional world(view) s. 
In anamnētheism we get past the religions to do it all again, afresh and anew.
The ‘God after God’ conversations are then one-part informed reflection as participant-observer in 
the Christian faith and another part a natural step toward a Christianity after the Christianity of the 
secular age as Catholicism and Protestantism. It is perhaps both foundationally secular and sacrally 
pluralistic in a way that may make sense as drawing together practices enabling relational engagement 
with the transcendent beyond ourselves and the horizon of our world(view) s as Śūnyatā and Šeḵînâ.
There is, literally, a world of difference between the diverse sacral world(view) s that precede their 
convergence in the secular age. Here a shift takes place from people living in a world that is religious 
and a world you retreat from to religious spaces and activities. We are challenged to understand this 
change and the implications thereof. We have had to develop a perspective that is broader than a 
single world(view) focused on the secularization of their religious world and the challenges of foreign 
religions. Here an understanding of world(view) s helps shift the focus to the development as a shared 
concern equally relevant to those who are religious and those who are not.
This work is informed reflection of someone seeking an understanding of the ‘God after God’ 
conversations in the secular age for those commuting between sacral, secular and post-secular 
world(view) s. It is for a person wrestling with the conjunction and disjunction between the ‘belief in’ 
and ‘belief against’ God and the absence and presence of God, yet who wishes to experiment through 
practices with themselves. Here a loose distinction was drawn between ‘spirituality’ as related to 
the individual, ‘religion’ as social institution, and ‘mysticism’ as related to the experience of the 
transcendent as ‘impersonal’ (Śūnyatā) and ‘personal’ (Šeḵînâ). The transcendent, and our exploration 
thereof, is here opened as Śūnyatā or Šeḵînâ to the individual through intentional practices, habits and 
a personal development (askesis).
Further work needs to be done. But at a basic level this has enabled us to propose a model including: 
(1) world(view) s, the transition from sacred to secular to post-secular in relation to world(view) s and 
religions; (2) and the real relationship between God as non-real and the transcendent as Śūnyatā or 
Šeḵînâ. This has enabled us to explore the absence of God following the-death-of God as carrying 
over into the thinking of modern philosophers, early essentialists, Constructivists and Essentialists, and 
modern Christianity as a kind of rationalism disconnected from the relational experience of God as God’s 
Self-revelation (Šeḵînâ). Yet in opening to the returning question of God within Christianity, it perhaps 
contributes toward developing a Christianity and Christian spirituality after modern Christianity.
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